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ABSTRACT 
 
Although it has been readily acknowledged that regional economic growth and structural changes 
can directly affect land use patterns within the regions, little is known about the inverse: how a 
change or intervention in land use influences regional economic performance.  Does land use 
planning or regulation promote a region’s economic well-being?  Alternatively, does this action 
raise barriers to development and thus slow the pace of economic growth or progress?  Under 
what circumstances and how can we promote the potential contribution and/or minimize 
unexpected economic consequences of government interventions in land use? 
 
This dissertation research consists of the following three related studies that analyze the 
implications of land use planning and regulation for regional economic performance.  The first 
study empirically examines the potential negative effects of strict land use regulations on local 
housing supply and household residential mobility.  The second study looks at the potential 
contribution of land use planning to uncertainty reduction and the economically efficient use of 
land.  The third study assesses the macroeconomic effects of reactive land use regulations, 
implemented by some suburban communities in the Chicago metropolitan area, using a new, 
improved simulation model.  It is expected that the overall research provides better insights into 
the connections between regional economic shifts and land use changes and will eventually 
contribute to a more systematic coordination of land use policies and economic development 
initiatives. 
 
1) Land Use Regulation and Intraregional Population-Employment Interaction  
Land use regulation often delays the development process and increases the cost of development, 
although it may contribute to addressing market failures and realizing a well-organized spatial 
structure.  Raising barriers to development may prevent households from responding to job 
relocations or job growth at certain locations in a timely manner, by restricting local housing 
supply.  Further, this situation may result in longer commuting distances, times, and costs as well 
as greater spatial mismatches.  To examine the possible adverse effect of the regulation, this study 
analyzes how intraregional population-employment interaction varies by metropolitan areas 
having different degrees of land use regulations.  First, through a correlation analysis, the results 
reveal that highly regulated regions are likely to show a lower correlation between intraregional 
population and employment changes and an increasing mean commuting time between 1990 and 
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2000.  In addition, a spatial econometric analysis using a regional disequilibrium adjustment 
framework suggests that intraregional population and employment changes may not be well 
integrated in highly regulated metropolitan areas due to the lower household mobility, even 
though households and businesses consider accessibility to each other importantly in their 
location choices.   
 
2) Land Use Planning as Information Production & Exchange  
Local governments’ land use planning practice has been economically justified as an efficient 
means of producing and distributing necessary information relevant to land markets and further 
reducing the intrinsic uncertainties and transaction costs involved in land development processes.  
Although this way of justification, in addition to traditional welfare-economics-based rationales, 
has been adopted to give reason for land use planning, not much empirical evidence supporting 
the claim has been reported.  In order to fill this gap, this study attempts to empirically validate 
the argument by focusing on a particular case, namely the urban fringe land markets where the 
farmland owners make decisions under uncertainties regarding the timing of potential land 
development for urban uses.  First, through the exploration of land use data in Oregon, distinct 
farmland use patterns are found, consistent with the expectation that the establishment of urban 
growth boundaries (UGB) reduces uncertainty and therefore helps farmland owners make 
informed decision.  Furthermore, cross-sectional regression analysis using 82 single-county 
MSAs’ data detects a positive effect of UGB on agricultural investment levels, which may 
indicate the real contribution of the UGB to uncertainty reduction.  The UGB’s effect is found to 
be statistically significant in the MSAs showing relatively larger shares of livestock and fruit 
production (as opposed to crops) operations that generally require a greater amount of sunk costs 
and a longer period of operation for profits. 
 
3) The Macroeconomic Effects of Suburban Reactive Land Use Regulations: A Simulation Study 
using a Spatial REIM (Regional Econometric Input-Output Model)  
This study assesses the macroeconomic effects of minimum-lot-size requirements and building 
permit caps that have been implemented by some of the suburban municipalities in the Chicago 
metropolitan area.  This is accomplished by developing a new simulation model, which 
overcomes the shortcomings of traditional top-down approach to vertical regional economy – 
land use integration.  The new framework captures local- and lower-level dynamics and their 
effects on regional economic performance by using a modified regional disequilibrium 
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adjustment model that incorporates the intraregional dynamics into a regional econometric input-
output model in a reciprocal, interactive manner, as opposed to a top-down allocation process.  
The model simulation results reveal that the reactive land use regulations (minimum lot size 
zoning and permit caps), which bind local housing supply and population growth within the 
jurisdictions, 1) dampen the pace of regional economic growth considerably, although the actions 
are sometimes favorable to the long-term prosperity of the individual implementing 
municipalities; 2) tend to generate disproportionate impacts on different sectors of the economy – 
i.e. local sectors, which heavily depend on household expenditures, are affected more 
strenuously; and 3) induce effects that vary substantially by location and timing of the 
implementation.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Unlike other commodities or production factors, in most societies, the use of land is more or less 
out of the owners’ hands and under the control of government, although the property rights 
systems and intervention approaches vary significantly across history and culture.  Despite never-
ending challenges from a wide ideological spectrum, in the United States land use planning and 
regulation have remained at the core of decentralized governmental operations since the 1920s 
when zoning was legitimized as an exercise of police power in Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co. 
(1926) and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928 (Kaiser & Godschalk 1995; Teitz 
1996).1  Nowadays, most local and regional government bodies manage or control land use in and 
around their jurisdictional areas using a variety of policy instruments in addition to the traditional 
zoning techniques (see e.g. Rudel 1989; Platt 1996).  According to a fairly recent survey of 50 
largest U.S. metropolitan areas conducted by Pendall et al. (2006), 91.5 percent of municipalities 
have zoning ordinance; 84.6 percent have comprehensive plans; 37.5 percent have impact fees; 
18.6 percent have adequate public facilities ordinance, while 16.4 percent have urban 
containment policies.  
 
The prevalent government intervention in land use is certainly based on the notion that proper 
land use controls actually enhance public interest, by 1) eliminating negative externalities among 
conflicting land uses (see e.g. Bailey 1959; Stull 1975; Lafferty & Frech 1978); 2) protecting 
natural environments and consequently promoting the location-specific amenities (see e.g. Correll 
et al. 1978; Spalatro & Provencher 2001; Randolph 2004); 3) providing adequate amount of 
public goods and services more efficiently (see e.g. Moore 1978; Burchell et al. 1998 and 2005; 
Muro & Puentes 2004); and 4) reducing uncertainty and transaction costs involved in the land 
development processes (see e.g. Schaeffer & Hopkins 1987; Alexander 1992 and 1994; Dawkins 
2000).    
                                                 
1 Governments’ planning practice, including land use planning and regulation, has been criticized by many ideological 
perspectives: “On the left are the neo-Marxists who argue that planning by the capitalist state was intended not to serve 
the people but to save capitalism from the crisis it had created. …  On the right is the argument that planning is, at best, 
ineffective and, at worst, counterproductive. …  In the center are the post-modernists who argue that planning is part 
and parcel of the modernization project and, hence, should be rejected as yet another form of social control to 
implement a hegemonic vision of progress” (p.330, Sanyal 2000). 
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Some previous studies, however, report that: 1) there are undesirable consequences of strict land 
use regulations, such as the enhancement of monopoly power of the land owners (see e.g. 
Hamilton 1978; Thorson 1996), the rapid increases in land or house price due to limited supply 
(see e.g. Rose 1989; Pollakowski & Wachter 1990), and consequent affordable housing problems 
(see e.g. Downs 1991; Quigley & Raphael 2004); 2) land use regulations, implemented by one 
locality for its own sake, sometimes generate unfavorable external effects on adjacent 
communities or the region as a whole (see e.g. Foster 2001; Buzbee 2005; McKinney & 
Essington 2006); 3) some types of land use controls (e.g. low-density zoning and building caps) 
and the fragmented political system are likely to aggravate sprawl, causing a long list of 
undesirable consequences (see e.g. Pendall 1999; Razin & Rosentraub 2000; Carruthers & 
Ulfarsson 2002).2   
 
Furthermore, in recent years, it has been suggested that strict regulations on land use might hinder 
economic growth by constraining land supply for urban uses excessively, increasing the costs of 
housing significantly, and limiting not only land but also labor supply for business activities (see 
e.g. Evans 2002; Glaeser et al. 2006; Saks 2008; Vermeulen & Ommeren 2008).  In other words, 
land use regulations may have negative effects on the performance of economies that offset the 
benefits stemming from the correction of the market failures. 
 
Does land use planning or regulation really promote our economic well-being?  Alternatively, 
does this action raise barriers to development and thus slow the pace of economic growth or 
progress?  Although it has been readily acknowledged that regional economies and land use are 
highly interrelated with each other (see e.g. Parr 1979 and 1987; Knaap & Nelson 1992; Krabben 
& Bokema 1994), little is known about the interrelationship, particularly how a change or 
intervention in land use influences the behavior of economic systems.3  Typically, economic 
                                                 
2 Numerous studies suggested that sprawl leads to automobile-based longer commuting, disruption of environmentally 
sensitive areas, central city decline, segregation, inefficient public service provision, etc. (See e.g. Ewing 1996; 
Burchell et al. 1998 and 2005; Ewing et al. 2002; Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2003; Muro & Puentes 2004), while a few 
research, such as Gordon and Richardson (1997), contended that the spatial pattern of urban development, called 
‘sprawl’, is the natural consequence of economic decentralization and majority Americans’ preference on suburban 
living environment.  It also needs to be noted that some, including Glaeser & Kahn (2003), argued that government 
intervention in land use is not a main cause of sprawl. 
3 According to Parr (1979), “One of the most unsatisfactory features of regional analysis, or for that matter regional 
science, is the gulf that has emerged between the study of regional economic change on the one hand and the study of 
regional spatial structure on the other. … Although this division of the field of regional analysis may be legitimate and 
perhaps even inevitable, it is regrettable fact that the two branches appear to have been developing independently, with 
3 
development strategies have focused on labor force training, business recruitment, and tax 
incentives, rather than seeking a better spatial arrangement of the socio-economic activities 
within a region.  Moreover, in many planning studies and models, the interactions have been 
considered from a ‘top down’ perspective without consideration of ‘bottom up’ connections; that 
is, regional economic growth and transformation is only assumed to have significant effects on 
land use and the spatial structure of the region.  This lack of appreciation of the ‘bottom up’ 
impacts may limit current land use planning practices and further generate some unintended 
conflicts between land use policies and regional economic development initiatives.   
 
 
1.2. Research Objectives, Approaches, and Contributions  
 
To better understand the interrelationships between land use and regional economies, this 
dissertation research analyzes the economic consequences of land use planning and regulation 
through the three studies and a literature review.  More specifically, the first and second studies 
empirically examine the selected causal links between land use and regional economies which 
have not been fully investigated: first, the potential negative effect of strict land use regulations 
on local housing supply and household residential mobility and, second, the potential contribution 
of land use planning to uncertainty reduction and the economically efficient use of land.  The 
third study assesses the macroeconomic effects of minimum-lot-size requirements and permit 
caps, implemented by some of the suburban municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area, 
using a new integrated simulation framework that overcomes the shortcomings of ‘top down’ 
models.  Overall, the research aims to provide better insights into the ‘bottom up’ causal 
connections and derive meaningful lessons for planners and policy makers.  The dissertation 
research seeks to inform local planning practices and land use decision making, not only by 
discovering how land use planning and regulation affect regional economic variables but also by 
developing a new analytic tool which can be used for the analysis of the macroeconomic effects 
of land use policies.  Furthermore, it contributes to a more systematic coordination of economic 
development and land use planning, which is essential for achieving a more complete realization 
of urban development that is ecologically and socio-economically sustainable and prosperous. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
remarkably little interaction or cross-fertilisation.” (p.825)  In fact, despite Parr’s indication, this unsatisfactory feature 
has not been completely addressed until now.   
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1.3. Dissertation Outline  
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature, from which the causal links between government interventions in land use and regional 
economic performance can be inferred.  Chapters 3 through 5 present the three empirical studies.  
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the findings, outlining limitations of the 
present studies, discussing the policy lessons, and identifying directions for future research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LAND 
USE PLANNING AND REGULATION 
 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
Although just a few studies explicitly relate a change or intervention in land use to the 
performance of a regional economy, much research has examined the economic effects of land 
use regulation or land use planning and suggested that land use may have significant implications 
for regional economic performance.4  This chapter attempts to examine how government 
interventions in land use can influence the behavior of regional economic systems and to derive 
some policy lessons by reviewing relevant literature.   
 
One could argue that the goal of land use planning is not to generate economic benefits.  It can 
also be claimed that economic development is more efficiently accomplished through appropriate 
taxation, labor force training, industrial policies, and so on, rather than through an intervention in 
land use.  Although such claims are valid to some extent, a better understanding of ‘bottom up’ 
causality is not trivial because land use planning is one of the most powerful instruments in the 
hands of planners; regional economic prosperity is a common goal of planners; and most 
importantly, economic prosperity and land use are tightly interrelated.   
 
First, however, some preliminary points should be noted.   
1) Land use regulation and land use planning are distinct and different from one another. 
Hopkins (2001, p.9-10) clarifies this point by stating that “Regulations [are] … 
enforceable assignment and reassignment of rights.  Regulations affect the scope of 
permissible actions.  Plans … provide information about interdependent decisions in 
relation to expected outcomes but these plans do not determine directly the scope of 
permissible actions.” In this literature review, the effects of governmental actions on land 
use are examined, including both land use regulation and planning practices.  To some 
                                                 
4 It needs to be noted that some fairly recent studies, such as Nelson & Peterman (2000), Glaeser et al. (2006), and Saks 
(2008), reviewed in section 2.2 and 2.5, pay explicit attention to the effects of land use policies on regional economic 
growth.  Also, there are some other studies, considering the regional property market as an important factor in the 
region’s competitiveness and suggesting that land use and development process may have significant implications for 
regional economic prosperity (see e.g. D’Arcy & Keogh 1999; Gibb et al. 2002; Bramley & Lambert 2002).   
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extent, land use regulation or policies can be regarded as a product of land use planning 
practices, although the implementation and enforcement steps are not generally 
controlled by planners.   
2) The dependent variable of interest in this literature review is the performance of regional 
economies.  In fact, this is a somewhat elusive concept, as it is associated with both 
qualitative improvement in wealth creation process (i.e., economic development) and 
quantitative growth in production or employment size (i.e., economic growth).  However, 
it is useful to employ this inclusive concept, as it is relevant to a common goal: the 
economic prosperity of regions.  
3) Since different strands of research attempt to probe different causal links between land 
use and regional economies, a broad range of literature needs to be reviewed, and a 
broad-brush approach needs to be adopted to thoroughly understand how government 
actions in land use influences the performance of regional economies.  Thus, this review 
tries to provide a synthesis of various studies from which ‘bottom up’ causal links can be 
inferred.  Covering a variety of studies inevitably results in a somewhat incomplete 
explanation of each research and the exclusion of some studies that deserve recognition.  
The focus of the paper will be on research findings and implications rather than on 
detailed research design, data treatment, and methodological improvements as 
showcased in individual studies.  
4) A synthesis across various literatures is presented along with four categories that 
represent the major causal links, namely, the connections through 1) development pattern 
changes and spatial structure reformation; 2) land development process efficiency 
improvements; 3) supply constraints and price increases in property markets; and 4) 
labor market shifts.  Subsequent sections will review the studies in each category with an 
emphasis on what the findings of the studies imply with respect to the hypothesized 
causal link between land use and regional economies.   
5) Here, consideration is mainly given to urban and metropolitan areas, rather than rural 
settings.  Although an intervention in land use probably generates substantial effects in 
the context of an agriculture-based rural economy, these areas are less likely to adopt 
many types of land use regulations and planning practices as compared with urban 
regions.  In the latter case, internal changes are often dramatic, which in turn creates 
greater demand for the systematic management of land use.  
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6) This literature review does not cover some research that examines the positive effect of 
property rights reform on economic development by analyzing transitional economies or 
developing countries (Feder and Feeny 1991; Besley 1995; Do and Iyer 2003) because 
the objective of this review is not to determine the contribution of stable private property 
rights to economic development but rather to understand the economic effects of 
prevalent land use policies in the U.S., where the property rights system is firmly 
established.  
 
 
2.2. Development Pattern Changes and Spatial Structure Transformation 
 
Land use regulations are primarily implemented to better manage the spatial arrangement of 
various human activities by controlling the associated uses of land for these activities.  For 
instance, traditional zoning is mainly designed to implement a spatial form that minimizes 
negative externalities among different types of urban activities by separating conflicting uses.  
Another typical example includes urban growth boundaries (UGB), which have been widely 
adopted in the U.S. to promote more compact and contiguous development by allowing land use 
for urban purposes only within the boundaries. 
 
Consistent with their primary purpose, these regulations are expected to substantially change 
development patterns and further improve the spatial structures of areas.  Numerous theoretical 
and empirical studies have paid attention to the effectiveness of a variety of land use regulations 
in achieving these expected outcomes, i.e., whether or not a particular type of regulation is 
actually effective in modifying land development patterns, creating a more desirable spatial 
structure, and generating the benefits that are linked with well-managed spatial arrangements.  If 
land use regulation really contributes to creating a desirable form of socio-economic activity, the 
performance of regional economies will be improved thanks to “efficient urbanization,” as argued 
by Cervero (2001) and others. 
 
2.2.1. Improving Welfare by Correcting Market Failures 
 
One typical example in the literature involves justifying land use regulations based on welfare 
economics and supporting such justification with empirical evidence.  Bailey (1959) and Davis 
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(1963) contend that the welfare level of landowners can be increased through appropriate land use 
controls, particularly zoning, that eliminate negative externalities among different uses.  
According to them, this welfare increase is a major benefit of land use controls.  Gardner (1977) 
and Moore (1978) argue that land use regulations can also contribute to preserving public goods 
that are unlikely to be maintained without government intervention, since the social values of 
these public goods are not seriously considered by private agents who focus on pursuing their 
own interests.  Lee’s (1981) article “Land use planning as a response to market failure” highlights 
the same point: residents and the region as a whole should benefit from proper land use planning 
practices that address intrinsic market failures in land use and, consequently, lead to a more 
economically efficient land use.   
 
Claims that land use regulations can increase the welfare of landowners and even of all residents 
by correcting market failures have been mainly buttressed by two sets of empirical analyses.  The 
first is a set of research showing the virtual existence of negative external effects in the context of 
non-managed land use.  For instance, Stull (1975) analyzes the property values of single-family 
housing units across communities in the Boston metropolitan area and finds that their value is 
more likely to be higher when the property is in communities where the proportion of land 
devoted to non-single-family uses is low.  As argued by the author, this finding may imply that 
negative externalities actually do exist between single-family houses and other land uses, and a 
separation of different land uses by zoning ordinances is therefore warranted.  Lafferty and Frech 
(1978, 382) extend Stull’s (1975) research with more detailed land use data from Boston and 
conclude that “increases in non-single-family land uses within a town raises property values if 
suitably concentrated, but increasing the dispersion of a fixed amount of these land uses reduces 
property values.”  Although their finding certainly differs from that of Stull’s (1975), the 
argument that a greater degree of dispersion of different types of land use results in lower 
property values also supports the presence of negative external effects at the neighborhood level 
or at more spatially-disaggregated levels.  Burnell (1985) tries to differentiate air polluting 
activities from other types of commercial and industrial land use to present a more refined 
understanding of the main source of negative external effects.  He concludes that air-polluting 
activities generate statistically significant negative influences on housing values, while other 
types of commercial and industrial land use exhibit positive impacts.  Hughes and Sirmans (1992) 
direct their attention to traffic intensity rather than to a particular type of land use.  They examine 
single-family house transaction data from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, between 1985 and 1989 and 
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analyze how the amount of traffic on streets can influence the value of individual housing units 
using a traditional hedonic formulation.  They find a statistically significant negative price effect 
of high traffic.  Although traffic - as opposed to land use - is their focus, the traffic externality 
may justify the need for a zoning protocol that separates commercial and industrial activities, 
which in turn leads to a greater amount of traffic from residential uses.   
 
The second group includes empirical studies that demonstrate the positive effects of 
environmental amenities, preserved by land use regulations, on housing values.5  Correll et al. 
(1978) analyze the effect of the green belt of Boulder, Colorado, on the prices of residential 
properties in the region. Conducting a regression analysis, they find that walking distance to the 
green belt has a negative effect on property values; i.e., if a property is closer to the green belt, it 
is more likely to sell for a higher price.  They interpret this result as a quasi-public good effect of 
greenbelts.  In other words, the preserved open space and the associated higher amenity level 
provided by the green belt generate positive effects in terms of resident welfare; this increase in 
welfare and a better living environment might be capitalized and thus transformed into an 
increase in property price.  Spalatro and Provencher (2001) investigate the case of minimum 
frontage zoning in northern Wisconsin and also conclude that this regulation generates economic 
gains by preserving lakefront amenities rather than constraining development and leading to 
economic losses. The significant, positive impacts of amenities preserved by environmental 
zoning are also identified by Netusil (2005), who considers the different effects of various types 
of amenities.  
 
It should be noted that although a number of studies have provided empirical evidence in support 
of the potential welfare gains that may accompany land use regulations as explained above, many 
other researchers have been unable to find any statistically significant evidence of these effects.  
Crecine et al. (1967) analyze urban property transactions in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and find no 
evidence of the externality or interdependence of the property market.  Rueter (1973, 336) also 
investigates Pittsburgh and concludes that “there is little likelihood that all of the external effects 
anticipated by the zoning ordinance actually arise in urban property markets.”  In addition, in 
their analysis of land prices in Rochester, New York, Maser et al. (1977) detect insignificant 
external effects in all but certain exceptional cases.  Mark and Goldberg (1986, 257) also argue 
                                                 
5 Although the literature on the amenity effect is voluminous, there are relatively few studies that focus explicitly on the 
role of land use regulations in preserving such amenities and that measure the benefits of preserved amenities. 
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that “the negative externalities that are generally assumed to exist may in fact not exist … the use 
of zoning to control the effects of such presumed externalities may not be justified”, based on 
statistical analyses of single-family housing sales price data over a 24-year time period.  Although 
these results might be attributable to problems associated with data, model formulation, or 
estimation, the conclusion regarding insignificance may imply that the extent of conflicts is 
narrower than that suggested by received theory.  Also, the status quo (i.e., no zoning at all) may 
not be a chaotic state with negative externalities that carry significant dead-weight loss.  
Accordingly, the true contribution of zoning would not be very substantial.6 
 
I note certain additional points.  First, most studies typically focus on the prices of single-family 
housing units, assuming that this variable suitably represents the welfare levels of residents.  
Although it is true that amenities are capitalized and can thus be represented by housing prices, 
these prices are also determined by supply, as discussed later.  It seems clear that this supply-side 
effect is not appropriately controlled in many of these studies.  In fact, a location with a larger 
proportion of preserved natural amenities under environmental zoning conditions will inevitably 
have a reduced capacity for housing supply within a given area.  Thus, it remains to be verified 
that higher prices are attributable to the elimination of negative external effects and/or the 
preservation of amenities, rather than a relative scarcity in supply.  
 
Second, as a generally static framework, the welfare economics approach may not be perfect in 
dealing with the dynamics of urban environments, although the framework and approach are 
indeed useful.  Within cities and metropolitan areas, a particular location that is initially suitable 
for single-family houses can become a desirable site for multi-family housing, businesses, or 
public facilities in the future.  On the basis of these welfare economics and market failure 
approaches, one might question whether zoning or other types of land use planning can really 
handle such dynamic problems adequately, and then contribute to the development of a desirable 
spatial pattern that promotes inter-temporal economic well-being.   
 
                                                 
6 It is well known that residential and commercial-industrial land use tends to be segregated in Houston, Texas, even 
without zoning; see Siegan (1972) and Berry (2001).  In other words, private deed covenants or other types of private 
bargaining in the market system may also mitigate negative effects. 
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2.2.2. Desirable Spatial Structures and Consequent Economic Benefits: Compact 
Development versus Sprawl 
 
While the research mentioned above focuses on the benefits of well-managed land use patterns at 
the level of neighborhoods or other relatively low levels of geography, another set of research has 
emphasized the impact of land use planning and regulations on the spatial structure of an entire 
region.  These studies attempt to evaluate the desirability of a region’s spatial structure based on 
certain criteria and test whether a certain land use policy is effective in improving it.   
 
This literature includes research on urban sprawl versus compact development. Because 
sprawling patterns of physical growth can force public service provision to become inefficient 
(Ewing 1996; Moe & Wilkie 1997; Burchell et al. 1998 and 2005; Ewing et al. 2002; Carruthers 
& Ulfarsson 2003; Muro & Puentes 2004), we can secure fiscal benefits and other favorable 
economic impacts at the regional level by curbing sprawl.  Also, it has been suggested that 
compact development, which promotes agglomeration benefits and increased productivity, may 
have additional positive effects on regional economies (Ciccone & Hall 1993; Nelson & 
Peterman 2000; Cervero 2001).  Thus, the issue is whether a particular type of land use 
intervention actually controls sprawl and promotes compact development or whether it in fact 
causes a more dispersed spatial structure within the region.  Also, attention needs to be paid to the 
side effects of regulations that may offset the benefits of compact development.  
 
Although results are mixed, growth management policies have generally been considered 
effective in curbing sprawl, particularly when they are implemented with the systematic 
cooperation of multiple local governments.7  For instance, Nelson and Moore (1993) assess the 
effectiveness of the urban growth boundary (UGB) of Portland, Oregon, by analyzing residential 
building permits, residential land divisions, and the density of residential development from 1985 
to 1989.  They find that almost all new development was directed toward the UGB, although they 
did identify problems with the administration of growth management policies.  Moore and Nelson 
(1994) evaluate the Medford metropolitan statistical area (MSA), another case of growth 
management in Oregon, using a similar method.  They examine the location and density of new 
                                                 
7 In contrast to many other studies, Jun’s (2004) analysis of Portland’s urban growth boundary suggests that its 
effectiveness is doubtful.  He compares Portland with 31 other metropolitan areas and finds that Portland did not 
experience less suburbanization or greater infill development between 1980 and 2000.  In addition, according to his 
regression analysis, the presence of the urban growth boundary does not lead to a statistically significant effect on the 
location of new housing construction. 
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development, including commercial and industrial development, from 1985 to 1989.  They 
conclude that the policy is somewhat effective in encouraging new development within the UGB 
and in facilitating high-density development, although it does not sufficiently contribute to 
protecting resource lands.  The effectiveness of Portland’s UGB approach is also confirmed by 
Kline and Alig (1999).  They analyze the conversion of land use from forest or farmland to urban 
purposes using the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) land use dataset and find that new 
development has been concentrated within the designated areas thanks to the UGB.   
 
In addition to the above case studies that look exclusively at a particular growth management 
region, some studies compare growth management regions or states with control groups (i.e., 
comparable areas that lack such initiatives) and identify similar outcomes, implying that growth 
management does accomplish its mission of sprawl control.  Nelson (1999) examines the 
effectiveness of state-level growth management in not only preventing urban sprawl but also 
preserving farmland, reducing automobile use, improving transit accessibility, supporting energy 
conservation, and minimizing tax burdens.  Specifically, he compares Florida and Oregon as 
representative of growth-management states with Georgia as representative of states without 
significant government intervention in this regard.  To pinpoint the effect of growth management 
on sprawl control, he looks at density changes from 1980 to 1990 and finds that Florida and 
Oregon experienced a much smaller density decline than Georgia.  Analyzing the spatial pattern 
of new residential development, Dawkins and Nelson (2003) also examine the effectiveness of 
state-level growth management in preventing sprawl and promoting the revitalization of central 
city areas.  They conduct a multivariate regression analysis using a panel dataset covering 293 
metropolitan areas across 19 time periods and find a statistically significant, positive effect of 
state-level growth management on attracting new housing construction into central cities.  Similar 
to Dawkins and Nelson’s (2003) research, Nelson et al. (2004) examine the effectiveness of 
various urban containment policies implemented before 1985 in attracting new development 
activities into central cities.  Through a simple comparison and regression analysis, it is found 
that the central cities in regions with containment programs attracted more development per 
capita, although they did not exhibit a greater share of development within their metropolitan 
areas than the control cases.  In particular, according to their analysis, the effects of containment 
policies are strong for the construction of multi-family housing units as well as for the remodeling 
or addition of commercial buildings.   
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In contrast to growth management policies, some types of land use regulations that are 
implemented by individual communities seem to aggravate the problem of sprawl.  Shen (1996) 
investigates reactive growth controls enacted by local governments in the San Francisco Bay 
Area and finds a significant displacement effect, indicating the spatial dispersion of development 
rather than a compact urban development profile.  Pendall (1999) examines the effects of various 
locally-adopted land use regulations on controlling sprawl.  According to his analysis, low-
density-only zoning and building-permit caps are associated with more sprawl, while land use 
controls that impose social costs of development on developers, such as adequate public facilities 
ordinances, are effective in reducing sprawl.  Also, a growing number of recent studies have 
investigated the relationship between political fragmentation and sprawl and report that the level 
of fragmentation is strongly associated with urban sprawl (Razin & Rosentraub 2000; Glaeser et 
al. 2001; Fulton et al. 2001; Carruthers & Ulfarsson 2002; Carruthers 2003; Ulfarsson & 
Carruthers 2006).  One possible explanation for this correlation is that land use regulations 
implemented by fragmented municipalities for their own sake, as opposed to those based on 
systematic cooperation among local governments, cause a sprawling pattern of development by 
excluding high-density development.  
 
2.2.3. Desirable Spatial Structures and Consequent Economic Benefits: Land Use, 
Transportation, and the Regional Economy 
 
While the studies on compact development versus sprawl focus on density improvement and 
subsequent environmental, fiscal, and socio-economic benefits, another set of research evaluates 
the spatial structure of a region based on transportation-oriented criteria and examines whether 
and how land use policies impact the spatial arrangement of socio-economic activities related to 
transportation.  Although this research typically investigates the relationship between land use 
and transportation rather than focusing on regional economies, the effects of land use policies on 
regional economies can be inferred because 1) transportation plays an important role in 
supporting various economic activities; 2) congestion as well as non-congested auto-based travel 
generate significant social costs; and 3) providing a broader range of travel choice options should 
be an important factor in residents’ welfare.8  Given that transportation has a significant effect on 
                                                 
8 The relationship between transportation sectors and regional economies has been better documented and established 
than the relationship between land use and regional economies.  See the articles in The Annals of Regional Science Vol 
42, No 3, which is a special issue comprised of cutting-edge research on transportation investment and economic 
development. 
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the performance of regional economies, the major issues related to the effects of land use on 
regional economies via transportation include whether or not some types of land use regulation 
cause transportation problems (e.g., job-housing imbalances or excess commuting) and whether 
such problems can be addressed by implementing appropriate land use policies.   
 
A few studies have wrestled whether a particular type of land use regulation is responsible for 
jobs-housing imbalances or excess commuting.  Levine’s (1998) article and subsequent book 
(Levine 2006) are notable achievements that explore this issue.  Based on the outcome of his 
analysis of residential locations in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and other cases, he argues that 
housing units for low or moderate-income groups may be “zoned out” due to restrictive land use 
policies in many suburban communities that exclusively favor low-density development.  As a 
result, job-housing balance has not been a prominent feature of most U.S. metropolitan areas.  
Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (2000) also present survey-based evidence from Atlanta, Georgia, 
suggesting that job-housing imbalances have persisted due to the limited supply of affordable 
housing in suburban communities.  Ihlanfeldt (2004) later indicates that exclusionary land use 
regulations are a potential cause of this persistence of spatial imbalance, which in turn leads to 
undesirable transportation outcomes.  According to him, “since land use regulations contribute 
to … [the scarcity of affordable housing units in suburban areas] … the implication [of Ihlanfeldt 
and Sjoquist’s (2000) finding] is that they also contribute to the spatial mismatch problem” 
(p.272).   
 
Overall, the spatial job-housing imbalance may be encouraged by restrictive land use regulations 
and thus may lead to elevated transportation costs in the affected region.  At the same time, this 
mismatch indicates a potential problem for the local labor market.  In this sense, residential land 
use regulations indirectly affect business location decisions and further distort the spatial structure 
of the region.  Section 2.5 deals with this adverse effect of land use regulations on the 
performance of regional economies with regard to housing and the labor market.   
 
With respect to the second issue, namely whether some other land use policies are effective in 
addressing job-housing imbalances, auto-based congestion, and the limited availability of 
transportation options, mixed-land-use attracts attention as a policy instrument.  Research has 
explored the correlation between land use and urban design attributes, on the one hand, and travel 
outcomes, on the other; evidence shows that not only a higher density but also a greater degree of 
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mixed land use are negatively associated with the number of auto-based travel miles (Cervero and 
Kockleman 1997; Crane 2000; Ewing and Cervero 2001).  This correlation can be explained by 
the fact that mixed land use reduces trip distances by bringing origins and destinations closer to 
one another as well as by reducing the number of auto trips by encouraging people to use 
alternatives such as walking or bicycling.  Cervero and Duncan (2006) compare the magnitude of 
the potential impact of a job-housing balance with that of retail-housing mixing using travel data 
from the San Francisco Bay Area. They conclude that improvement in the job-housing balance 
may be a more effective way of reducing vehicle traffic.   
 
However, as Crane (2000), Knaap and Song (2004), and some others, point out, this research 
typically relates transportation outcomes to certain land use attributes rather than to the 
implementation of land use policies.9  In addition, there may be endogeneity problems.  For 
example, the actual reason for the higher correlation between mixed-use and lower levels of auto 
travel may not be that mixed-use policies induce people to walk or use bicycles but rather that a 
group of people choose mixed-use areas since they have a lower preference or financial capacity 
for driving.  For this reason, it is still unclear whether promoting mixed-use policies can improve 
transportation conditions.  Furthermore, empirical evidence still needs to be assembled regarding 
the extent of transportation and economic benefits that can be generated by mixed-use zoning or 
similar measures. 
 
 
2.3. Land Market Efficiency Improvements 
 
Government interventions in land use may also have a favorable effect on regional economic 
systems by improving land market efficiency.  Unlike other market transactions, land 
development is a process with a high degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry.  
Consequently, it incurs significant and various transaction costs, all over the entire course of 
development ranging from land purchases to construction and property transfers (Alexander 2001 
and Buitelaar 2004).   
 
                                                 
9 It needs to be noted that some studies, such as Rodriguez et al. (2006) and Deal et al. (2009), attempt to investigate 
the effects of land use policies, as opposed to land use attributes, on transportation, although the relationship between 
land use characteristics and travel behavior is the main subject of research in the literature related to this issue.    
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Throughout the practice of land use planning, information relevant to land use and development 
is generated.  This includes the analysis of current land use patterns, all estimates of future 
demand for new development, and the determination of potentially suitable locations for new 
development.  In addition, such information is widely distributed and helps the decision-making 
process for various actors involved in land development and land use (Friend & Jessop 1969 and 
Schaeffer & Hopkins 1987).  Furthermore, there is a stronger degree of certainty when local 
governments announce future plans regarding land use patterns within and around their 
jurisdictional areas.  In general, as compared with other institutional arrangements, government 
involvement in land use planning and regulation may be a relatively desirable institutional form 
for managing the land market and land development process.   
 
The importance of this contribution to land use planning has been emphasized by studies that 
draw on transaction cost economic theory.  For instance, Alexander (1992, 1994, and 2001) 
argues that transactions in a free land market are generally unplanned and spontaneously decided, 
and therefore tend to involve substantial unnecessary transaction costs, which could be reduced 
by land use planning.  In his view, the presence of uncertainty and transaction costs, like the 
existence of externalities, is one of the main rationales for government intervention in land use.  
Dawkins (2000) also pays attention to this aspect of land use planning and contends that a land 
use plan or regulation that serves as an agreement among actors who are involved with land 
development can effectively lower uncertainty as well as transaction costs.   
 
However, empirical studies that validate these theoretical suppositions are scarce; little is known 
about the magnitude of the effect of land use planning on uncertainty and transaction costs.  
Empirical tests to date have been limited as to whether plans or information contained in the plans 
have significant effects.  Talen (1996a) discusses several approaches as well as critical issues in 
evaluating plan implementation; she later conducts an illustrative analysis of Pueblo, Colorado, 
using various methods (Talen 1996b).  In this case study, she examines the degree to which the 
location pattern of parks in 1990 is consistent with patterns suggested by the earlier plan.  Overall, 
her finding is inconclusive with respect to whether the plan was successfully implemented.  
However, she reports that the access pattern in the earlier plan has explanatory power for the 
implemented access distribution under certain methods, although other techniques fail to 
substantiate this finding.  Knaap et al. (2001) investigate whether a light rail plan influences 
posterior land development in Washington County, Oregon.  By analyzing land sales data, they 
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find that both the timing and the pattern of land development were affected by the announcement 
of the plan preceding any investment or legislation.  This finding implies that planning practice as 
well as information contained in plans really matter for shaping land development patterns.   
 
 
2.4. Supply Constraints and Price Increases in Property Markets 
 
While land use regulations can enhance the welfare of residents and further promote regional 
economic prosperity by creating a better spatial pattern of human activities or by improving land 
market efficiency, they often constrain the supply of developable land and delay the development 
process, thereby affecting property sectors that are an important and fundamental basis of 
regional economies.10  In particular, land use regulations tend to raise the costs of providing 
housing and other built structures, and they may elevate prices in the housing and business space 
markets.  
 
2.4.1. Housing Price Inflation 
 
The effects of land use regulations on land or housing prices are one of the most popular research 
topics in this field.  Pogodzinski and Sass (1991), Malpezzi (1996), Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) 
and some other studies have comprehensively reviewed the research on price effects.  
 
Theoretically, it seems obvious that land use regulations can induce a certain level of housing 
price increases for both supply- and demand-side reasons.  Also, the significant price effects of 
many types of land use regulations, ranging from zoning to growth management policies, have 
been identified in numerous empirical studies, although some exceptions do exist.11  Currently, 
                                                 
10 The importance of property sector for economic growth has long been recognized.  Morevoer, recently, in the 
literature on urban economic competitiveness, a group of studies highlighted the role of the property sector in shaping 
or determining the performance of regional economies by influencing business environments and controlling the 
internal changes to external shocks (Begg 1999; D’Arcy and Keogh 1999; Gibb et al. 2002; Bramley and Lambert 
2002). 
11 However, some empirical studies have reported negligible or small price effects.  For example, no consistent and 
statistically significant effect of zoning on housing prices was identified by Mark and Goldberg (1986); their study 
analyzed single-family housing price data over a period of time that exceeded 20 years.  Philips and Goodstein (2000) 
analyzed the effect of Portland’s UGB on housing prices in the region by comparing Portland’s housing prices to those 
in other metropolitan areas using a regression technique.  They reported that “the urban growth boundary has created 
upward pressure on [land and thus] housing prices, but the effect is relatively small in magnitude” (p.334).  They 
argued that the higher level of density induced by the urban growth boundary mitigated the negative impact of the 
shortage of developable land.  Downs (2002) also compared changes in Portland’s housing prices from 1980 to 2000 
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academic attention is increasingly being paid to why prices increase, beyond asking whether a 
certain type of land use regulation increases housing prices.  That is, does the observed price 
increase mainly come from 1) amenity improvements and subsequent increases in demand or 2) 
supply constraints and greater costs of development?  This issue is critical because a different 
conclusion regarding the effect of land use regulations on the performance of regional economies 
may be expected, depending on why housing prices increase.  If price increases are mainly 
attributable to elevated demand induced by a higher quality of life in the area, then one might 
posit that the regulation attracts new residents and thus contributes to regional economic 
growth.12  In contrast, if housing price increases are stimulated by limited supply, this would 
seem to suggest that regulation dampens growth momentum by preventing a region from 
satisfying its need for growth.  Also, in this case, inflated housing expenses and development 
costs may generate significant economic impacts on not only construction but also other 
interdependent sectors in regional economies; this can also affect the consumption and investment 
patterns of residents.  Moreover, as discussed in the following section, these changes further 
affect regional labor markets, which are directly linked to the performance of regional economies.   
Although a large number of studies claim that land use regulations raise the demand for an area 
by improving amenities and thus raising housing prices,13 more recent studies increasingly 
suggest that price inflation is mainly caused by the limited supply and higher development costs 
under strict land use regulations.  A notable study, analyzing the reasons behind price increases is 
one by Pollakowski and Wacher (1990).  They estimate the effects of zoning restrictions on 
housing prices by investigating Montgomery County, Maryland and find significant direct effects 
as well as significant spillover effects.  This spillover effect is important, because it implies that 
the higher price is attributable to supply constraints rather than demand-side dynamics.  More 
specifically, the spillover effect “could only occur through supply restrictions in a closed rather 
than open-city model, unless the adjacent zone restrictions also affected the desirability of living 
within the nearby areas” (p. 323), which was not the case in their analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
with those of other metropolitan areas to determine the price effect of the UGB.  He found a significant price effect 
only for a limited time period and argues that the increase in housing prices is not an inevitable consequence of this 
land use regulation. 
12 Of course, even in this case, price increases may have macroeconomic implications.  Consideration should be given 
to the magnitude of any increase, in the context of housing supply elasticity as well as the size of demand expansion, in 
order to precisely analyze the economic impacts of price changes. 
13 These include most of the studies mentioned in Section 2-1.  However, as indicated above, some of these studies just 
regard higher prices as an indication of reduced disamenities or a higher level of preserved amenities, rather than 
identifying the exact cause of price increases through a consideration of supply-side and other effects. 
19 
The conclusion that the price effects of land use regulations are primarily attributable to supply 
constraints is also supported by studies that investigate how the housing supply is affected by 
land use regulations.  For example, Thorson (1997) analyzes the case of agricultural down-zoning 
in McHenry County, Illinois, and finds that housing supply as measured by the number of 
building permits significantly declined with a lag after zoning implementation.  Levine (1999) 
examines the effect of growth controls in California and reports a similar outcome; the policy of 
interest (i.e., growth controls) actually reduces housing supply, thereby elevating housing prices.  
Mayer and Somerville (2000) and Green et al. (2005) relate the amount of housing supply or 
supply elasticity in metropolitan areas to the degree of overall restrictiveness of residential land 
use regulation in various regions, based on a variety of survey-based data.   Both studies report a 
smaller housing supply and lower elasticity in a highly regulated region, which may imply that 
land use regulations in general do indeed serve as supply constraints. 
 
2.4.2. Higher Costs for Business Spaces 
 
Since land use regulations can increase the price of developable land in a community or a region, 
it is anticipated that businesses will pay commensurately higher costs for the sites or floor spaces 
used in their production activities.  This probable consequence of land use regulations should be 
considered when the macroeconomic impact of land use regulations is of interest, since land 
availability and costs are some of the most important factors in industrial location decisions, as 
shown in Calzonetti and Walker’s (1991) survey analysis and other studies.  In particular, 
industries that require large sites for production purposes can be seriously affected by the scarcity 
and/or high price of industrial land.  Also, such effects, in the form of limited reinvestment or 
production expansion, can spread across an entire regional economy through inter-industry 
linkages.  
 
In fact, these adverse economic effects of land use regulations are less likely to be documented in 
the U.S. literature, where studies on housing price effects have been much more prominent, 
compared to many other countries.14  This is probably because the adverse effects are generally 
weak due to the favorable attitudes of local governments toward commercial and industrial 
development (Cheshire and Hilber 2008).  Actually, in the U.S., the tax system as well as various 
                                                 
14 The effect of land use regulations on the price of business space has been more thoroughly researched in the U.K. 
and other countries where land availability is relatively low and stricter controls of land use exist (Evans 2004; 
Henneberry et al. 2005; Cheshire and Sheppard. 2005; Cheshire and Hilber 2008). 
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fiscal incentives often forces local and state governments to compete with each other to attract 
businesses into their jurisdictions. 
 
Even in the U.S. context, however, land use regulations can cause a serious shortage of business 
space or even prevent particular production activities from settling into a region.  The 1000 
Friends of Oregon (1982) analyze whether a sufficient area of land was made available for 
industrial development in Portland, where developable land is limited by the enforcement of the 
urban growth boundary as well as by local government zoning.  They report that industrial land 
supply is much smaller than the estimated demand.  They also find that some sites zoned for 
industrial use are in flood plains or inaccessible given the existing infrastructure, so that nominal 
supply, already failing to meet the demand, overestimates the amount of available land.  Also, 
according to Hanushek and Quigley (1990), in the 1970s and 1980s, many local governments, 
particularly in California, implemented restrictive non-residential zoning ordinances designed to 
control industrial growth, since those activities were presumably not fiscally desirable. 
 
 
2.5. Labor Market Shifts 
 
The effect of housing market changes prompted by land use regulations in the context of the 
regional labor pool is not trivial, given that spending for housing comprises a major proportion of 
total household expenditures; for example, this figure generally totals about 20 percent in the U.S.  
More specifically, higher housing prices and a limited supply of new housing may significantly 
increase the cost of living; may make the region less attractive as a place to live; may push the 
labor supply curve upward; and eventually may hinder the economic growth of the region.  
Recently, a set of studies has highlighted this causal link between land use regulation and the 
performance of regional economies via housing and labor markets.   
 
For instance, Glaeser (2006) claims that land use controls seriously constrain housing supply and 
adversely affect the economic growth of a region, positing that “No Homes, No People, No Jobs”, 
since “the economy cannot grow unless population grows and the population cannot grow 
without new housing” (p.2).  In another paper, Glaeser et al. (2006) attempt to empirically 
support this argument.  By conducting a MSA-level econometric analysis, they detect a positive 
effect of strict land use regulations on housing prices and a deterrent effect on population growth; 
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that is, in a metropolitan area with strict land use regulations, the population is less likely to grow 
in response to labor demand increases, while housing prices are more likely to increase even 
though no effect on income is apparent.  The magnitude of this effect is substantial: “the effect of 
labor demand on population growth is 50% lower in areas with highly regulated housing markets” 
(p.85).15  Saks (2008) also investigates this issue empirically by using a three-variable vector auto 
regression model.  Here consideration is given to not only short-term but also long-term impacts 
of land use regulations that restrict the housing supply.  Based on this empirical analysis, she 
reports that under a given constant labor demand increase, land use regulations tend to lower the 
elasticity of housing supply, increase housing prices more rapidly, raise the wage level, and 
hinder employment growth.  In addition, the adverse effect of land use regulations on 
employment growth extends over time.  Vermeulen and Ommeren (2008) also examine this issue 
using a model of a simultaneous three-equation system that includes the labor force, employment, 
and housing.  They conclude that employment growth is determined by the labor supply, which is 
predominantly affected by the housing supply.  Based on these findings, they argue that strict 
land use regulations that deter housing and limit the labor supply are responsible for sluggish 
regional economic growth. 
 
So far, these studies typically have focused on the aggregate population or workforce, rather than 
on discerning different socio-economic groups.  Studies such as Downs (1991), Levine (1999), 
Anthony (2003), and Quigley & Raphael (2004), for example, identify the serious scarcity of 
affordable units as a consequence of restrictive land use controls.  This may imply that socio-
economic groups are affected by and react to the tightened housing market differently due to their 
different financial capabilities and asset holdings.  This disproportionate effect is useful to better 
understand the labor market implication of land use regulations.  Furthermore, a different 
portfolio of industries within a region will generate different qualitative and quantitative labor 
demands, and a careful consideration of this disproportionate effect will enable us to better assess 
the distinct impact of land use regulations on a particular industry, as well as the overall influence 
on the industrial structure of a region.  
  
 
                                                 
15 It needs to be noted that interregional variation in many respects other than the degree of land use regulation is not 
considered to be a potential factor in the lower responsiveness of population to labor demand increases.  Likewise, in 
Saks (2008), no alternative hypothesis is tested to corroborate these claims. 
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2.6. Summary of the Literature Review 
 
With this literature review, a set of complex causal links between land use and regional 
economies have been identified (figure 2.1).  These links suggest that land use regulation and 
planning have countervailing effects on the performance of regional economies. On the one hand, 
land use regulations may promote regional economic prosperity 1) by eliminating negative 
externalities, preserving public goods, and implementing amenity improvements; 2) by 
encouraging compact development, which is associated with a higher efficiency in public service 
provision as well as other agglomeration benefits; 3) by improving transportation outcomes or 
broadening the potential options for travel choices that have significant implications for regional 
economies; and 4) by reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs involved in land 
development.  On the other hand, land use regulations may affect regional economies negatively 
1) by causing a more dispersed or mismatched pattern of development rather than controlling 
urban sprawl, if local governments distort market processes through exclusionary land use 
regulations; 2) by reducing site availability for urban uses, imposing additional costs on 
developers, and dramatically increasing the prices of developable land, housing, and business 
spaces; and 3) by preventing regions from satisfying the increasing needs for housing and labor in 
a timely manner as regional economies grow. 
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Figure 2.1. The Complex Causal Links between Land Use and Regional Economic Performance 
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Given that countervailing effects exist, in all probability, most regional economies will be pushed 
and pulled by both the negative and positive effects of land use planning and regulation.  The 
resultant forces may generate influences on regional growth and development that are dynamic in 
nature and that exhibit very complex paths over time.  Furthermore, the policy outcome – i.e., 
whether a land use regulation or planning actually promotes or hinders regional economic 
prosperity – might depend on the context, including the institutional setting, as well as the timing, 
degree of restrictiveness, and the detailed approaches of the intervention.   
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3. LAND USE REGULATION AND INTRAREGIONAL POPULATION – 
EMPLOYMENT INTERACTION 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Through the literature review, it has been found that land use regulations can bring a considerable 
amount of economic benefits by addressing market failures and realizing a well-organized spatial 
structure.  However, on the other hand, the regulations often delay the development process 
(Mayer & Somerville 2000) and sometimes shift the cost of development from the localities to 
developers (Quigley & Rosenthal 2005).  Raising barrier to development may prevent a region 
from satisfying the growing demand for labor and housing in a timely manner, even if there are 
significant opportunities for rapid economic growth.  As noted in section 2.5, recently Glaeser et 
al. (2006) and Saks (2008) highlight this issue and claim that strict land use regulations limit 
housing and thus labor supply, thereby hindering regional economic growth.   
 
Is the same claim valid at the intraregional level?  Within a highly regulated region, households 
could not respond to job growth at certain locations or job relocations, due to the inflexible local 
housing supply.  This situation may result in longer commuting distances, times, and costs as well 
as spatial mismatches.  For instance, if the supply of affordable housing units is significantly 
limited in suburban communities, many employees working for increasing suburban retailers or 
other firms may need to travel long distances everyday to work (probably from a central city, 
where housing units for low- or moderate-income households are available, to the suburban 
communities) due to the difficulties in moving into the regulated communities.  Furthermore, 
business relocation may also be influenced by the affected property market conditions or limited 
labor supply.  Consequently, the spatial structure of the region may be distorted and evolve into a 
state that is far from an efficient form.  
 
There are a few studies that have reported some evidence consistent with this possible adverse 
effect.  The studies include Levine (1998 and 2006) and Ihlanfeldt (2004) that point out that 
restrictive land use controls that exclusively favor low-density development, as opposed to 
housing units for low or moderate-income groups, may be responsible for intraregional spatial 
mismatch.  The studies by Shen (1996) and Pendall (2000), indicating the displacement or 
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exclusion as a consequence of some types of regulations, are also relevant.  Moreover, some 
literature on residential relocation suggests that local housing market conditions have significant 
implications for residential mobility of households (see e.g. Cameron & Muellbauer 1998 and 
Van der Vlist et al. 2002).   
 
This chapter empirically examines the possible adverse effect of land use regulations in the U.S. 
context.  The analysis focuses on how intraregional population-employment interaction varies by 
metropolitan areas having different degrees of land use regulations using two methods: 1) 
correlation analysis and 2) spatial econometric analysis.  The first analysis computes the 
correlation between disaggregated-level population and employment changes for each of selected 
40 large U.S. metropolitan areas and checks whether there is any notable relationship between the 
correlation and the degree of regulatory barriers to residential development (measured by a 
residential land use regulation index).  Here, consideration is also given to mean commuting time 
changes, a variable of policy interest that is closely related to this issue.  Then, in the second 
spatial econometric analysis, by employing a regional disequilibrium adjustment framework, an 
attempt is made to estimate some advanced measurements of intraregional population-
employment interaction (i.e. population adjustment rate; employment adjustment rate; magnitude 
of job effect on household location choice; and magnitude of population effect on business 
location choice) and closely investigate how such measures differ across regions with different 
regulation levels.  In the process, this study attempts to shed a light on the issue of interest, 
namely the potential effect of strict land use regulations on intraregional population-employment 
interaction.  
 
 
3.2. Correlation Analysis 
 
How are land use regulations and intraregional population-employment interactions related to 
each other?  What if land use regulations freeze local housing markets, thereby preventing people 
from following jobs in a timely manner?  In this section, these issues are explored through the 
examination of the relationships among three variables of interest: 1) the region-wide degree of 
regulatory barriers to residential land development, 2) the correlation between disaggregated-
level population and employment changes (hereafter, PCh-ECh Correlation), and 3) mean 
commuting time change.  If the hypothesis that within a highly regulated region, households are 
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less likely to relocate responding to the changes in job conditions due to the inflexible local 
housing supply, there will be an expectation that commuting distances and times tend to increase. 
If these assumptions are correct, then the analysis should reveal 1) a negative relationship 
between the regulatory level and PCh-ECh Correlation and 2) a positive relationship between the 
regulatory level and mean commuting time changes, although the relationship itself does not 
necessarily verify that the hypothesis is correct.  
 
3.2.1. Variables & Data  
 
3.2.1.1. Land Use Regulation Index 
 
Pendall et al (2006) and many others have noted that a variety of land use policy instruments, 
ranging from traditional zoning ordinances to urban growth boundaries and impact fees, have 
been adopted by local or state governments in the U.S.  Also, the set of policy actions (e.g. zoning) 
is often qualitatively and administratively different in different regions.  For this reason, case 
studies, analyzing the effect of a government intervention in a particular location for a particular 
time period, are a typical format of research, dealing with primarily with land use policies.   
 
Despite the difficulties in comparison and quantification, however, there have been considerable 
efforts to synthesize a wide range of land use regulations across states in an attempt to measure 
the degree of regulatory actions in a quantitative manner.  An underlying rationale of the 
synthesis is that such regulations may commonly generate a certain effect, particularly on housing 
market, because they mostly raise barriers to land development by delaying the development 
process or increasing the cost of development.  In addition, the quantification allows comparisons 
or other types of analyses, seeking a more generalizable conclusion on the causes and effects of 
land use regulations in general like this study.  
 
The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI; Linneman & Summers 1991; 
Gyourko et al. 2008) is a notable accomplishment.  By conducting surveys and analyzing other 
information (e.g. how long it takes to get subdivision approvals; whether a region or locality 
implements some land use policy measures or not) an index has been produced that represents the 
level of regulatory barriers, covering metropolitan and some other areas in the U.S.   
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In this study, an index developed by Saks (2008) has been used; this index is primarily based on 
an earlier version (late 1980s) of WRLURI.  But it also reflects the outcomes of a few additional 
surveys, such as one by the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation project (Clark 1988) and by 
American Institute of Planners (1976).  In other words, the index is designed to represent the 
overall degree of various regulatory barriers to residential development, imposed by state as well 
as local governments.  This index was chosen not only because it considers a broader range of 
information but also because 1) it is available for a large number of U.S. metropolitan areas and 2) 
it represents the relative level of residential land use regulation in late 1980s, that corresponds to 
the time span of this analysis, namely 1990 to 2000.   
 
3.2.1.2. PCh-ECh Correlation (Correlation between disaggregated-level population and 
employment changes) 
 
The primary focus of interest is in intraregional population-employment interaction and its 
variance across regions having different levels of land use regulations.  Here, a simple way of 
operationalizing and quantifying this population-employment interaction within each region is 
used.  In other words, the correlation between population and employment changes for smaller 
geographical units is computed and employed. 
 
The Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) provides individual census tracts’ 2000 
population and employment as well as 1990 population and employment by traffic analysis zone 
for most U.S. metropolitan areas.  An area-based spatial interpolation technique is used to 
construct a dataset having both 1990 and 2000 population and employment for identical 
geography (i.e. census tracts) by translating 1990 information by traffic analysis zone to the 
values for each tract.   
 
Then, one more step is made to derive a better measurement of intraregional population-
employment interaction.  Consider two contrasting cases: (A) responding to a job increase in a 
census tract, a group of households locate in a census tract next to the tract having new jobs vs. 
(B) despite a job increase in a census tract, households do not or cannot respond to that signal by 
moving.  If the correlation between population and employment changes is computed at the 
census-tract-level, that is generally smaller than the typical scope of labor sheds in metropolitan 
areas, it is not possible to distinguish Case (A) from (B).  Therefore, alternatively, the correlation 
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between P∆ and EWI ∆⋅+ )(  is computed.  Here P∆ and E∆  are population and employment 
change of individual census tracts respectively.  W  is a spatial weight matrix constructed based 
on tract-level journey to work data (i.e. row-normalized flow matrix in which all diagonal 
elements are zero), so that EWI ∆⋅+ )(  indicates the employment change in the labor market 
centered on each census tract.   
 
Figures 3.1 through 3.3 show the correlations of three largest metropolitan areas in the U.S.: 1) 
New York, 2) Los Angeles, and 3) Chicago.  According to the regulation index, New York is a 
typical highly regulated region, while residential development in Chicago is relatively 
unregulated.  Los Angeles is between the two in terms of the index.  
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Figure 3.1. PCh-ECh Correlation: New York 
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Los Angeles (Regulation Index: 1.21)
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Figure 3.2. PCh-ECh Correlation: Los Angeles 
 
Chicago (Regulation Index: -1.01)
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Figure 3.3. PCh-ECh Correlation: Chicago 
 
For completeness, the correlation between PWI ∆⋅+ )( and E∆  instead of that between P∆ and 
EWI ∆⋅+ )(  was also calculated to see how much these two differ from each other.  There is no 
significant difference (the correlation between the two correlation variables is 0.910).  It has been 
also confirmed that the outcomes of this analysis are almost same in the two cases. 
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3.2.1.3. Mean Commuting Time Changes 
 
Mean commuting time information is almost readily available for most metropolitan areas.  CTPP 
provides not only region-wide but also more disaggregated-level mean commuting time data.  I 
compute the changes in place-of-work-based mean commuting time between 1990 and 2000 for 
each region.  The place-of-work-based value, as opposed to place-of-residence one, is chosen to 
better capture the potential increase in commuting time attributable to the difficulties in moving 
towards the job locations due to the limited housing options in and around the place-of-work. 
 
3.2.2. Study Areas  
 
Consideration is given to 40 metropolitan areas in U.S., meeting two conditions: 1) the 1990 
(initial year) population is greater than a million, so the number of census tracts (i.e. sample size) 
is sufficient for the analysis and 2) the residential land use regulation index is available (table 3.1).  
The 1990 Census definitions of metropolitan areas, corresponding to the index, are used here.   
 
Table 3.1. List of the Selected Study Areas  
 
Region 1990POP Regulation Index 
New York, NY PMSA 8,546,846 2.21 
San Francisco, CA PMSA 1,603,678 2.10 
Sacramento, CA MSA 1,481,102 1.89 
Riverside--San Bernardino, CA PMSA 2,588,793 1.73 
San Jose, CA PMSA 1,497,577 1.65 
San Diego, CA MSA 2,498,016 1.60 
Seattle, WA PMSA 1,972,961 1.48 
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA PMSA 8,863,164 1.21 
Newark, NJ PMSA 1,824,321 1.02 
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA 1,072,227 0.96 
Portland, OR PMSA 1,239,842 0.94 
Washington, DC--MD--VA MSA 3,923,574 0.86 
Boston, MA PMSA 2,870,669 0.86 
Baltimore, MD MSA 2,382,172 0.80 
Orlando, FL MSA 1,072,748 0.50 
Philadelphia, PA--NJ PMSA 4,856,881 0.47 
Miami--Hialeah, FL PMSA 1,937,094 0.47 
31 
Table 3.1 (cont.) 
 
Region 1990POP Regulation Index 
Pittsburgh, PA PMSA 2,056,705 0.26 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywood--Pompano Beach, FL PMSA 1,255,488 0.23 
Milwaukee, WI PMSA 1,432,149 0.19 
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA 2,067,959 0.16 
Cincinnati, OH—KY--IN PMSA 1,452,645 0.16 
Oakland, CA PMSA 2,082,914 0.10 
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA 1,162,093 -0.04 
Columbus, OH MSA 1,377,419 -0.07 
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI MSA 2,464,124 -0.16 
New Orleans, LA MSA 1,238,816 -0.2 
Cleveland, OH PMSA 1,831,122 -0.25 
Houston, TX PMSA 3,301,937 -0.52 
Indianapolis, IN MSA 1,249,822 -0.55 
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA 2,444,099 -0.66 
San Antonio, TX MSA 1,302,099 -0.66 
Denver, CO PMSA 1,622,980 -0.68 
Rochester, NY MSA 1,002,410 -0.68 
Detroit, MI PMSA 4,382,299 -0.69 
Atlanta, GA MSA 2,833,511 -0.77 
Phoenix, AZ MSA 2,122,101 -0.91 
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA 1,566,280 -0.95 
Chicago, IL PMSA 6,069,974 -1.01 
Dallas, TX PMSA 2,553,362 -1.18 
Note: A higher value of regulation index (Saks 2008) indicates a more severe residential land use regulation. 
 
3.2.3. Analysis Outcomes 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between the regulation index (on the x-axis) and the PCh-ECh 
correlation (on the y-axis).  Although the relationship is not very strong, they are negatively 
associated with each other (correlation = –0.314).  This is consistent with the hypothesis.  
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Figure 3.4. Relationship between Regulation Index and Intraregional PCh-ECh Correlation  
 
I also relate both the regulation index and PCh-ECh correlation to the mean commuting time 
changes.  The outcomes are presented in figure 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.  As expected, the 
commuting time changes show a positive relationship with the regulation index and a negative 
relationship with the intraregional PCh-ECh correlation.  This suggests that commuting time 
tends to increase more in highly regulated regions where generally population and employment 
are not strongly tied to each other.  It should be noted that commuting time changes are more 
strongly associated with the regulation index rather than the PCh-ECh correlation.  This may 
imply that the real spatial mismatch between a particular class of jobs and the corresponding (or 
affordable) housing supply would be more serious than what I captured by using the correlation 
between aggregated population and aggregated employment.  
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Relationship between Regulation Index and Mean Commuting Time Change
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Figure 3.5. Relationship between Regulation Index and Mean Commuting Time Change 
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Figure 3.6. Relationship between PCh-ECh Correlation and Mean Commuting Time Change 
 
In addition, the analysis probed whether the relationships vary by metropolitan size, measured by 
1990 (initial year) population, to explore whether the hypothesis may be more valid in certain size 
categories.  The selected study regions were grouped into two categories – 1) those greater than 
two million and. 2) those between one and two million – and performed a similar analysis.  As 
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summarized in table 3.2, the relationships are much stronger in relatively smaller metropolitan 
areas, while the relations, except the one between PCh-ECh correlation and commuting time 
change, are somewhat maintained in larger regions as well. 
 
Table 3.2. Relationships among the Variables of Interest in Different Sizes of Metropolitan Areas  
 
Category Relationship Type Slope R-Squared Correlation 
Regulation Index (X) and  
PCh-ECh Correlation (Y) 
-0.036 0.071 -0.267 
Regulation Index (X) and  
Commuting Time Change (Y) 
0.269 0.117 0.342 
Greater than two 
million (n=19) 
PCh-ECh Correlation (X) and  
Commuting Time Change (Y) 
0.100 0.000 0.017 
Regulation Index (X) and  
PCh-ECh Correlation (Y) 
-0.051 0.136 -0.368 
Regulation Index (X) and  
Commuting Time Change (Y) 
0.859 0.351 0.593 
Between one and 
two million (n=21) 
PCh-ECh Correlation (X) and  
Commuting Time Change (Y) 
-5.789 0.311 -0.558 
 
 
Finally, tests were performed to explore whether a particular type of intervention is more or less 
relevant to the lower PCh-ECh correlation and increasing mean commuting time. For this purpose, 
four components of the regulation index, which are available, were used – 1) months to approve 
subdivision, 2) number of growth management techniques, 3) implementation of development 
fees, and 4) state-level regulatory index – individually, as opposed to the aggregated index and 
see how the relationships vary by types of intervention.16  Different approaches to land use 
control may generate different impacts, although they may commonly raise barriers to land 
development within the regions, as mentioned above.  Therefore, by checking the intervention-
type-specific relation to the PCh-ECh correlation and commuting time change, we can obtain a 
refined understanding of the potential effect from which more informative policy lessons are 
eventually drawn.  For example, if it is determined that the delay of development (measured in 
terms of the months to approve subdivision) only matters, we could say that the potential negative 
impact of land use regulations on intraregional population-employment interaction can be 
effectively addressed by reducing the delay through appropriate institutional or procedure reform.  
                                                 
16 The original data sources of these components of the index are an earlier version of WRLURI (Linneman & 
Summers 1991) and a survey by American Institute of Planners (1976).  This information is available through Mayer & 
Somerville (2000) and Malpezzi (1996). 
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In contrast, if the implementation of impact fees is found to have a more significant relationship, 
we could recognize that extra development costs imposed on the developers may be related to this 
issue and pay further attention to the improvement of the policy instrument.  
 
It is found that the relationships hold in every case (table 3.3).  In particular, the relationships 
appear most apparent, when a statistic, representing the time delay in development process (i.e. 
Months to approve subdivision) is adopted.  This may suggest various land use regulations 
generally have some potential effects on intraregional population-employment interaction and, 
consequently, affect commuting time within the region, although the delay of development matter 
most significantly.  
 
Table 3.3. Relationships by Intervention Type 
 
Correlation with 
Intervention type 
PCh-ECh Correlation Mean Commuting Time Change 
Months to approve subdivision 1 -0.484  0.359  
Number of growth management techniques 1 -0.146  0.391  
Implementation of development fees 1 -0.145  0.229  
State-level regulatory index 2 -0.251  0.178  
Sources: 1) Linneman & Summers (1991) and Mayer & Somerville (2000)  
 2) American Institute of Planners (1976) 
 
 
3.3. Spatial Econometric Analysis 
 
Through the correlation analysis, it was found that a highly regulated region is more likely to 
show a lower level of intraregional PCh-ECh correlation and an increasing mean commuting time 
between 1990 and 2000.  However, the findings of the correlation analysis do not necessarily 
mean that the hypothesis is valid.  It is probable that household location decisions in highly 
regulated regions depend less on job locations than those in less-regulated areas.  The observed 
lower PCh-ECh correlation may also be attributable to the business-side reasons. In other words, 
the PCh-ECh correlation has limited usefulness in informing how intraregional population-
employment interaction varies by metropolitan areas having different degrees of land use 
regulations.   
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In this section, the investigation focuses on the intraregional population-employment interaction 
more closely and checks four possible explanations for the relatively looser connection between 
population and employment changes in highly regulated areas. 
1) Lower household mobility … This means that households cannot rapidly respond to the 
evolving job conditions or other factors within a highly regulated area.  This explanation 
is consistent with the hypothesis.  
2) Smaller magnitude of job effect on household location choice … This means that 
households in a more regulated region may consider other factors, such as natural 
amenities, public services, etc, more importantly, when they decide their places of 
residence. 
3) Lower business mobility … Businesses may also follow people.  But the mobility may 
vary by regions.  This explanation means that businesses are hard to locate or relocate 
where they want to be, if the metropolitan area is highly regulated.  This may be the case, 
because residential land use regulations can affect the entire property market, including 
business space supply.  Another possibility is that commercial-industrial development 
may also be much more regulated in the metropolitan areas having higher values of the 
residential land use regulation index.  
4) Smaller magnitude of population effect on business location choice … This means that 
business do consider population distribution as less important in highly regulated regions 
for some reasons, such as different industrial structures, different production recipes, and 
so on, in their location decision making. 
 
Although these four explanations are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, explanation (2), 
(3), and (4) can be regarded as alternative hypotheses.  And, by examining what explanation is 
the case, we can better understand why highly regulated regions tend to show the relatively 
weaker connection between intraregional population and employment changes and, further, 
obtain an enhanced insight into the potential negative effect of strict land use regulations, 
although this investigation is not a test of causality.17  This is accomplished by conducting a 
spatial econometric analysis, using a regional disequilibrium adjustment framework, in which 
population and employment interaction is explicitly described in a form of simultaneous equation 
system.  
                                                 
17 This investigation approach has bee employed by Sohn (2004) and many other studies, which attempt to draw better 
insights, understandings, and policy recommendations from the found patterns or correlations.     
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3.3.1. Regional Disequilibrium Adjustment Framework 
 
The regional disequilibrium adjustment model (RDAM) was initially developed by Steinnes & 
Fisher (1974) and Carlino & Mills (1987), and then further extended by Boarnet (1994a) to a 
spatial econometric version.  Because the RDAM framework properly separates population-
employment interaction out of the other factors, it has been used by various studies, 1) 
determining whether jobs follow people or people follow jobs or the both (see e.g. Steinnes 1977; 
Boarnet 1994b), 2) examining the determinants of growth or location decisions (see e.g. Steinnes 
& Fisher 1974; Fisher & Fisher 1975; Carlino & Mills 1987; Boarnet 1994a), 3) investigating 
spread vs. backwash effects (Henry et al. 1997 and 2001; Feser & Isserman 2005), and 4) 
analyzing the impacts of other events or policies (see e.g. Bollinger & Ihlanfeldt. 1997; 
Carruthers & Mulligan 2007).   
 
The RDAM framework assumes that the spatial distributions of population and employment are 
at disequilibrium but tending to adjust to an equilibrium point that is moving over time.  The 
framework regards the adjustment process towards the equilibrium state as the main element of 
population and employment changes.  It also considers other determinants of household and 
business location decisions – i.e. H and B in following RDAM equations –, in accordance with 
more traditional urban location theories. 
 
More specifically, an estimable RDAM can be formulated, as follows.  First, the equilibrium 
levels of population and employment of area i at time t, that are not observable, can be written: 
),( *,,
*
, tititi EHfP =    (3-1)      
),( *,,
*
, tititi PBgE =    (3-2) 
where tiH ,  and tiB ,  indicate a vector of household and business location factors of zone i at time 
t respectively; and 
*
,tiP  and
*
,tiE  represent equilibrium population and employment in the labor 
market centered on zone i at t. 
 
As noted above, assuming that actual population and employment are adjusting to their 
equilibrium points, population and employment changes that can be observed are expressed: 
)( 1,
*
,1,,, −− −⋅=−=∆ titiptititi PPPPP λ    (3-3)  
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*
,1,,, −− −⋅=−=∆ titiEtititi EEEEE λ    (3-4)  
where pλ  and Eλ  are [0,1] adjustment rates of population and employment changes responding 
to the gap between t-1 state and equilibrium level at t. 
 
Applying the same logic, the changes in population and employment in the labor market centered 
on zone i at time t are: 
)( 1,
*
,1,,, −− −⋅=−=∆ titiptititi PPPPP λ    (3-5) 
)( 1,
*
,1,,, −− −⋅=−=∆ titiEtititi EEEEE λ    (3-6) 
 
By rearranging the equations, we can get  
 )(1 1,,1,
*
, −− −⋅+= titi
p
titi PPPP λ    (3-7) 
 )(1 1,,1,
*
, −− −⋅+= titi
E
titi EEEE λ    (3-8) 
 
One more required step for making a RDAM is to specify the population and employment in the 
labor market centered on each zone.  As explained when the method of intraregional PCh-ECh 
correlation calculation is presented in the previous section, the census-tract is typically smaller 
than the scope of labor sheds in metropolitan areas, so that the population and employment 
growth in a particular tract may be directly influenced the employment and population changes in 
adjacent areas as well as the changes in the very tract.  The RDAM is designed to consider such 
effects over the tract boundary by using the population and employment in the labor market 
centered on zone i, rather than those in the zone only.  More specifically, the population and 
employment in the labor market centered on zone i at t is computed by employing a spatial 
weight matrix (W), as follows.   
titi PWIP ,, )( ⋅+=    (3-9) 
 titi EWIE ,, )( ⋅+=    (3-10) 
 
If (3-9) and (3-10) are plugged into (3-7) and (3-8), then  
ti
p
titi PWIPWIP ,1,
*
, )(
1)( ∆⋅+⋅+⋅+= − λ    (3-11) 
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To finalize the formulation, let’s assume a linear relationship in equation (1) and (2) and 
substitute into equation (3) and (4).  This generates 
titiptipPtiti uPEHP ,1,
*
,,, +⋅−⋅+⋅=∆ −λθβ    (3-13) 
titiEtiEEtiti vEPBE ,1,
*
,,, +⋅−⋅+⋅=∆ −λθβ    (3-14) 
where Pβ and Eβ are column vectors of parameters for individual household and business 
location factors; pθ  and Eθ  are scalar parameters; and tiu ,  and tiv ,  are i.i.d. errors. 
 
By plugging (3-11) and (3-12) into (3-13) and (3-14), finally, an estimable RDAM can be derived, 
as follows. 
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In the next section, attention will be directed to the main parameters of interest. 
 
3.3.2. Parameters of Interest 
 
There are four main parameters of interest, which are associated with the four explanations for the 
found weaker connection between intraregional population and employment changes in highly 
regulated regions, respectively: 1) lower household mobility, 2) smaller magnitude of job effects 
on household location choice, 3) lower business mobility and 4) smaller magnitude of population 
effect on business location choice.  The first one is pλ , which is the rate of population adjustment 
responding to the gap between its state and the equilibrium level; and thus represents the level of 
household mobility.  If the estimated values of pλ  for highly regulated areas are significantly 
lower than those of relatively unregulated regions, it could be argued that households in a highly 
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regulated region could not respond to new job conditions or other location factors in a timely 
manner, so that intraregional population and employment changes are not well connected.   
  
The second parameter of interest is pθ , the magnitude of the effect of employment on population, 
relevant to the second explanation.  This indicates how strong job conditions influence household 
location decision-making in a region.  If the estimated values of pθ  for highly regulated areas are 
smaller than those of less regulated areas, the relatively looser connection between population and 
employment changes in the regulated regions can be attributed to the differences in household 
location choice preference.   
  
In the same vein, Eλ  and Eθ  are associated with the third and fourth explanation, respectively.  
In other words, it is possible to check whether the third and fourth explanations are the case or not, 
by analyzing how Eλ  (representing business mobility) and Eθ  (meaning the magnitude of 
population effect on business location choice) vary by regions having different regulatory levels.   
 
It needs to be noted that each parameter of interest cannot be determined based on a single 
estimated coefficient in the RDAM, namely a set of equation (3-15) and (3-16).  For instance, pλ  
is included in both population and employment change equations, so that can be obtained in two 
different ways: 1) from the estimated coefficient of 1, −tiP  in population change equation and 2) 
from the estimated coefficients of  1,)( −⋅+ tiPWI  and tiPWI ,)( ∆⋅+  in employment change 
equation.  The case of Eλ  is similar.  In addition, Pθ  and Eθ  can be derived by using two 
estimated coefficients, 1,)( −⋅+ tiEWI  & 1, −tiP  and 1,)( −⋅+ tiPWI  & 1, −tiE  respectively.  For this 
reason, the values of the parameters are accepted only when all these coefficients in each equation 
have statistically significant estimates.   
 
3.3.3. Data & Estimation 
 
Like the exploratory analysis presented above, I consider the 40 metropolitan areas; the time span 
of analysis is 1990 to 2000; a spatial weight matrix (W), constructed based on tract-level journey 
to work data, is used.  For the independent variables, the 1990 Census, CTPP, and National 
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Highway Planning Network data that are commonly available for all study areas are used (see 
table 3.4).   
 
The RDAM is a spatial cross-regressive simultaneous equation system (according to the Rey & 
Boarnet’s (2004) taxonomy).  Due to the feedback and spatial simultaneity problems, traditional 
least square techniques, including traditional two-stage least square, cannot yield consistent and 
unbiased estimates.  Hence, the model is estimated using a spatial generalized moments (GM) 
approach, initially developed by Kelejian & Robinson (1993) and later extended by Kelejian & 
Prucha (1998 and 1999).  According to Rey & Boarnet’s (2004) Monte Carlo simulation 
experiments, the GM estimation method performs better than alternatives, especially as the 
number of samples increases.  In this case, instrumental variables for the endogenous variables 
are XWyXXX 1)( −′  rather than [ ]XyXXXW 1)( −′ . 
 
Table 3.4. Independent Variables and Data Sources in the RDAM Estimation  
  
Variable Description Data Sources 
NWR The Ratio of Non-White Population in 1990 Census 1990 
HISPR The Ratio of Hispanic Population in 1990 Census 1990 
VACR Vacancy Rate in 1990 Census 1990 
EDU 1 The Level of the Educational Attainment in 1990 Census 1990 
MHOHINC Median Household Income in 1990 Census 1990 
MHV Median Value of Specified Housing Units in 1990 Census 1990 
POVR Poverty Rate in 1990 Census 1990 
MIXE 2 Industry-mix effect 1990~2000  CTPP 1990 
SHARE90_S(j) 3 Share of sector j in 1990 CTPP 1990 
HW_All 
A dummy variable, indicating whether there is any 
types of highway in the tract   
National Highway Planning Network 
data 
HW_C1 
A dummy variable, indicating whether there is 
interstate-highway (Functional Class: 01) in the 
tract 
National Highway Planning Network 
data 
HW_C2 
A dummy variable, indicating whether there is 
other expressway (Functional Class: 02) in the tract 
National Highway Planning Network 
data 
1) EDU is defined as a percentage of 25+ population, whose educational attainment is Bachelor's degree or above 
2) This represents the relative advantage of each tract for job growth because of its industrial structure in initial year.   
 
More specifically, it is defined as   
 
where TrtEmp(j,t) and REmp(j,t) are tract-level and regional employment in sector j at time t, respectively 
   
3) This is defined as  
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3.3.4. Analysis Outcomes 
 
Using the spatial GM approach, the model for each region is estimated.  To obtain the final 
estimation outcomes, the model specification is repeatedly modified, by excluding the 
independent variables that are statistically insignificant (10%-level).  Table 3.5 presents the final 
estimation outcomes for Cincinnati, as an example.18  
 
Table 3.5. An Example of the Estimation Outcomes: Cincinnati (Regulation Index = 0.16 | n = 346) 
  
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic P-value 
Population Change Equation     
C Intercept -673.166 246.842 -2.72712 [.006] 
IWECH tiEWI ,)( ∆⋅+ ; This coefficient is EPp λθλ ⋅  0.611898 0.135464 4.51706 [.000] 
P0 1, −tiP ; This coefficient is pλ−  -0.082974 0.037665 -2.20298 [.028] 
IWE0 1,)( −⋅+ tiEWI ; This coefficient is pp θλ ⋅  0.046433 0.019877 2.33598 [.019] 
MHOHINC Median household income 0.021798 5.00E-03 4.35868 [.000] 
MHV Median value of specified housing units -7.59E-03 2.34E-03 -3.24509 [.001] 
R-squared = 0.151 | Adjusted R-squared = 0.139     
      
Employment Change Equation     
C Intercept -706.856 286.714 -2.46537 [.014] 
IWPCH tiPWI ,)( ∆⋅+ ; This coefficient is PEE λθλ ⋅  0.523736 0.116596 4.4919 [.000] 
E0 1, −tiE ; This coefficient is Eλ−  -0.142054 0.026769 -5.30675 [.000] 
IWP0 1,)( −⋅+ tiPWI ; This coefficient is EE θλ ⋅  0.099835 0.034612 2.88443 [.004] 
MIXE Industry mix effect 0.527012 0.140346 3.7551 [.000] 
SHARE90_S2 Share of Construction Sector  -2395.78 1131.42 -2.11749 [.034] 
SHARE90_S7 
Share of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
Sector  
3111.51 1445.52 2.15252 [.031] 
HW_C1 Interstate highway dummy 351.369 135.519 2.59276 [.010] 
R-squared = 0.192 | Adjusted R-squared = 0.175     
 
Some of the estimated coefficients, presented in table 3.5, need to be explained.  First, the 
negative coefficient of MHV may suggest that a greater amount of housing costs tend to push 
people out of the area.  The positive value of SHARE90_S7’s coefficient can be interpreted as the 
                                                 
18 It needs to be noted that the low values of r-squared, to some extents, are attributable to the model design in which 
population or employment changes (as opposed to population and employment levels) are dependent variables.  In fact, 
most studies, specifying the RDAM in this way, report r-squared lower than 0.40.  Another reason may be a limited 
number of independent variables considered due to the data availability problem.  
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attracting force of the financial sector.  Finally, the negative coefficient of SHARE90_S2 can be 
attributed to the temporary construction jobs in the field.  In other words, the areas showing a 
high share of construction sector in 1990 tend to show a job loss after the completion of 
development projects which would not last a decade (i.e. from 1990 to 2000).     
 
Like many other studies employing the RDAM, for some metropolitan areas, statistically 
insignificant estimates for key variables are often found: IWECH, P0, and IWE0 in population 
change equation and IWPCH, E0, and IWP0 in employment change equation.  This may happen, 
because all location factors cannot be considered due to the data availability problem.  According 
to Boarnet et al. (2005), the performance of this model can be improved by considering micro 
land use information as explanatory variables.  Also, Mulligan and others’ (1999) experiment 
suggests that better estimation outcomes would be obtained, if 5 years or shorter time spans are 
used in the analysis.  However, a shorter time span or sufficient explanatory variables could not 
be used in this study, because tract-level population and employment data only available for 
decennial years; and the information for many other factors at this level is unavailable. 
 
As mentioned above, in these cases of invalid estimation outcomes, it is impossible to determine 
valid values of the four parameters of interest.  Therefore, the outcomes of these regions are not 
considered.  The estimation outcomes of the key coefficients in valid cases are summarized in 
table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6. Estimation Outcome Summary: 16 Metropolitan Areas Showing Valid Results 
  
Population Change Equation Employment Change Equation 
Region 
Regulation 
Index 
IWECH 
(
EPp λθλ ⋅ ) 
P0 
(
pλ− ) 
IWE0 
(
pp θλ ⋅ ) 
IWPCH 
(
PEE λθλ ⋅ ) 
P0 
(
Eλ− ) 
IWE0 
(
EE θλ ⋅ ) 
Sacramento, CA MSA 1.89 Not Valid 0.95037**** -0.12610* 0.14430** 
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA PMSA 1.21 Not Valid 0.25126*** -0.04758**** 0.04345*** 
Miami--Hialeah, FL PMSA 0.47 Not Valid 0.50012** -0.12156**** 0.11611** 
Philadelphia, PA--NJ PMSA 0.47 0.32855**** -0.03184** 0.02665*** 0.71001**** -0.14916**** 0.04574** 
Pittsburgh, PA PMSA 0.26 0.12070**** -0.03464** 0.06373**** 0.47314** -0.29661**** 0.14598**** 
Fort Lauderdale--Hollywood--Pompano 
Beach, FL PMSA 
0.23 0.66911*** -0.11623** 0.07097* 0.43375*** -0.09684*** 0.09795* 
Milwaukee, WI PMSA 0.19 0.39182**** -0.05889* 0.07807**** 0.52439**** -0.16191**** 0.12449*** 
Cincinnati, OH—KY--IN PMSA 0.16 0.61190**** -0.08297** 0.04643** 0.52374*** -0.14205**** 0.09984*** 
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA 0.16 Not Valid 0.67406**** -0.20866** 0.15683*** 
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA -0.04 Not Valid 0.43678** -0.20428**** 0.13095* 
Columbus, OH MSA -0.07 0.39945*** -0.09865** 0.02295* Not Valid 
San Antonio, TX MSA -0.66 Not Valid 0.76274**** -0.55355**** 0.15554** 
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA -0.66 0.36427**** -0.08224*** 0.04277** 0.49847*** -0.21192**** 0.06510** 
Rochester, NY MSA -0.68 Not Valid 0.71154* -0.12624**** 0.13357* 
Detroit, MI PMSA -0.69 0.23336**** -0.07150**** 0.02727*** Not Valid 
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA -0.95 0.56793**** -0.13350**** 0.05585** 0.28365** -0.33916**** 0.10012*** 
Note: **** 0.1% level | *** 1% level | ** 5% level of significance | * 10% level of significance. 
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Using the valid estimation outcomes, the parameter values are determined for individual 
metropolitan areas.  Then, they are related to the regulation index to see how they differ across 
regions with different regulation levels.  Figures 3.7 through 3.10 demonstrate the relationships 
between the region-wide land use regulation index and the four parameters.  
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Figure 3.7. Relationship between Regulation Index and Household Mobility (
pλ ) 
 
Relationship between Regulation Index and the Magnitude of Job Effect
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Figure 3.8. Relationship between Regulation Index and the Magnitude of Job Effect (
pθ ) 
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Relationship between Regulation Index and Business Mobility
y = 0.0748x + 0.1622
R
2
 = 0.0687
y = -0.0944x + 0.2128
R
2
 = 0.3203
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Regulation Index
B
u
si
n
es
s 
M
o
b
ili
ty
from Pop Change Eq
from Emp Change Eq
Linear (from Pop Change Eq)
Linear (from Emp Change Eq)
Correlation = -0.566
Correlation = 0.262
 
Figure 3.9. Relationship between Regulation Index and Business Mobility (
Eλ ) 
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Figure 3.10. Relationship between Regulation Index and the Magnitude of Population Effect (
Eθ ) 
 
Although the valid outcomes are obtained only for a limited number of study regions, this set of 
the results, as it stands, suggests that a more regulated metropolitan area tends to have: 
1) a lower level of household mobility (figure 3.7); 
2) a greater magnitude of job effect on household location choice (figure 3.8); 
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3) mixed outcomes regarding business mobility (figure 3.9)19; 
4) a greater magnitude of population effect on business location choice (figure 3.10) 
 
Overall, at least, the results may suggest that the alternative hypotheses, particularly a smaller 
magnitude of job effect on household location choice and a smaller magnitude of population 
effect on business location choice, may not be the case.  Rather, intraregional population and 
employment may not be well interconnected in regulated metropolitan areas due to the lower 
household mobility, even though household and businesses may want to locate closer to each 
other, consistent with the hypothesis of this research. 
 
 
3.4. Summary & Discussion 
 
In this study, I attempt to examine whether or not land use regulations prevent people from 
responding to new job conditions or other location factors in a timely manner, by analyzing how 
intraregional population-employment interaction varies by regions having different degrees of 
land use regulations.  Through the correlation analysis, the results revealed that highly regulated 
metropolitan areas are more likely to show lower levels of correlation between intraregional 
population and employment changes and increasing mean commuting time between 1990 and 
2000.  Also, the estimation outcomes of the spatial econometric analysis, using a regional 
disequilibrium adjustment model, suggest that household mobility is lower in more regulated 
areas than relatively less regulated regions, consistent with the hypothesis.  
  
However, the findings rest on limited analysis outcomes and thus are not conclusive.  In the 
correlation analysis, various other factors that may influence the PCh-ECh correlation or 
commuting time changes are not controlled.  Also, in the spatial econometric analysis, valid 
estimation outcomes were available for only some metropolitan areas.  In particular, many highly 
                                                 
19 First, the estimated coefficients of employment change equations indicate a poorer mobility of business in a highly 
regulated metropolitan area.  This can be explained by 1) that commercial-industrial development is also much more 
regulated in the regions having high values of the index, although the index primarily represents residential land use 
regulations or 2) that residential land use regulations affects property market, as a whole, so that business mobility is 
influenced.  However, the opposite relationship (i.e. a higher level of business mobility in the region with higher 
regulation index) is derived from the estimates in the population change equations.  
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regulated regions cannot be considered in the interpretation of the outcomes, due to the problem 
of insignificant estimates.   
 
This study is also limited in the sense that aggregated population and employment, as opposed to 
households by group and businesses by sector, are modeled.  As well presented in housing and 
migration literature, household location choice heavily depends on many demographic (e.g. 
household size, age, children, etc) and economic (income level, one-earner vs. two-earner 
households, etc) factors.  A great deal of heterogeneity also exists in business location decision-
making, because of the differences in production recipes, suppliers, and customers.  This issue of 
aggregation is clearly important as some income groups have no limitations while, for lower 
income groups, land use regulation may generate significant impediments to re-location. 
 
Also, the 10 year time span of this analysis may not be ideal for obtaining precise values of 
residential or business location mobility, although this is somewhat inevitable due to the limited 
availability of disaggregated-level data.  Furthermore, the direction of causality has not been 
tested especially whether land use regulations are really responsible for the observed inclinations 
of highly regulated regions, such as the relatively weak intraregional population-employment 
connections and increasing mean commuting time.   
 
Nevertheless, by showing some empirical analysis outcomes corresponding to the hypothesis, the 
present research may be able to provide land use planners or policy makers with a meaningful 
caution about their regulatory actions.  It is probable that strict regulatory barriers make local 
housing markets less flexible and dampen household mobility and that may result in the reduced 
utility of residents and further reduced profits of businesses.  Moreover, the affected intraregional 
population-employment interaction may generate longer commuting times, distances and costs 
and distort the spatial structure of the region.  However, the results should not be interpreted to 
imply that planners’ intervention in the land development process is harmful.  Rather, it is a claim 
for more informed decision-making as well as a balanced view of the benefits and costs of land 
use regulations.  
 
 
 
49 
 4. LAND USE PLANNING AS INFORMATION PRODUCTION & EXCHANGE 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Government interventions in land use planning have been traditionally justified from an economic 
perspective as well as by political theories and environmental rationales.  In particular, welfare 
economic theory, combined with the demonstration of some market failures that can be traced to 
externalities and public goods problems, has been mainly used for the justification.  As explained 
in the literature review, for example, Bailey (1959) noted that the welfare level of land owners 
can be raised by appropriate land use controls that eliminate existing negative externalities.  He 
argued that this welfare increase is a major benefit of land use planning.  Davis (1963) considered 
the ideal zoning restriction as a state “under which external diseconomies are simply eliminated” 
(p.383), so that land use becomes more economically efficient.  In addition to these early studies, 
many others have justified government action in the form of land use planning and regulation, in 
a similar way – i.e. using welfare economics per se.  The studies would include Gardner (1977) 
and Moore (1978)’s work that focus on the issue of public goods as well as Lee’s (1981) article, 
Land Use Planning as a Response to Market Failure, where the regulations of the land market 
process are advocated.  Furthermore, such claims have been supported by many empirical studies 
that demonstrate the virtual existence of negative externalities in the context of uncontrolled land 
use (see e.g. Stull 1975; Lafferty & Frech 1978: Burnell 1985) or the benefits of environmental 
amenities, preserved by the regulations (see e.g. Correll et al. 1978; Spalatro & Provencher 2001). 
 
However, there are some critical shortcomings of the justification on the basis of welfare 
economic theory and the existence of typical market failures.  First, because it is a static 
framework, the welfare economics approach has limited usefulness in dealing with land use and 
development issues, which are dynamic and irreversible in nature (see e.g. Ohls & Pines 1975; 
Arnott & Lewis 1979; Capozza & Helsley 1990).  In addition, based on the government vs. 
market dichotomy, this approach only considers the possible benefits of land use regulation, 
which is just an end-product from a series of land use planning practices, in addressing market 
failures and, consequently, achieving a higher level of the efficiency in land allocation among 
 
 
 
50 
various uses.20  It neglects the other benefits of the entire land use planning process, particularly 
the aspect of information production and exchange.  Land use planning practice produces 
information relevant to land use as well as facilitates the exchange of information, and 
consequently may reduce uncertainties and help the decision-making of various actors involved in 
the process of land development (Friend & Jessop 1969; Schaeffer & Hopkins 1987; Knaap et al. 
1998).  In other words, land use planning practice could bring some economic benefits, even if 
the final decision – that may or may not be a regulatory action – does not achieve a higher level 
of the efficiency in allocation.     
 
The importance of this contribution of land use planning (i.e. information production and 
exchange) has been emphasized by studies that draw on transaction-cost economic (TCE) theory.  
For instance, as mentioned in the literature review, Alexander (1992, 1994, and 2001) claimed 
that land markets generally bear substantial uncertainties and unnecessary transaction costs, thus 
requiring government intervention which reduces those costs by providing valuable information 
more efficiently.  Dawkins (2000) also highlighted this point by arguing that land use planning 
practices or regulatory interventions by government can effectively lower uncertainties as well as 
transaction costs involved in land development processes.   
 
Notwithstanding these important theoretical discussions, empirical studies that validate the 
theoretical suppositions are scarce, so that little is known about the real-world effect of land use 
planning on uncertainties and transaction costs.21  The present study attempts to fill this gap.  
Here, an examination is made to see whether or not land use planning actually contributes to 
reducing the level of uncertainty in land markets as suggested by the TCE-based claims.  Rather 
than considering various kinds of uncertainties in multi-stage land development and land use 
processes, the focus will be on a particular case, namely the urban fringe land markets where 
farmland owners are faced with uncertainty regarding the timing of potential land development 
for urban uses.  Based on an understanding of the strategic behavior of farmland owners under 
                                                 
20 In fact, land use planning is different from the regulatory behavior of government.  As noted in chapter 2, Hopkins 
(2001) makes this point clear by explaining that “Regulations [are] … enforceable assignment and reassignment of 
rights.  Regulations affect the scope of permissible actions.  Plans … provide information about interdependent 
decisions in relation to expected outcomes but these plans do not determine directly the scope of permissible actions” 
(p.9-10).   
21 There are a few empirical studies which examine whether plans or information contained in the plans, as opposed to 
the regulatory actions, have effects on decision-making of economic agents (See e.g. Talen 1996a and 1996b; Knaap et 
al. 2001).  But they do not test the validity of the TCE-based justification of land use planning. 
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uncertainty, the validity of the TCE-based justification is tested by conducting an exploratory 
spatial data analysis first followed by an MSA-level statistical analysis.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.2 briefly discusses the choice 
problems and decision making of farmland owners for using urban fringe areas until the uncertain 
time point of development and the consequences if land use planning, particularly the urban 
growth boundary (UGB), reduces the uncertainty as suggested by the TCE-based argument.  In 
section 4.3, the farmland use pattern in Oregon is explored as an example to see how farmland 
owners may exploit or respond to the information in the UGB.  Section 4.4 presents a regression 
analysis designed to measure the effect of the land use planning practice (i.e. UGB establishment) 
on uncertainty reduction, by using the data of 82 single-county MSAs across states.  A 
concluding section, where the findings are summarized and discussed, completes the paper. 
 
 
4.2. Behaviors of Farmland Owners & the Establishment of UGBs  
 
Farmland conversion to developed land is a general trend across the states.  According to the 
1997 National Resources Inventory prepared by USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS), approximately 15 million acres of cropland, pastureland, and rangeland had been 
developed for urban uses between 1982 and 1997 (table 4.1).  In particular, the farmland at the 
urban fringe has been the main target of the new development.   
 
Under this situation with a high pressure or probability of conversion, the farmland owners at the 
urban fringe are facing two types of important decision-making every year.  The first decision to 
be made is a discrete choice on whether to subdivide their lots and convert them for urban uses 
right now or keep using the land for agricultural production at least for the current year. 22  The 
farmland owners, who seek to maximize their profits, may develop their land, if and only if they 
conclude that the conversion at this time brings a greater value in terms of the future stream of 
returns than all other alternatives (i.e. no conversion or conversion at all other time points), 
                                                 
22 This (first) decision-making process has been discussed more intensively by many studies on land use changes, such 
as Bockstael (1996), Irwin & Geoghegan (2001), and Segerson et al. (2006).     
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considering the profitability of continuing agricultural production activities and the expected 
returns of the development in future.23  
 
Table 4.1. Land Use Change between 1982 and 1997 in the United States (Unit: 1000 acres) 
 
Land cover/use in 1997 
Land 
cover/use 
in 1982 Cropland 
CRP 
land 
Pasture-
land 
Range-
land 
Forest 
land 
Other 
rural 
land 
Developed 
land 
Water 
areas & 
federal 
land 
1982 
total 
Cropland 350,265 30,412 19,269 3,659 5,607 3,159 7,098 1,485 420,954 
Pasture-
land 
15,347 1,330 92,088 2,568 14,091 1,619 4,230 733 132,006 
Rangeland 6,968 729 3,037 394,617 3,022 1,703 3,281 3,383 416,739 
Forest land 2,037 129 4,168 2,099 380,343 1,755 10,279 2,528 403,338 
Other rural 
land 
1,387 93 1,014 719 2,768 42,713 727 228 49,648 
Developed 
Land 
197 1 79 111 227 12 72,619 1 73,246 
Water areas 
& federal 
land 
798 3 337 2,204 898 181 18 443,761 448,198 
1997 total 376,998 32,696 119,992 405,977 406,955 51,142 98,252 452,118 
1,944, 
130 
Source: Table 5, 1997 National Resources Inventory, USDA NRCS  
 
The second decision-making option comes when the farmland owners do not convert their land at 
this time.  If this is the case, a set of decisions need to be made on how to use the land without 
development, until the time comes for them to opt for development.  In other words, they decide 
the items of production, the number of workers to be hired, and the level of capital investment in 
order to maximize the profits while using their land for the agricultural production.24   
 
These decisions, particularly production item choice and capital investment, are highly affected 
by the farmland owners’ prediction of the timing of land development in the future.  Because 
cultivating certain items requires a longer period of operation or a larger amount of sunk costs to 
                                                 
23 The assumption of farmland owners’ profit maximization does not mean the homogeneity of the owners. There is a 
significant amount of variance by individuals in this decision making, as reported by Barnard & Butcher (1989) and 
many others. 
24 It is possible not to use the land for any purposes.  However, since there is a considerable amount of financial 
advantages while using land for agricultural activity in the U.S., the owners may tend to use or pretend to use the land 
for agricultural production.  
 
 
 
53 
make an acceptable amount of profit, they are reluctant to choose those items if there is an 
enhanced probability of development of his/her parcels within the next few years.  Also, since 
capital investment is generally irreversible, they are less likely to put capital in agricultural 
production if they think the invested capital may not be fully utilized in terms of the return on 
investment.  In this case, they may give up the improvement of irrigation or other supporting 
system or use existing machinery and equipment rather than buying new ones, even if new 
investment is required for the optimal agricultural production from a long-term perspective.  
 
These influences of development timing have been investigated by some studies on agricultural 
production, although consideration has not been given to the role of land use planning.  For 
example, Lopez et al. (1988) conducted a longitudinal analysis to examine how agricultural 
production in New Jersey is affected by the degree of suburbanization, measured by population in 
nonurban counties, and found that fruit and livestock production is discouraged by 
suburbanization.  Their analysis outcomes also suggest that agricultural production tends to 
become more labor intensive (i.e. declining capital and land inputs), as the region is more 
suburbanized.    
 
The Farm & Ranch Irrigation Survey, conducted by the USDA National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS), also provides some evidence of this behavioral pattern.  As a part of the survey, 
the farmers were asked about the “barriers to making improvements to reduce energy use or 
conserve water”.  According to the survey, 5~8 percent of respondents in the entire U.S. 
answered “will not be farming this operation long enough to justify improvements” in response to 
the question, “why not invest in improvements?” (table 4.2).  
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Table 4.2. Farm & Ranch Irrigation Survey Outcomes: Barriers to the System Improvements 
  
 2008 Survey 2003 Survey 
 Farms % Farms % 
1."Investigating improvements not a priority" 46,825 21.7% 9,055 8.0% 
2. "Risk of reduced yield or poor crop quality" 18,578 8.6% 9,818 8.7% 
3. "Physical field/crop condition limit system 
improvements" 
20,888 9.7% 8,951 7.9% 
4. "Improvements will not reduce costs enough to cover 
installation costs" 
33,725 15.7% 21,304 18.8% 
5. "Cannot finance improvements"  37,512 17.4% 20,122 17.7% 
6. "Landlord will not share in cost" 6,815 3.2% 8,194 7.2% 
7. "Uncertainty about future availability of water" 19,536 9.1% 13,790 12.2% 
8. "Will not be farming this operation long enough to 
justify improvements" 
17,280 8.0% 6,204 5.5% 
9. "Other"  14,272 6.6% 15,995 14.1% 
Total 215,431 100.0% 113,433 100.0% 
Source: Table 41, 2008 Farm & Ranch Irrigation Survey Report  
Note: Respondents are allowed to choose more than one barrier to improvement.  Here, “Total” is the number of all 
responses, as opposed to the number of respondents.    
 
 
In the real world, the farmland owners’ prediction of development timing and the following 
decisions are made with uncertainty.  Under a higher level of the uncertainty, the owners cannot 
predict the exact timing of land development and attach low values of confidence in their 
predictions.  This may raise the risk of over-investment and alter the item choices and capital 
investment decision-making for the agricultural production: i.e. the farmland owners are less 
likely to grow the items with a greater amount of sunk costs and are less likely to increase or 
continue irreversible investment.   
 
According to the argument of TCE-based justification of planning, these kinds of uncertainties 
can be reduced with relevant information, produced and exchanged through effective land use 
planning practices.  Particularly, the uncertainty in the urban fringe land markets could be 
lowered by the establishment of an UGB, a widely used land use planning practice related to such 
fringe areas.25  Although the practice qualitatively and administratively differs across regions (see 
e.g. Gale 1992; Innes 1992), through the UGB establishment processes, local and regional 
government bodies typically 1) conduct population projections, 2) determine the future demand 
                                                 
25 In the United States, an UGB was first adopted by Lexington, Kentucky in 1958 (Nelson & Duncan 1995).  As of 
1998, more than a hundred regions establish UGBs (Staley et al. 1999).  Furthermore, Oregon, Washington, and 
Tennessee enacted state-level legislation that mandates local and regional government to do this work and to 
incorporate the UGBs into their comprehensive plans. 
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of new development, 3) investigate suitable or desirable locations for new development, and then 
4) draw the boundary, as a proposal (Anderson 1999).  In addition, like many other planning 
processes, the proposed boundary is publicized and reviewed by various actors at public hearings 
or some other forms of public engagement where the ideas and information related to future 
development are exchanged.  In the end, an UGB, as a final product that reveals the expected 
expansion of developed areas for upcoming 20 years or some other periods of time, is established.   
 
From the perspective of farming, the UGB is not a regulation binding item choice, investment, or 
detailed operation.  Rather, the boundary is valuable information that helps individual farmland 
owners obtain a better sense about the probable timing for development of their land, as 
characterized by Knaap (1985).  In addition to the UGB itself, population projection, new 
development demand estimation, site investigation, and opinions of other actors at the place of 
collaborative planning may also inform the farmland owners, who make their own decisions 
looking forward.  
 
 
4.3. Spatial Data Analysis 
 
Do uncertainties exist in urban fringe land markets?  Does the UGB establishment really inform 
farmland owners in the sense of reducing uncertainty and thus transactions costs?  In this section, 
a data analysis will be conducted using the case of Oregon, in order to explore 1) whether or not 
there are any notable relationships between farmland use patterns and the established UGBs and 
2) whether the demonstrable relationships suggest a real contribution of the UGB establishment 
practice to the uncertainty reduction.  
 
Given that disaggregated-level investment data or other measurements representing the 
uncertainty level are not available, the only option is to use the farmland use pattern (i.e. what 
items are grown at particular location points), along with the knowledge about the characteristics 
of various items, such as the minimum period of operation for the profit and the required level of 
sunk costs for production.  Although farmland use is determined by many other factors, such as 
physical characteristics, the farmer’s capability and preferences, and so on, certain types of 
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agricultural production, with greater time and sunk cost requirements, may be less likely to 
appear where land development is expected to happen soon. 
  
4.3.1. Method & Data 
 
The main task of this spatial analysis is to explore how the farmland use patterns vary across 
space.  To do this, above all, the urban fringe areas of interest are divided according to the 
distance to the cities.  This is accomplished by using the boundaries of the Census’s Urbanized 
Area and Urban Cluster, which well represent the borders of the densely developed territories, 
rather than using the administrative city limits.  In other words, the fringe areas are first classified 
into six categories: 1) between the border and 0.5 mile buffer, 2) 0.5~1.0 mile area, 3) 1.0~1.5 
mile area, 4) 1.5~2.0 mile area, 5) 2.0~2.5 mile area, and 6) 2.5~3.0 mile area.  Although this way 
of space division is useful for capturing the relationship between the farmland use pattern and the 
proximity to the cities that had been well discussed in the land use analysis of von Thunen (1826), 
the buffer width (i.e. 0.5 mile) may be too large to consider the uncertainty and thus the full 
impact of the UGB.  Therefore, the first category (i.e. between the border and 0.5 mile buffer) is 
sub-divided to 0.1 mile buffer zones: i.e. 1-a) between the borders and 0.1 mile buffers, 1-b) 
0.1~0.2 mile area, 1-c) 0.2~0.3 mile area, 1-d) 0.3~0.4mile area, and 1-e) 0.4~0.5 mile area 
(figure 4.1).  Then, the zones are further classified by overlaying the UGBs.  As a result, the areas 
Within vs. Out of the UGBs are differentiated, even though the areas have the same distance to 
the cities.  Finally, by using the Tabulate Area function in ArcGIS as well as high-resolution land 
use data, the farmland use patterns in each type of zones are measured in terms of the land use 
mix.   
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Figure 4.1. Space Division and Land Uses: The Case of Eugene-Springfield MSA (Lane County, OR) 
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This method of analysis is applied to the state of Oregon where the UGBs have long been 
implemented.  The availability of GIS data for the analysis is another reason of the choice.  The 
Oregon Geospatial Enterprise Office provides the UGB shapefiles for recent years; 2007 version 
is used for this analysis.  For the land use information, the 2007 Cropland Data Layer (CDL) for 
Oregon made by USDA NASS is employed.  Because the original CDL adopts a very detailed 
land use type classification, the uses are aggregated into 10 categories for the analysis, as 
presented in figure 4.1.  For the boundaries of Census’s Urbanized Area and Urban Cluster, the 
Census TIGER (Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing) data are 
employed. 
 
 
4.3.2. Analysis Outcomes 
 
Table 4.3 shows how the land use mixes differ across 0.5-mile buffer zones from the urbanized 
area borders in Oregon.  Also, the varying farmland patterns are graphically demonstrated in 
figure 2, where each item’s share of the sum of all croplands is plotted over the distance to the 
cities.   
 
The general trends of farmland use across space are well revealed here.  Small grains, such as 
corn, rice, and wheat, are more likely to be grown, as the distance to the cities goes up.  In 
contrast, consistent with our intuition based the lessons from von Thunen, tree fruits and nuts as 
well as potatoes, onions, peas, etc, bearing larger per distance transportation costs, tend to be 
grown more in the areas with higher accessibility to the cities.  The pattern of Fallow/Idle 
Cropland (i.e. declining share over distance) is interesting.  One possible explanation could be 
traced to the farmland owner’s strategic behavior, that is they are less likely to improve the soil 
quality by letting their land lie fallow near city edges, because they feel that the land will be 
developed soon, so that agricultural production will not continue long enough.26 
   
                                                 
26 Alternatively, this may happen, because this type of land use (i.e. Fallow / Idle Cropland) is highly associated with 
small grains, showing the same declining pattern over distance, rather than other items.  
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Table 4.3. Land Use Patterns by 0.5-Mile Buffer Zones in Oregon 
 
  Borders 
~0.5mile 
0.5~1.0 
mile 
1.0~1.5 
mile 
1.5~2.0 
mile 
2.0~2.5 
mile 
2.5~3.0 
mile 
       
Percentage to total       
Small grains, including corn, rice, 
barley, wheat, etc 
1.7% 2.4% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 2.8% 
Hays, including rye, oats, canola, etc 1.2% 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.6% 
Other crops, including potatoes, 
onions, peas, etc 
1.6% 2.0% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.6% 
Tree fruits and tree nuts 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 
Fallow/Idle cropland 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 
Developed 21.0% 12.2% 10.2% 9.1% 8.4% 7.4% 
Grassland, including seed/sod grass, 
herbs, clover/wildflowers, etc 
28.2% 30.2% 29.8% 28.7% 28.1% 27.2% 
Forest, woodland, and shrubland 32.4% 40.4% 43.3% 46.7% 49.2% 51.8% 
Barren 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 
Water and wetlands 12.0% 9.2% 8.4% 7.2% 6.1% 5.6% 
       
Percentage to the sum of croplands       
Small grains, including corn, rice, 
barley, wheat, etc 
30.8% 34.0% 35.3% 36.0% 35.7% 38.2% 
Hays, including rye, oats, canola, etc 21.7% 21.5% 23.7% 22.8% 23.4% 21.5% 
Other crops, including potatoes, 
onions, peas, etc 
30.0% 27.9% 23.6% 23.0% 24.6% 22.3% 
Tree fruits and tree nuts 10.9% 8.9% 9.2% 8.2% 6.3% 6.2% 
Fallow/Idle cropland 6.6% 7.7% 8.1% 10.0% 10.0% 11.7% 
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Figure 4.2. Farmland Use Patterns in Oregon’s Urban Fringe Areas  
 
The farmland land use patterns within the 0.5 mile buffer, where a higher level of uncertainty 
may exist, are investigated in detail by using the 0.1 mile buffer zones and UGBs.  Table 4.4 
presents the patterns over distance with respect to UGBs in terms of percentage to the sum of 
croplands.   
 
Above all, attention needs to be paid to the pattern of tree fruits and tree nuts.  As found in the 
previous analysis, generally this item is more likely to occupy the areas close to the cities.  
However, since it bears a larger amount of sunk costs, thereby profitable when the operation 
continues for a certain period of time, the item may be less likely to appear where development is 
expected to occur in few years or development timing is very uncertain.  If the UGBs really 
inform the farmland owners and help their decision-making as argued by the TCE-based 
justification of land use planning practices, we will find the distinct difference in this land use 
type between Within-UGBs zones and Out-of-UGBs zones, although the difference does not 
necessarily mean the TCE-based argument is valid.   
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Table 4.4. Land Use Patterns within 0.5-Mile Buffer in Oregon 
 
  Borders 
~0.1mile 
0.1~0.2 
mile 
0.2~0.3 
mile 
0.3~0.4 
mile 
0.4~0.5 
mile 
      
Percentage to the sum of croplands (Within UGBs) 
Small grains, including corn, rice, 
barley, wheat, etc 
23.8% 27.8% 36.4% 37.9% 43.7% 
Hays, including rye, oats, canola, etc 20.6% 17.7% 16.1% 14.4% 11.7% 
Other crops, including potatoes, 
onions, peas, etc 
37.5% 35.0% 32.1% 31.9% 29.5% 
Tree fruits and tree nuts 9.1% 9.9% 7.6% 7.3% 6.1% 
Fallow/Idle cropland 9.1% 9.5% 7.9% 8.5% 9.0% 
      
Percentage to the sum of croplands (Out of UGBs) 
Small grains, including corn, rice, 
barley, wheat, etc 
28.3% 28.8% 30.1% 30.7% 32.9% 
Hays, including rye, oats, canola, etc 19.8% 22.3% 23.7% 23.3% 22.4% 
Other crops, including potatoes, 
onions, peas, etc 
30.9% 30.3% 30.0% 29.6% 27.3% 
Tree fruits and tree nuts 14.3% 12.3% 10.6% 10.5% 10.5% 
Fallow/Idle cropland 6.8% 6.2% 5.7% 5.9% 6.8% 
            
 
It needs to be noted that the item choice in reality is path-dependent, thus more complicated than 
the description here.  Suppose a farmland owner who has grown tree fruits in his land a long time 
before the emergence of development pressure.  Because the trees and other structures for the 
operation are sunk costs, he may continue to cultivate the fruits rather than changing the item 
with a certain (probably low) level of investment in maintenance, even if his land will be 
developed soon.  This results in the production of the tree fruits in the farms with high 
development probability or uncertainty, in contrast to the noted expectation.  However, new fruit 
production may be less likely to locate in these farms.  It may tend to go to the sites where the 
need for accessibility and the required operation period for profits are satisfied.  If an UGB 
functions as anticipated, it provides valuable information for this site selection.  As a result, the 
fruit items will be more likely to appear out of UGB, ceteris paribus.   
 
The outcomes of the detailed investigation suggest this is the case.  It is apparent that tree fruits 
and tree nuts is much important in the farmlands outside of the UGBs (table 4.4 and figure 4.3).  
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One could interpret this finding as one that can be traced to the uncertainty reduction effect of 
UGB establishment: i.e., setting UGBs makes it more probable that large acres of farmland 
outside of the UGBs are not going to be developed soon even though they are close to city edges, 
so that the farmland owners do not need to give up the option of tree fruits and tree nuts.  This 
results in a more efficient use of land.   
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Figure 4.3. The Land Use Share of Tree Fruits and Tree Nuts in Oregon 
 
 
The case of Fallow/Idle cropland also needs to be noted.  According to the analysis outcomes, this 
type of land use tends to appear within UGBs more (figure 4.4).  More specifically, the share of 
Fallow/Idle cropland within UGBs exceeds its value at 1.5 miles from the cities.  At first glance, 
this seems counter-intuitive.  Why do the farmland owners tend to let their farmlands lie fallow, 
even though the areas are included in UGBs that indicates development in near future?  This 
cannot be explained if the soil quality improvements were the only motivation of this type of land 
use.  To elucidate this, consideration may need to be given to the possibility of farmland owners 
not growing anything in their farmlands while waiting development, so that the land use is 
recognized as Fallow/Idle cropland.  If this is the case, it can be argued that a larger part of the 
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urban fringe lands (i.e. the areas outside of the UGBs) is more intensively used as a direct 
consequence of the establishment of the UGB that informs the farmland owners that their parcels 
are not going to be developed soon.  
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Figure 4.4. The Land Use Share of Fallow / Idle Cropland in Oregon 
 
 
4.4. Regression Analysis 
 
The previous section explored the UGB’s effect in the urban fringe land markets by using high-
resolution land use data.  In this section, an examination will be made of the possible contribution 
of UGB establishment to uncertainty reduction and to derive a more generalized conclusion on 
the validity of TCE-based justification of land use planning practice by conducting a statistical 
analysis with single-county MSAs as units of analysis.  The idea, explained in section 4.2, is that 
the farmland owners may tend to increase the value of investments if the level of the uncertainty 
associated with the timing of development of their farmlands is reduced, as they would then be 
faced with a lower risk metric with respect to wasting irreversible investments.  In other words, 
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the value of investments may to some extent represent the uncertainty level.  If the UGB 
establishment really reduces the uncertainty consistent with TCE-based arguments, then there 
should be a positive effect of UGBs on agricultural investment when other factors are properly 
controlled.   
 
4.4.1. Model  
 
For the simplicity, suppose that the agricultural production exhibits constant returns to scale with 
a Cobb-Douglas form.  
γβαφ LKSX ⋅⋅⋅=    (4-1)  1=++ γβα  
where X  is the output of agricultural production, S  is land input, K  is capital investment, and 
L  is labor force for the production.  Coefficient φ  is the technology parameter, which represents 
the efficiency level in production.  α , β , and γ are cost share parameters for land, capital, and 
labor force, respectively. 
 
In this setting, the optimal levels of land and capital input, that minimizes the production cost for 
a certain amount of production, are  
Sp
Xp
S
⋅⋅
=
α*
   (4-2) 
Kp
Xp
K
⋅⋅
=
β*
   (4-3)  
where p , 
Sp , and Kp  are the price of final farm product, land, and capital, respectively.  
 
From the equation (4-2) and (4-3), the optimal level of per acre capital investment can be derived, 
as below. 
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Then, by taking log on both sides of the equation (4-4), a linear form, which is a basis of the 
model making, can be obtained.  
( ) )log()log()log()log(log * βα +−−= KS ppSK    (4-5) 
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The equation (4-5) implies that per acre capital investment is a function of land price (
Sp ), 
capital price (
Kp ), and the two cost share parameters (α and β ), in the assumed situation of 
agricultural production.  Among the four determinants in this equation, land price is the most 
important factor to explain the level of per acre capital investment in an empirical analysis using 
cross sectional data like this study, since it varies significantly across regions.  The two cost share 
parameters, representing the character of agricultural production, are also influential ones.  
Because these parameters are item- and region-specific, this study tries to capture the influence of 
these factors on per acre capital investment by including additional explanatory variables, such as 
individual items’ shares in terms of sales and the regional control dummies.  Unlike land price 
and the two cost share parameters, capital price is assumed to be a constant, since its variance 
across regions in the U.S. is not available.  
 
In addition to the above variables, several more factors should be included to precisely explain 
the real per acre capital investment and correctly examine the effect of UGB establishment 
practice on investment level.  Since the farmland owners are able to adjust the level of capital 
investment responding to the relative prices of other inputs (i.e. they can substitute capital with 
other inputs and vice versa) for the cost minimization as well, here, the price of labor (i.e. wage 
level of hired farm labor), which varies by region most significantly, is included in the list of the 
independent variables.  Also, because the economies of scale may exist in the real agricultural 
production and supporting industries, total acre of farmland in each single-county MSA is 
included as an explanatory variable in the model.27  
 
Moreover, as noted, the actual level of per acre capital investment may be determined by the 
probable development timing of individual farmland properties and uncertainty level.  As a MSA 
is growing more rapidly, a larger share of farmland is expected to be developed soon with a 
higher uncertainty level.  Therefore, in this model, the population growth rate is used to reflect 
the influences of the development timing and uncertainty.  Finally and the most importantly, a 
dummy variable, representing whether a region has established an UGB or not, is included in the 
                                                 
27 This is relevant to the “critical mass”, suggested and investigated by many studies on agricultural sector and 
farmland loss, such as Dhillon & Derr (1974) and Lynch & Carpenter (2003).  Because the level of critical mass 
threshold is uncertain and may not constant across state, total acre of farmland in each county, as opposed to a dummy 
variable based on a threshold, is used in the estimation. 
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model to examine the effectiveness of such land use planning work in reducing the uncertainty.  
As noted in following sections, interactive dummy variables, derived by multiplying the UGB 
dummy and other item-related dummies, are also used, because the UGB’s effect on investment 
may significantly depend on what items (i.e. one requiring large sunk costs vs. the others) are 
mainly cultivated. 
 
4.4.2. Samples & Data 
 
To conduct an empirical analysis using the model presented above, this study selects the single-
county metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the U.S. with year 2000 population ranging 
between 100,000 and 500,000, except for Anchorage MSA, Alaska (see table 4.5 and figure 
4.5).28  Here, the MSAs that consist of multiple counties or county equivalent areas, are excluded 
to measure the presence of the UGB establishment practice more accurately.29  Also, by limiting 
the range of population, this sample selection tries to use a set of homogeneous MSAs in size and, 
eventually, to minimize the possible unexpected variances and disturbance. 
 
Table 4.5. List of the Samples 
 
No MSA State County Pop in 2000 
1 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL Polk County 483,924 
2 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL Brevard County 476,230 
3 Lancaster PA Lancaster County 470,658 
4 Modesto CA Stanislaus County 446,997 
5 Fort Myers--Cape Coral FL Lee County 440,888 
6 Madison WI Dane County 426,526 
7 Spokane WA Spokane County 417,939 
8 Salinas CA Monterey County 401,762 
9 Santa Barbara--Santa Maria--Lompoc CA Santa Barbara County 399,347 
10 York PA York County 381,751 
11 Reading PA Berks County 373,638 
12 Provo--Orem UT Utah County 368,536 
 
                                                 
28 The geographical delineation of the MSAs follows 1999 definition of U.S. Office of Management and Budget, which 
is used for Census 2000, found at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt.  
29 Since an UGB is usually established by municipalities or counties, the identification of the UGB practice for such 
MSAs consisting of a number of counties and municipalities is more likely to generate a larger error than the single-
county MSAs. 
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Table 4.5 (cont.) 
 
No MSA State County Pop in 2000 
13 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA Tulare County 368,021 
14 Reno NV Washoe County 339,486 
15 Brownsville--Harlingen--San Benito TX Cameron County 335,227 
16 Eugene--Springfield OR Lane County 322,959 
17 Fayetteville NC Cumberland County 302,963 
18 Erie PA Erie County 280,843 
19 South Bend IN St. Joseph County 265,559 
20 Ocala FL Marion County 258,916 
21 Fort Collins--Loveland CO Larimer County 251,494 
22 Naples FL Collier County 251,377 
23 Lincoln NE Lancaster County 250,291 
24 San Luis Obispo--Atascadero--Paso 
Robles 
CA San Luis Obispo County 246,681 
25 Lubbock TX Lubbock County 242,628 
26 Green Bay WI Brown County 226,778 
27 Yakima WA Yakima County 222,581 
28 Gainesville FL Alachua County 217,955 
29 Waco TX McLennan County 213,517 
30 Merced CA Merced County 210,554 
31 Chico--Paradise CA Butte County 203,171 
32 Myrtle Beach SC Horry County 196,629 
33 Laredo TX Webb County 193,117 
34 Cedar Rapids IA Linn County 191,701 
35 Lake Charles LA Calcasieu Parish 183,577 
36 Elkhart--Goshen IN Elkhart County 182,791 
37 Medford--Ashland OR Jackson County 181,269 
38 Champaign--Urbana IL Champaign County 179,669 
39 Tyler TX Smith County 174,706 
40 Las Cruces NM Dona Ana County 174,682 
41 Fort Walton Beach FL Okaloosa County 170,498 
42 Topeka KS Shawnee County 169,871 
43 Bellingham WA Whatcom County 166,814 
44 Tuscaloosa AL Tuscaloosa County 164,875 
45 Redding CA Shasta County 163,256 
46 Benton Harbor MI Berrien County 162,453 
47 Yuma AZ Yuma County 160,026 
48 Jackson MI Jackson County 158,422 
49 Bryan--College Station TX Brazos County 152,415 
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Table 4.5 (cont.) 
 
No MSA State County Pop in 2000 
50 Janesville--Beloit WI Rock County 152,307 
51 Bloomington--Normal IL McLean County 150,433 
52 Jacksonville NC Onslow County 150,355 
53 Panama City FL Bay County 148,217 
54 Monroe LA Ouachita 147,250 
55 Punta Gorda FL Charlotte County 141,627 
56 Pueblo CO Pueblo County 141,472 
57 Jamestown NY Chautauqua County 139,750 
58 Columbia MO Boone County 135,454 
59 Greenville NC Pitt County 133,798 
60 Billings MT Yellowstone County 129,352 
61 Altoona PA Blair County 129,144 
62 Waterloo--Cedar Falls IA Black Hawk County 128,012 
63 Dover DE Kent County 126,697 
64 Abilene TX Taylor County 126,555 
65 Alexandria LA Rapides Parish 126,337 
66 Wausau WI Marathon County 125,834 
67 Florence SC Florence County 125,761 
68 Rochester MN Olmsted County 124,277 
69 Bloomington IN Monroe County 120,563 
70 Sharon PA Mercer County 120,293 
71 Muncie IN Delaware County 118,769 
72 Grand Junction CO Mesa County 116,255 
73 Auburn--Opelika AL Lee County 115,092 
74 Lawton OK Comanche County 114,996 
75 Decatur IL Macon County 114,706 
76 Goldsboro NC Wayne County 113,329 
77 Sheboygan WI Sheboygan County 112,646 
78 Iowa City IA Johnson County 111,006 
79 Sherman--Denison TX Grayson County 110,595 
80 Sumter SC Sumter County 104,646 
81 San Angelo TX Tom Green County 104,010 
82 Gadsden AL Etowah County 103,459 
Note: “Pop in 2000” is each MSA’s population by Summary File 1, Census 2000, U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Figure 4.5. Study Areas: 82 Single-County MSAs in the U.S.  
 
The necessary agricultural and economic data are derived from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), namely 2002 Census of 
Agriculture data, and Regional Economic Information System (REIS), U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA).  In addition, the presence of an UGB in each MSA is identified by not only 
reviewing other surveys, particularly Burby et al. (2001), but also modifying the surveys’ results 
through an investigation on the official web-sites of the municipalities and counties for each 
individual MSA.  Table 4.6 lists the measurements for both dependent and independent variables 
and the data sources for the measurements.  In table 4.7, the statistics of the collected input data 
for the 82 MSAs are summarized. 
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Table 4.6. Measurements & Data Sources 
 
Variable Measurement Data Sources 
   
Dependent Variable   
Log of per acre capital 
investment  
LPACI = log [ (Value of machinery and equipment in 2002) / 
               (Land in Farm in 2002) ] 
NASS, USDA 
   
Independent Variables   
Log of land price 
LLP = log [ (Estimated market value of land and buildings in  
           2002) /  (Land in Farm in 2002) ] 
NASS, USDA 
Log of labor force price 
LLFP = log [ (Hired Farm Labor Expenses in 2002) /  
(Number of Non-proprietors Employment in 2002) ] 
REIS, BEA 
Total acre of farmland  TAF = Land in Farms in 2002 NASC, USDA 
Share of fruits, tree nuts, and 
berries in terms of sales 1 
SFTB = (Sales of Fruits, Tree Nuts, and Berries in 2002) / 
(Total Sales in 2002) 
NASS, USDA 
Share of the crops (except 
fruits, tree nuts, and berries) 
in terms of sales  
SNFC = (Sales of Crops except Fruits, Tree Nuts, and  
              Berries in 2002) /(Total Sales in 2002) 
NASS, USDA 
Dummy for the regions 
showing high shares of non-
fruit crop production 2 
If the MSA’s SNFC > 0.4, HSNFC1 =1 
Otherwise, HSNFC = 0  
NASS, USDA 
Dummy for the regions 
showing low shares of non-
fruit crop production 2 
If the MSA’s SNFC =< 0.4, LSNFC1 =1 
Otherwise, LSNFC = 0 
NASS, USDA 
Regional control dummies 
for Midwest, South, & West  
If the MSA is in the Census Region, MIDWEST, SOUTH, or 
WEST = 1; Otherwise, MIDWEST, SOUTH, or WEST = 0 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
Population growth rate PGR = [ (Pop in 2001) – (Pop in 1991) ] / (Pop in 1991) REIS, BEA 
Presence of the UGB 
establishment practice  
If the MSA has the UGB establishment practice, UGB=1 
Otherwise, UGB=0 
Anderson (1999) 
GOP&R (1999) 
Burby et al. (2001) 
   
1 The data of Sales of Fruits, Tree Nuts, and Berries in 2002 for some MSAs are suppressed.  In these cases, the 
suppressed values are estimated using 1997 data for the MSAs or state-level data.  
2 HSNFC and LSNFC are multiplied by UGB and used as interactive terms, in order to capture the potential difference 
in UGB’s effect under different contexts.  It is expected that the UGB effect may be greater in the regions having 
relatively lower SNFC (i.e. where NSNFC = 1) thereby having relatively larger shares of live stocks or fruit production 
which require greater amount of irreversible investments.  
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Table 4.7. Statistics of the Input-data  
 
Variable Description Mean Variance Min Max 
      
LPACI Log of per acre capital investment -1.424 0.531 -4.704 0.001 
      
LLP  Log of land price  0.827 0.309 -0.798 2.060 
LLFP Log of labor force price 3.428 0.151 2.410 4.615 
TAF  Total acre of farmland  411,883 1.510E+11 10,863 2,042,680 
SFTP  
Share of fruits, tree nuts, and berries in 
terms of sales  
0.104 0.029 0.0003 0.764 
SNFC  
Share of crops, except fruits, tree nuts, and 
berries  
0.403 0.058 0.947 0.038 
HSNFC Dummy for the regions with higher SNFC Number of samples with 1 = 39 
LSNFC Dummy for the regions with lower SNFC Number of samples with 1 = 43 
MIDWEST Regional control dummy for Midwest Number of samples with 1 = 21 
SOUTH Regional control dummy for South Number of samples with 1 = 33 
WEST  Regional control dummy for West  Number of samples with 1 = 21 
PGR Population growth rate 0.143 0.015 -0.040 0.613 
UGB  Presence of the UGB establishment practice  Number of samples with 1 = 34 
      
 
 
From the estimation, it is anticipated to have the positive estimated coefficients for log of land 
price (LLP), as presented in the model: equation (4-5), because the farmland owners may use 
expensive land more intensively by making a greater amount of investment per area.  A positive 
coefficient is also expected for log of labor force price (LLFP), since the farmland owners’ 
dependence on capital will increase as the price of labor force, which can substitute for capital or 
be substituted by capital to some extent, goes up.  In contrast, the coefficients for the Share of 
fruits, tree nuts, and berries (SFTP) and Total acre of farmland (TAF) may show negative signs, 
due to the high labor-intensity (i.e. relatively low dependence on capital) of the production of 
FTP items and the benefit of the scale effect in saving expenditures, respectively.  The expected 
sign for population growth rate (PGR) is negative, which implies that a larger share of total 
farmland is under the situation of being developed soon with a higher level of uncertainty, so that 
investment level may be generally low in a more rapidly growing MSA.  Finally, for the UGB 
dummy variable, a positive coefficient will be found, if the establishment of UGB really reduces 
uncertainty, consistent with the TCE-based justification of land use planning. 
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4.4.3. Analysis Outcomes 
 
Using the data of the 82 MSAs, the models with different settings are estimated by employing the 
ordinary least square regression method.  Table 4.8 presents the estimation outcomes of two 
model types showing the highest R-squared.  In the first one, UGB, the dummy variable of 
interest, is included as it stands, whereas the second model uses the interactive dummy variables, 
derived by multiplying it by HSNFC and LSNFC, to capture the UGB effects in the relatively 
higher- and lower-crop-share MSAs separately.  
 
Table 4.8. Estimation Outcomes of the Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Description Model 1 Model 2 
C  Intercept  -2.221 **** -2.265 **** 
LLP  Log of land price  0.771 **** 0.762 **** 
LLFP Log of labor force price 0.218 * 0.226 * 
TAF  Total acre of farmland  -0.510E-06 **** -0.510E-06 **** 
SFTP  Share of fruits, tree nuts, and berries to total sales  -0.552 ** -0.520 * 
MIDWEST Regional control dummy for Midwest -0.170  -0.131  
SOUTH Regional control dummy for South -0.229  -0.212  
WEST  Regional control dummy for West  -0.159  -0.165  
PGR Population growth rate -1.434 **** -1.411 **** 
UGB  Presence of the UGB establishment practice  0.150  - 
UGB* HSNFC UGB in the regions with higher crop shares - 0.045  
UGB* LSNFC UGB in the regions with lower crop shares - 0.233 ** 
R-squared | Adjusted R-squared 0.764 | 0.734 0.770 | 0.738 
Note: **** 0.1% level | *** 1% level | ** 5% level of significance | * 10% level of significance. 
 
The overall models’ explanatory powers seem moderately high, considering the adjusted R-
squared, 0.734 and 0.738.  Most control variables, except the three regional control dummies 
(MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST), show high-level statistical significances as well as the 
expected signs in both models.  More specifically, the positive estimated coefficients are found 
for log of land price (LLP), which indicates the farmland owners’ extensive use of expensive land.  
The positive sign of the estimated coefficients for log of labor force price (LLFP) is also the 
expected finding, because of the substitution effect between labor and capital as explained above.  
The negative coefficients of Share of fruits, tree nuts, and berries (SFTP) and Total acre of 
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farmland (TAF) also correspond to the intuition noted above: i.e. the FTP items’ labor-intensive 
character and the economies of scale in agricultural production and supporting activities.   
 
Population growth rate (PGR), that is included in the model to capture the influences of 
development timing and uncertainty level, also exhibits the expected sign with 0.1% level of 
significance in both models.  The negative sign of PGR’s estimated outcome may suggest that 
rapid (mostly urban) population growth increases the area of farmlands under the situation of 
being developed soon with a higher level of uncertainty and, consequently, has a negative effect 
on the average per acre investment level in the region.   
 
Of considerable interest are the estimated coefficients of Presence of the UGB establishment 
practice (UGB) in the first model and the UGB-based interactive dummy variables in the second 
one.  In both models, the signs of these experimental variables’ coefficient are positive which 
indicate that the MSAs having an established UGB are more likely to have a higher level of per 
acre capital investment.  As discussed above, this outcome of the regression analysis may suggest 
that the UGB establishment practice actually reduces the uncertainty regarding development 
timing of the farmlands at urban fringe and thus increases the per acre capital investment in the 
area.  
 
It should be stressed that only UGB* LSNFC in the second model shows a statistically significant 
(5%-level) estimation outcome.  On the one hand, this implies that the UGB establishment has a 
strong effect on per acre capital investment in the MSAs having larger shares of live stock and 
fruit production that require greater amount of sunk costs as well as a longer period of operation 
for profits to be realized, in contrast to crop production.  More specifically, the magnitude of the 
coefficient, 0.233, indicates that the UGB establishment raises the per acre capital investment by 
about $55.1 [$2.1~$233.1], which is approximately $22.7 million in a medium size single-county 
MSA (figure 4.6).30  On the other hand, the result suggests that the UGB’s effect is weak or 
neglectable in the MSAs where crop production is dominant.  However, this may not mean that 
the UGB establishment contributes to uncertainty reduction only in the limited number of regions.  
Rather, it may imply that the per capita investment is not much dependent on the level of 
                                                 
30 The unit of PACI in this study is $1000/acre.  Therefore, the 0.0551 increase in PACI is interpreted as $55.1 
additional investment per acre. 
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PACI: 
S
K  
Max(PACI)=1.0005 
LPACI: )log(
S
K    
Min(PACI)=0.0091 
Min(LPACI)= –4.7045  Max(LPACI)=0.0005  Mean(LPACI)= –1.4421 
Range of the Samples in LPACI  
Range of the Samples in PACI 
PACI=eLPACI 
0.2364 
The slope of this graph at a particular LPACI 
is equal to PACI.  It ranges from 0.0091 to 
1.0005 and is 0.2364 at the mean of LPACI.   
 
Therefore, the increase by 0.233 in LPACI, 
which is the influence of UGB in the regions 
with LSNFC=1 means the PACI increase by 
0.0551 at the mean of LPACI; 0.0021 at the 
Min; and 0.2331 at the Max. 
uncertainty in the crop-oriented areas, because generally a larger amount of sunk costs or a longer 
period of operation is not necessary for profitable crop production.  For example, certain types of 
crop production can continue right before the physical development begins.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Interpretation of the Magnitude of UGB’s Estimated Coefficient  
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The present study attempts to test the empirical validity of the TCE-based justification of land use 
planning.  More specifically, this study examines whether or not the establishment of an UGB 
supports the farmland owners’ informed decision-making and eventually contributes to a more 
efficient use of land by reducing the level of uncertainty regarding the timing of potential 
farmland development in the urban fringe land markets.  Testing this proposition was 
accomplished by conducting an explanatory analysis of high-resolution farmland use data in 
Oregon as well as a statistical analysis using 82 single-county MSAs’ data with a log-linear 
regression model.  
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Through the exploration of farmland use data in Oregon, the results revealed that:   
1) Tree fruits and tree nuts, which generally require a larger amount of sunk costs and a 
longer period of operation for the profits, is more likely to be grown outside of UGBs 
rather than within UGBs, even if the distance to the cities is controlled.  This may 
suggest that the farmland owners exploit the information contained in UGB plans in their 
decision-making, become more certain about the timing of potential land development, 
and enjoy a wider range of item choice options if their land is not included in the growth 
boundaries (i.e. information is available that the area will not be developed soon.)   
2) Fallow/Idle cropland, which may indicate inactive use of farmland while waiting 
development rather than soil quality improvements for a long-term agricultural purpose 
in this case, is less likely to appear outside of UGBs, compared to the areas within UGBs.  
This may also be evidence of the UGB’s effect on uncertainty reduction, thereby offering 
support for the TCE-based arguments.  In other words, the UGB establishment informs 
many farmland owners (having the areas out of the UGBs) that their parcels are not 
going to be developed soon and, consequently, induces a more intensive and efficient use 
of land.   
 
According to the MSA-level statistical analysis, regressing available independent variables on log 
of per acre capital investment (LPACI),  
1) For Population growth rate (PGR), negative estimated coefficients are obtained with a 
very high level (0.1%) of statistical significance.  This may imply that the farmland 
owners’ decision making is indeed a strategic choice looking forward and that the 
uncertainty, which could be represented by the variable, exists, as argued by TCE-based 
justification of land use planning practice. 
2) For the variable indicating the Presence of an UGB (UGB), positive coefficients were 
found that suggest that the UGB establishment reduces the uncertainty and further 
facilitates capital investment for agricultural production.  However, the estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant (5%-level), only in the MSAs having relatively 
larger shares of livestock and fruit production, as opposed to crops; these activities 
generally require a greater amount of sunk costs as well as a longer operation period to 
be profitable.  The insignificance of the estimates for other MSAs may need to be 
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explained by the weak connection between the uncertainty and capital investment, rather 
than no or weaker UGB’s effect on uncertainty reduction. 
 
Overall, this study empirically validates the TCE-based justification of land use planning.  It is 
suggested that uncertainties exist in land markets and prevent economically efficient use of land.  
Furthermore, land use planning practice may help land-owners make better land use-related 
decisions by proving the relevant information and reducing the level of uncertainties.  In this 
sense, governments’ involvement in land use and development may be warranted, because of the 
higher efficiency of information production and exchange, beyond the appropriateness of 
regulatory actions.   
  
Finally, it should be emphasized that this contribution of land use planning may not be trivial.  
The UGB’s effect on agricultural investment estimated in this study (i.e. 22.7 million dollars in 
the case of a medium size single-county MSA) may turn out to be a very small portion of the full 
potential contribution.  Land use planning practice may inform not only the farmland owners in 
urban fringe areas but also land developers in this particular situation.  More generally, a larger 
amount of benefits may arise in urban areas where various kinds of uncertainties along with 
dramatic internal changes exist, which in turn causes a greater amount of transaction costs and a 
greater demand for the systematic management of land use. 
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5. THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REACTIVE SUBURBAN LAND USE 
REGULATIONS: A SIMULATION STUDY USING A SPATIAL REIM  
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
As summarized in the literature review, the performance of a regional economy is likely to be 
influenced by interventions in land development, which significantly affect its property and labor 
markets as well as overall spatial structure. It seems that this issue, namely the macroeconomic 
effects of land use regulations, has attracted a great deal of attention by planning academics and 
the planning profession as a whole.  Recently, even a greater deal of attention is paid to the issue, 
as policy makers explore the full vision of sustainable development by reconciling the potential 
conflicts among economic, environmental, and social goals (Campbell 1996).  
 
How does a particular type of land use regulation affect a regional economy?  How can we better 
assess the effects?  In thinking about the issue, at least two very important dimensions of the 
subject need to be considered.  The first one is the complexity and dynamics of regional 
economies.  Generally, a regional economic system is structured by many sectors and 
components that are highly interrelated in multiple markets and also linked through non-market 
connections.  Therefore, the impact of any event or intervention, including land use regulation, is 
inevitably system-wide, even if it is directly related to a part of the system (e.g. housing sector).  
Furthermore, the system’s behavior is dynamic, so that a shock presenting one time period often 
generates long run consequences.  For this reason, it would be desirable to use a simulation model 
that better characterizes the structure of a regional economic system and further describes the 
dynamic behavior of the system, in order to properly assess the effects of land use regulation on a 
regional economy.31   
 
                                                 
31 A simulation model is an excellent instrument that enables scientists to experiment with a system of interest (see. e.g. 
Frigg & Hartmann 2006).  It is more valuable, especially when the system is very complex and cannot be experimented 
with in the real world.  Despite some disadvantages, such as inherent biasedness of modeler, “Modeling and 
Simulation” has been appreciated in the field of planning, because 1) it enables us to conduct valuable experiments 
about urban system under various conditions and to answer many “what if?” questions that we frequently asked in the 
process of planning practice and 2) it allows us to conduct an analysis with a long time frame, which is essential for 
planning practice dealing with not only short-term but also long-term future. 
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Secondly, consideration needs to be given to the way in which land use regulations are 
implemented.  In the U.S. context, land use regulations and public goods provisions are typically 
under the control of local authorities rather than region-wide planning agencies, although 
metropolitan-level or state-level involvement is not absent.  Also, a large degree of heterogeneity 
is likely to exist within a region.32  Thus, it is necessary to appropriately deal with the spatial 
organization of local decision-making and to consider the interaction between local and region-
wide variables over hierarchy.  If a simulation model is adopted because of its methodological 
advantages for the analysis, it needs to be designed to handle these spatial and multi-level aspects 
of the problem.  
 
In the urban economics literature, there are a series of theoretical studies that analyze the 
economic consequences of zoning or growth controls by employing a spatial general equilibrium 
framework, in which land use and regional economy are interrelated (see e.g. Brueckner 1990; 
Engle 1992; Sakashita 1995; Sasaki 1998; Lai & Yang 2002; Sheppard 2004).  These studies 
have contributed a great deal to improving our understanding of the economic effects of land use 
regulation.  However, the complexity and dynamics of the problem are too often simplified in 
most of these theoretical studies, so their framework, as it stands, has limited usefulness in 
simulating the reality.  In particular, it is difficult to examine the outcomes of policy options or to 
explore for the role of planning practice in complex metropolitan areas.33  For example, many of 
the models posit a monocentric spatial structure and single government having the authority of 
land use control.  Also, the models often lack consideration of detailed industrial structure, 
demographics, irregular physical characteristics, and so forth.  
 
Although various operational urban and regional system models have been developed and are 
now available for policy and impact analyses, most of them have limited usefulness in analyzing 
the effect of local land use policies on regional economic performance, due to the top-down 
approach to regional – local integration.  In a recent study (Kim & Hewings 2010), an 
investigation of the integrated analytic frameworks of 26 large U.S. metropolitan areas’ planning 
                                                 
32 Following Tiebout’s (1956) pioneering examination, a voluminous literature has discussed the variance in local 
actions (see e.g. Ross & Yinger 1999 for a detailed summary).  Also the presence of intraregional heterogeneity has 
been shown by some empirical studies, such as Heikkila (1996) and McDonald & McMillen (2004).  
33 A notable exception is the RELU-Trans model, developed by Anas and his colleagues through their long efforts to 
integrate regional economy, land use, and transportation within a general equilibrium framework (See e.g. Anas & Kim 
1996, Anas & Xu 1999, and Anas & Liu 2007).  Their model is considered as one of the most theoretically robust 
operational urban system models, because of its solid microeconomic foundation. 
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agencies was made and the results revealed that most of them, except Atlanta, Portland, and San 
Diego, adopted a strict top down approach to the vertical integration (table 5.1).  In these models, 
regional variables are typically determined without consideration of local conditions; and then, 
the local growth dynamics were strictly bounded by fixed regional totals in most cases. 34 
 
Table 5.1. The Analytic Frameworks of 26 Large U.S. Metropolitan Planning Agencies (As of July 2009) 
 
Representa-
tive City 
Organization 
Regional 
Growth 
Modeling 
Method 
Sub-regional 
Development Modeling 
Method 
Approach to 
Vertical 
Integration 
Atlanta Atlanta Regional Commission 
REIM  
(REMI) 
Simulation Model 
(PECAS) 
Feedback 
Boston 
Boston Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council  
Cohort-
Component 
Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Buffalo  
Greater Buffalo-Niagara Regional 
Transportation Council  
Other Type Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Chicago  
Chicago Metropolitan Agency for 
Planning 
REIM Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Cincinnati 
Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional 
Council of Governments 
External Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Cleveland 
Northeast Ohio Areawide 
Coordinating Agency 
External Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Columbus 
Mid-Ohio Regional Planning 
Commission 
External Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Dallas 
North Central Texas Council of 
Governments 
External 
Simulation Model 
(DRAM/EMPAL) 
Top-down 
Detroit 
Southeast Michigan Council of 
Governments 
REIM  
(REMI) 
Simulation Model 
(UrbanSIM) 
Top-down 
Houston  Houston Galveston Area Council  Other Type 
Simulation Model 
(UrbanSIM) 
Top-down 
Kansas City Mid-America Regional Council  
REIM  
(REMI) 
Simulation Model 
(DRAM/EMPAL) 
Top-down 
Los Angeles 
Southern California Association of 
Governments 
Cohort-
Component 
Other Type Top-Down 
Milwaukee 
Southeastern Wisconsin Regional 
Planning Commission 
Cohort-
Component 
Other Type Top-down 
                                                 
34 This does not imply that regional as well as local projections used for planning practices are not under local reviews.  
Rather, this indicates that in the analytic frameworks, the sum of all local-level values is strictly controlled by the 
regional totals, while regional variables are independent of the local indicators.  Although the outcomes of the models, 
particularly socio-economic forecasts, are the subject of local reviews to some extent before approval, such review 
processes are generally an adjustment of model outcomes rather than a modification of model structure or formulation.  
In many metropolitan planning agencies, local level variables are determined by using a share-based allocation 
approach where attention is paid to the share only, accepting the given totals to be multiplied.  The top-down approach 
is also adopted by the agencies, employing various urban system simulation models for their sub-regional level analysis.  
This may be attributed to the designs of the simulation models, where regional totals, as exogenous inputs, are required.  
Under this setting, sub-regional analyses are nothing other than the allocation procedure of regionally-determined 
growth, so that here the region-wide growth is not influenced by local actions, including land use regulations.    
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Table 5.1 (cont.) 
 
Representa-
tive City 
Organization 
Regional 
Growth 
Modeling 
Method 
Sub-regional 
Development Modeling 
Method 
Approach to 
Vertical 
Integration 
Minneapolis  Metropolitan Council  
Cohort-
Component 
Share-based Allocation Top-down 
New York 
New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Council  
Cohort-
Component 
Simulation Model 
(NYMTC-LUM) 
Top-down 
Phoenix 
Maricopa association of 
governments 
External 
Simulation Model 
(DRAM/EMPAL) 
Top-down 
Philadelphia  
Delaware Valley Regional Planning 
Commission  
Cohort-
Component 
Simulation Model 
(Other) 
Top-down 
Pittsburgh 
Southwestern Pennsylvania 
Regional Planning Commission 
REIM  
(REMI) 
Other Type Top-down 
Portland Metropolitan Service District  REIM 
Simulation Model 
(Other) 
Feedback 
Sacramento 
Sacramento Area Council of 
Governments 
Cohort-
Component 
Other Type Top-down 
San Antonio 
San Antonio-Bexar County 
Metropolitan Planning Organization 
External 
Simulation Model 
(DRAM/EMPAL) 
Top-down 
San Diego  
San Diego Association of 
Governments   
REIM 
Simulation Model 
(Other) 
Feedback 
San Francisco  
Association of Bay Area 
Governments 
Cohort-
Component 
Simulation Model 
(POLIS) 
Top-down 
Seattle Puget Sound Regional Council  REIM 
Simulation Model 
(UrbanSIM) 
Top-down 
St. Louis 
East-West Gateway Council of 
Governments 
Cohort-
Component 
Simulation Model 
(LEAM) 
Top-down 
Tampa 
Hillsborough County Metropolitan 
Planning Organization (MPO) 
External Share-based Allocation Top-down 
Source: Kim & Hewings (2010) 
 
Therefore, in this study, an alternative integrated analytic framework (i.e. a spatial regional 
econometric input-output model) has been developed, which may be more appropriate for the 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of local actions.  This model extends a coupling-type 
regional econometric input-output model (REIM), by incorporating local- and lower-level 
dynamics in a reciprocal interactive manner, as opposed to a top-down allocation process.  The 
model is then applied to the Chicago metropolitan area; a set of simulation analyses are 
conducted to assess the macroeconomic effects of the reactive land use regulations (i.e. 
minimum-lot-size zoning and building permit caps), implemented by some of the suburban 
municipalities.   
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 5.2 first provides a concise 
explanation of a REIM, which is the starting point of the spatial REIM development.  Then, the 
discussion turns to the way in which the spatial REIM has been constructed on the REIM with an 
emphasis on the ways in which local variables are incorporated and vertical interaction is handled.  
In section 5.3, the model is applied to the Chicago metropolitan area and the baseline projections 
for individual municipalities as well as the Chicago region as a whole are generated.  The 
simulation analyses are presented in section 5.4, followed by a summary and discussion.  
 
 
5.2. Modeling: A Spatial REIM 
 
5.2.1. Conventional REIM 
 
This study develops an alternative framework that overcomes the shortcomings of existing 
models and can be used for the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of local actions, 
particularly land use regulations.  Before presenting the new framework, in this section, a concise 
explanation will be provided of the conventional regional econometric input-output models 
(REIMs), particularly the Chicago REIM (Israilevich et al. 1997), on which the new framework is 
built.   
  
By integrating regional input-output (hereafter IO) and econometric, the REIMs exploit the 
advantages of both methods.  In fact, this ‘IO+econometric’ integration offers the possibility of 
making the regional IO matrix dynamic and price-responsive and to forecast the growth, decline, 
and transformation of the regional economy with the consideration of a disaggregated industrial 
structure (see e.g. West & Jackson 1998; Rey 2000).   
 
More specifically, the Chicago REIM (CREIM), here a basis for the new integrated framework 
development, is a coupling-type REIM (according to Rey’s (1998) taxonomy) for the Chicago 
region.  Its structure, most simply, can be demonstrated in figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1. Conventional CREIM Structure 
 
The CREIM’s logic starts from the exogenous national economy (and implicitly, the international 
economy), driving or constraining Chicago’s economic growth, as a major source of demand for 
regional production.  As the national economy grows, Chicago’s production is stimulated; this 
initial stimulus generates not only the immediate production increase but also ripple effects 
through regional inter-industry linkages.  This mechanism is simulated by CREIM’s dynamic 
input-output module, which is one of the most important features of CREIM.   
 
The module is designed to consider the dynamic nature of inter-industry and final demand 
linkages and to update the IO coefficients over time.  Adopting the idea presented in Conway 
(1990), here, the temporal IO coefficient changes are described by using two types of output that 
interact with each other, rather than a rule or function of direct transformation.  More specifically, 
consideration is given to two different types of output – 1) “actual output” (X): the real values of 
production and 2) “expected output” (Z): the expected level of outputs, derived from the base 
year’s input-output matrix.  By definition, these two variables are related to each other, as follows. 
FXAZ +⋅=    (5-1) 
where A is a base year’s input-output matrix and F represent final demands. 
 
Dynamic IO: Actual 
Output (X) – Expected 
Output (Z) Interaction 
Employment
(E)
Income (Y)
Population (P)
Final Demand
(F)Output
National Economy
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In base year, Z is exactly same as X ( i.e. XFXAZ =+⋅= ), because A is the IO for that year.  
Also, if the IO coefficients (A) were not changing over time, the equation Z=X can be maintained 
in all other years.  In reality, due to the technological shifts and other factors affecting the 
production recipe changes, IO coefficients are not constant but evolving over time.  Consequently, 
Z and X are rarely identical, although they are associated with each other.   
 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show Z and X in two sectors as examples – 1) Sector 18: Fabricated metal 
products manufacturing and 2) Sector 35: Real Estate.35    
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Figure 5.2. Expected Output (Z) and Actual Output (X) in Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing 
(1969~2005) 
 
                                                 
35 The data series Z can be generated by using historical data of actual output (X) by sector and final demands (F) as 
well as a base year IO matrix (A). 
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Z & X: Sector35 Real Estate
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Figure 5.3. Expected Output (Z) and Actual Output (X) in Real Estate (1969~2005) 
 
 
Here, the base year is Year 2005, where Z and X are identical.  In all other years, Z is not equal to 
X; and sometimes they reveal large differences.  More specifically, in the case of Sector 18: 
Fabricated metal products manufacturing, X is much greater than Z in 1970s and 1980s, while the 
gaps are relatively smaller since 1990 (figure 5.2).  This implies that the level of output will be 
underestimated, if the base year IO table is used for 1970s and 1980s.  In other words, the current 
linkages of this industry to other sectors in the Chicago economy are weaker than those in past 
(i.e. 1970s and 1980s).  This is consistent with the understanding of changes in the Chicago 
economy, particularly the increased locational fragmentation of manufacturing activities 
(implying declining forward and backward linkages) in that period of time (see Hewings et al. 
1998, Okuyama et al. 2002 and 2006).  The real estate sector, which is primarily local, shows a 
different trajectory of Z and X over time, with little evidence of fragmentation, unlike 
manufacturing (figure 5.3).     
 
Finally, Z and X need to be related econometrically.  In the process, a dynamic IO, which is 
embedded in the model, will be generated; further, it will be possible to obtain actual output (X) 
in the future corresponding to the final demands (F) and the updated IO.  In CREIM, this is 
accomplished in the following form.   
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where i and t are industry and time subscripts, respectively; and g represent a set of exogenous 
variables.  It needs to be noted that the lag structure (e.g., first order or second order) varies by 
sector depending on the fitness.  As demonstrated in Israilevich et al. (1996), this specification 
captures the lag effect of any shock in IO coefficients. 
 
Once the output (X) is derived based on the dynamically updated IO module in the model, 
employment (E) by industry needs to be projected.  This can be accomplished by forecasting 
regional labor productivity using national productivity projections, which are exogenous, as 
shown below.  
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where f(·) is industry-specific regional productivity function; and ti,φ  is an error term. 
 
Then, based on the employment projection, CREIM generates income (y) by sector in a similar 
manner.  
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where h(·) is industry-specific regional wage function; and ti ,ω  is an error term.  In this case, the 
national wage level is used as the main exogenous independent variable.   
 
As income is derived from employment, CREIM sets working age population as a function of 
regional employment as well as other factors.  In addition, regarding population, birth and death 
rates in future are forecast primarily based on historical trends, and also applied to generate the 
projections for population by cohort.  Net migration is also estimated, completing the 
demographic accounting.  
 
Then, using both income and population, the endogenous final demand levels – i.e. various types 
of consumption, investment, and state and local government spending – are determined.  Finally, 
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the model is brought to closure by linking the endogenously determined final demands back to 
the input-output module, particularly F in equation (5-1): FXAZ +⋅= .  
 
The regional economic and population forecasts can be generated, once the entire model is 
constructed, through the estimation of all equations in the input-output module as well as 
employment, income, population and final demand bloc.  Forecasting identifies the solutions for 
the entire set of equations and identities for every forecast year.  In this sense, it can be stated that 
the forecasts represent a sort of general equilibrium state where all markets are balanced.  That is 
the reason why this type of REIM is sometimes referred to as a Marshallian type of general 
equilibrium model in which commodity adjustments (through changes in the IO coefficients) 
facilitate market equilibrium at each point in time.  
 
It needs to be emphasized that, although not perfect, the model systematically connects various 
macroeconomic variables; and it is designed to describe the dynamic behaviors of the system.  
Particularly, detailed inter-industrial linkages are well characterized in a dynamic manner.  Also, 
the model integrates regional population and employment in a reciprocal manner.  One the one 
hand, as mentioned above, regional employment is used to explain changes in working age 
population.  On the other hand, population is linked to the regional economic production (X) via 
final demands (i.e. household consumption and expenditure of state and local governments); and 
further employment (E), which is derived from the production, creating an endogenous multiplier 
process.  
 
5.2.2. Spatial REIM: A Multi-level Integrated Analytic Framework  
 
The REIMs are relatively more sophisticated regional macro-economic tools which support 
regional economic forecasting and economic impact analysis based on dynamically updated IO.  
This family of the models has been widely employed by applied research since 1980s and has 
now become a key analytic tool, competing with Walrasian computable general equilibrium 
models (see e.g. West 1995; Rey 2000).  According to Kim & Hewings (2010), this technology is 
increasingly adopted by metropolitan planning agencies as well to generate region-wide forecasts 
and to conduct the analysis of regional economic scenarios.   
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However, the conventional REIMs (including CREIM), as they stand, only focus on the 
macroeconomic and region-wide demographic behaviors.36  The models neither support 
disaggregated-level analysis or forecasting nor consider the sub-regional-level conditions or the 
spatial structure of the region.37  In order to overcome this limitation and further to make a multi-
level framework which is suitable for the analysis of land use regulations, the REIM (particularly 
CREIM) will now be developed into a spatial REIM where 1) attention is also paid to the 
dynamics within a region and 2) regional- and sub-regional variables are vertically integrated in a 
reciprocal interactive form.  
 
The proposed new framework has a hierarchical structure (as opposed to the REIM having 
region-wide variables only) that consists of 1) three endogenous layers: region – municipalities – 
cell and 2) national economy as an exogenous input remains on the top.  Rather than simply 
allocating the region-wide totals generated by the conventional REIMs, here the main idea of the 
framework development is to establish a reciprocal vertical integration (figure 5.4) – i.e. in every 
round of model run (i.e. in each year (t) of the projection) the model is working across the 
hierarchy as follows:   
1) Using national economic forecasts for year t, the potential (expected) regional 
economic growth rate by sector is first derived from the regional layer. 
2) The cell-level information (i.e. lowest level conditions) at t-1 for each municipality 
is quantified to be taken into account in local level forecasting and analysis at t. 
3) Local level population and employment changes are tentatively determined with the 
consideration of a) the region-wide potential growth at t, b) the cell-level conditions 
at t-1, c) local socio-economic characteristics at t-1, and d) local level ‘population – 
employment’ interactions across space. 
4) The tentative values of local population and employment changes are sent back to 
the regional-level to project macro-economic variables, which are systemically 
integrated with each other according to the REIM formulation. 
                                                 
36 There have been the extensions of the conventional REIMs, such as the application to multi-regional contexts or the 
temporal disaggregation (see e.g. Rey & Dev. 1997; Donaghy et al. 2007).  However, the incorporation of intraregional 
dynamics (i.e. development of the spatial REIM) has not been accomplished.   
37 Therefore, when this modeling technology is adopted by metropolitan planning agencies, it is used only for 
generating regional level forecasts or region-wide impact analysis; and sub-regional level values are separately 
determined by using share-based allocation techniques or urban simulation models that just allocate the given totals 
(from REIMs) across space within the region (Kim & Hewings 2010).  Again, the combined use of a REIM and a 
disaggregation tool has been typically made in a top-down manner.   
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*) Then, the potential (expected) growth rate by sector is newly derived based on the 
new levels of final demands.  (1) – (3) – (4) processes are iterated until convergence, 
with given (2).    
5) Once the values of all regional and local variables for year t are finally determined 
through the iteration, cell level conditions are updated from t-1 to t by employing a 
simple logic or a more sophisticated simulation method.  The updated cell-level 
information is used in the next round (i.e. year t+1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. The Spatial REIM Structure, as Opposed to a Traditional REIM & Allocation 
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The third step is the most important part of this model formulation and operation.  Although 
various methods can be adopted for this stage, use here is made of a spatial econometric version 
of regional disequilibrium adjustment model (RDAM), that has a following spatial cross-
regressive simultaneous equation system (according to Rey & Boarnet’s (2004) taxonomy), as 
explained in detail in section 3.3.1. 
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where k and t denote cross sectional unit (e.g. municipalities) and time, respectively. 
 
The RDAM’s dynamic nature and explicit treatment of disaggregated-level population and 
employment changes together with the consideration of their spatial interdependence promote its 
use combined with a REIM.  In addition, the benefits of using a RDAM could be larger than 
expected, since many local or lower level factors, such as social indicators, land use, and 
location-specific amenities, can be conveniently included as exploratory variables to determine 
local population and employment changes. 
 
However, because it primarily focuses on population and employment changes originating from 
the spatial adjustment process and intraregional location factor differentials, a RDAM itself is not 
suitable for long-term forecasting, even though the dependent variables are population and 
employment changes.  To be an effective supporting tool for long-term analysis, the system 
would need to consider the fundamental growth drivers.  This is the reason why the potential 
(expected) growth is derived in step (1) and used in local forecasting and analysis.38 
   
                                                 
38 It needs to be emphasized that the forecasting accuracy can be improved by the inclusion of upper-level estimates in 
the model for disaggregated-level variables.  Zellner & Tobias (2000) compared seven models which can be classified 
into three main categories – 1) aggregated-level forecast, 2) disaggregated-level forecast, and 3) using the aggregated-
level forecasts in disaggregated-level forecasting as an explanatory variable – and found that the third approach shows 
the best performance. 
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More specifically, instead of the actual employment change between t-1 and t (i.e. 
k
tE∆ ), the 
dependent variable of the employment change equation is set as below. 
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where 
k
tZE  is the potential level of employment, calculated based on the region-wide potential 
employment growth rate by sector between t-1 and t.   
 
This new dependent variable indicates the number of job increase beyond the potential (expected) 
level of growth.  If a particular municipality shows actual employment growth larger than 
expected for a certain time period, the value of the variable will be positive. In contrast, if it fails 
to attain the expected level of growth, the value will become negative.   
 
k
tZE  is computed as follows (Step 1 in the model working).  First of all, the potential regional-
level employment growth rate by sector is derived using the concept of expected output (Z), 
existing in CREIM.   
1,
,
1,
1,
0,
1,
,
)(exp
−
−
−
−








⋅−⋅+







⋅+⋅
=
ti
tig
ti
ti
Zti
ti
ti
e
fg
z
x
z
e
ze
ααα
   (5-7)     
where tize ,  is the expected level of regional employment in sector i at time t; and the multiplied 
part in the form of exp( ) is industry-specific function which converts Z to employment via X, as 
presented in equation (2) and (3).  The numerator of this equation indicates the number of 
employees that the producers in sector i may hire to meet demand growth.  Whereas the 
numerator is adopted as the predicted value of employment in sector i at time t in the 
conventional CREIM without consideration of local conditions or supply constraints, the new 
framework uses it as an indicator that represents the potential employment growth of each 
municipality, as further explained below.  
 
Then, this expected rate of employment growth by sector is applied to individual municipality’s 
employment at time t-1(
k
tie 1, − ) to generate the expected employment level at time t in 
municipality k (i.e. 
k
tZE ), as follows:   
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This expected employment level of each municipality can be understood as the sum of growth 
and industry-mix effect in the context of shift share analysis, although the “expected” change by 
sector in a higher-level, as opposed to the “actual” change, is used.  In this sense, the new 
dependent variable, which is the residual (i.e. 
k
t
k
t ZEE − ), represents the competitiveness of each 
municipality in terms of job attraction.  In other words, given that the new dependent variable is 
adopted, the employment change equation tries to capture the variance of the competitiveness 
across municipalities by using the changing proximity to population and other business location 
factors.  This is a feature in various urban system simulation models, ranging from Lowry-type 
spatial interaction frameworks to micro-simulation and spatial IO approaches (see e.g. Wegner 
1994; Hunt et al. 2005; Kim & Hewings 2010) 
 
In a similar way, the population change equation is modified.  Here, the new dependent variable, 
used instead of 
k
tP∆ , is  
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where 
k
tZP  is the potential (expected) level of population, which is simply computed by 
multiplying the natural population growth rate (i.e. the gap between the birth rate and death rate) 
and 
k
tP 1− .   
 
In the present application of the spatial REIM, for simplicity and due to the data availability 
problem, the birth rate and death rate are exogenously determined using regional level 
information; and no consideration is given to the different rates for different cohort groups.  
However, the demographics can be further extended by introducing the logic of the cohort 
component survival model as well as exploiting the possibility of using more (spatially) detailed 
migration data.   
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As the regional expected growth rate is used in local forecasting and analysis, some variables, 
that represent the cell-level conditions such as detailed land use or other physical conditions, are 
measured and plugged into the local level layer to reflect the bottom-up effects (Step 2 in the 
model working).  This is accomplished by including such conditions at t-1 as components of B or 
H in the population and employment change equations for time t.  It is not a new method to derive 
a particular variable from the lower-level and to include it in higher level estimation.  For 
instance, White & Engelen (2000) derive 1) cellular density by activity, 2) mean cellular potential 
by activity, and 3) mean suitability for agricultural land from cell-based land use change 
simulation module and use them as explanatory variables to determine the regional-level growth.  
Furthermore, it has been found that the performance of RDAM can be improved by including 
micro land use information (Boarnet et al. 2005).  
 
Returning back to Step 3, local population and employment changes are calculated based on the 
modified RDAM.  Again, in this process, the factors of local population and employment changes 
include 1) region-wide growth driving forces derived from the upper layer in terms of 
k
tize , , 2) 
lower level information, such as detailed land use attributes, 3) socio-economic characteristics of 
each municipality (e.g. municipalities’ ethnic composition, education level, house price, etc), and 
4) the intraregional ‘population – employment’ interaction over space captured by using the 
spatial weight matrix.   
 
It should be noted that aggregate employment, as opposed to employment by sector, is modeled 
in the current application to the Chicago metropolitan area, presented in the next section.  
Because the sectoral employment is required for the next rounds of model run and regional 
forecasts, the sectoral disaggregation of the projected employment for each municipality is 
conducted as follows.39 
 
∑
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39 The assumption here is that local level changes in industrial structure stems only from the regionally determined 
growth differentials by sector.  Under this setting, if a particular municipality shows employment change same as the 
expected one (i.e. if 0ˆ =kty ), for every sector 
k
tie ,
 will be equal to k
tize ,
.  Because this assumption is somewhat 
unrealistic, it may need to be released later by modeling employment in different sectors differently rather than using a 
two equation system for population and aggregate employment.  It has been found that there is a challenge that the 
simulation outcomes become instable, as the number of structured equations increases.   
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Here, 
k
tEˆ  is the projected employment for municipality k, that is equal to 
k
t
k
t ZEy +ˆ , where 
k
tyˆ  
is the predicted value of the modified RDAM employment equation.   
 
As mentioned above, the calculated values of local population and employment for t are sent back 
up to regional-level layer to project macro-economic variables (Step 4 in the model working).  In 
detail, first region-wide population and sectoral employment are calculated by summing up the 
employment and population of all municipalities.40  Then, all other macroeconomic variables are 
determined according to the REIM formulation.41  Further, the expected output (Z) will be newly 
calculated using the new final demands as well as the actual output (X), based on the equation (5-
1): FXAZ +⋅= .   
 
The newly calculated Z generates a new series of the potential level of employment for individual 
municipalities (
k
tZE ).  In other words, step 1 of the modeling working is repeated.  (Step 1) – 
(Step 3) – (Step 4) processes need to be iterated until convergence to finally determine local 
population and employment as well as regional variables for t.   
 
Once this is done, cell level conditions need to be updated from t-1 to t based on the new local 
population and employment (Step 5).  For instance, to be consistent with the determined 
population and employment increases between t-1 and t, an appropriate number of undeveloped 
cells within a municipality need to be converted to residential and commercial-industrial land 
uses respectively.  This task can be accomplished by simple updating or through the use of a more 
sophisticated simulation method.  The updated cell-level information is again plugged into the 
local level layer as explanatory variables in the population and employment change equations for 
time t+1.  This is for step 2 of the model flow-chart in the next round.   
 
Suppose that a key sector of the study region is projected to grow very rapidly, according to the 
national economic forecasts.  Under these national economic forecasts, the REIM tends to 
generate a rapid increase in regional employment in many others as well as the sector.  If we 
                                                 
40 In real applications, regional and local level may have different levels of sectoral details, because of data availability 
(i.e. generally, much disaggregated information is only available for regions.)  If this is the case, appropriate 
aggregation and disaggregation process is required when the values are transferred over hierarchy.    
41 While the actual output (X) is generated by the equation (2) using Z in the conventional REIM, it is now derived by 
the equation (3) using the locally determined emplo
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adopt the conventional CREIM, a large employment growth will be placed in the region 
regardless of local conditions.  In contrast, the spatial REIM framework transmits this signal to 
the local level, particularly to the municipalities having greater numbers of employment in the 
key sector and checks whether or not the rapid demand increase of this sector’s employment can 
be satisfied by the existing local and lower level conditions, so that a large amount of multiplier 
effects can be realized.  If many establishments in this sector are currently located in a very 
congested zone where growth cannot be accommodated efficiently, the level of actual 
employment growth in the sector may be projected to be lower than the expected level at the local 
layer; and the regional employment growth trajectory is also altered according to the modified 
employment increase.42  This may be more consistent with the reality that the chance of attaining 
the potential growth in the region is influenced by the internal conditions.   
 
This is what the spatial REIM attempts to describe by establishing a feedback link that was 
described earlier.  More generally, it tries to reflect the probable supply constraints and the effect 
of regional spatial structure on the performance of a regional economy, rather than assuming that 
all demand increases will be satisfied and that the additional activities to meet the demand 
increase will be located somewhere within the region.   
 
 
5.3. An Application of the Spatial REIM: The Case of Chicago  
 
5.3.1. Study Area 
 
The established framework is applied to the Chicago metropolitan area by extending the 2008 
version of CREIM (Base year: Year 2005).  In this version of CREIM, the economy of the seven-
county Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) region – Cook, DuPage, Kane, 
Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will in Illinois – is described with a new industrial classification 
system that consists of 45 NAICS-based industries and government sectors, listed in table 5.2.  
The 2008 CREIM, estimated with historical data between 1969 and 2005, is capable of producing 
                                                 
42 One critical issue in modifying the regional growth trajectory may be whether the unmet potential growth will be 
deflected to another part of the metropolitan area or outside the region.  The spatial REIM does not directly describe 
this behavior of the system.  Rather, in the model, the modified trajectory is determined by solving the entire set of 
macroeconomic and the RDAM equations under given conditions through the iteration.  
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the macroeconomic forecasts from 2006 up to 2040 by using national economic forecasts for the 
corresponding forecast years. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Study Area: Seven County CMAP Region 
 
 
Table 5.2. Industry Classification System of CREIM 
 
Code Description 2002NAICS 
01 Livestock and Other Agricultural Products            111, 112 
02 Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                   113, 114, 115 
03 Mining                                                21 
04 Utilities 22 
05 Construction 23 
06 Food and Kindred Products                311 
07 Tobacco Product Manufacturing 312 
08 Apparel and Textile Products             313, 314, 315 
09 Leather and Leather Products                          316 
10 Lumber and Wood Products               321 
11 Paper and Allied Products                  322 
12 Printing and Publishing                      323, 511, 516 
Lake Michigan 
Chicago 
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Table 5.2 (cont.) 
 
Code Description 2002NAICS 
13 Petroleum and Coal Products                           324 
14 Chemicals and Allied Products                         325 
15 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products                    326 
16 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products                       327 
17 Primary Metals Industries                             331 
18 Fabricated Metal Products                             332 
19 Industrial Machinery and Equipment                    333 
20 Computer and other Electric product, component manufacturing 334, 335 
21 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 336 
22 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 337 
23 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 339 
24 Wholesale Trade 42 
25 Retail Trade 44, 45 
26 Air Transportation 481 
27 Railroad Transportation and Transportation Services 482, 492, 487, 488 
28 Water Transportation 483 
29 Truck Transportation, Warehousing, Waste & Remediation services 484, 493, 562 
30 Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation 485 
31 Pipeline Transportation 486 
32 Information, except Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 515, 517 
33 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 512 
34 Finance and Insurance 52, 55, 533 
35 Real Estate 531 
36 Professional and Management services and other support services 54, 518, 561 
37 Educational Services 61 
38 Health Care 621, 622, 623 
39 Social Assistance 624 
40 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 711, 713 
41 Accommodation Services 721 
42 Food Services 722 
43 Repair and Maintenance 811 
44 Personal and Laundry Services 812 
45 Memberships Organizations and Private Households 712, 813, 814 
FGE Federal Government Enterprises N/A 
OFGC Other Federal Government, Civilian N/A 
FGM Federal Government, Military N/A 
SLGE State and Local Government Enterprises N/A 
OSLG Other State and Local Government N/A 
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There are 296 municipalities within this area, as shown in figure 5.5.  While most of them are 
completely included in the study area, a few municipalities are located across the region’s 
boundaries.  The partly included municipalities are considered, with their shares of population 
and employment within the portions included in the study area.  The unincorporated areas of each 
county are considered as a municipality to maintain the identity between the regional values and 
the sum of all local units.  As a result, there are 303 units of local analysis. 
 
5.3.2. Model Calibration 
 
The main tasks of this spatial REIM application are 1) to calibrate the model by estimating the 
modified RDAM, 2) to solve the entire set of equations with a feedback loop for every forecast 
year and 3) to generate a set of baseline simulation outcomes.  First, for the calibration task, data 
for five time spans were used, from [2000,2001] to [2004,2005] due to the data availability 
problem.  Particularly, there is no single source of information, providing annual employment by 
municipality, which is the main variable of this analysis.  Therefore, an employment dataset was 
constructed using three data sources: 1) 2000 Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) 
data, 2) Zipcode Business Pattern (ZBP) data by U.S. Census, and 3) Regional Economic 
Information System (REIS) data by U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  More specifically, 
employment by sector in 2000 for individual municipalities was identified using CTPP data that 
provides employment information for each census tract in decennial years.43  Then, using the ZBP 
dataset, that contains annual establishment and employment information at zip-code area level, 
the rate of employment changes from 2000 to other years for each zip-code areas are derived.  A 
series of spatial smoothing is applied to generate a more realistic surface of employment change 
rates across the space.  Then, by multiplying the values of smoothed employment change rates 
with 2000 employment derived from CTPP, employment by municipality is derived for every 
year from 2001 to 2005.  Finally, the outcome of the former procedure is adjusted to match to the 
values provided by REIS (annual employment by sector at county level), when they are 
aggregated up to county-level, because REIS has been used as a main source of information for 
CREIM development.  Since there are some discrepancies in definitions of employment in 
                                                 
43 Local employment information available is disaggregated by 14 sectors based on NAICS, whereas CREIM has a 45-
sector classification scheme.  For this reason, aggregation and disaggregation work is conducted when the values are 
transferred over hierarchy.  It needs to be noted that the potential (expected) employment growth (i.e. k
tize ,
) for each 
municipality is computed based on the 14-sector classification.  
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different datasets, the gaps to be adjusted are inevitable.  A similar approach (i.e. using multiple 
data sources and trying to mitigate the discrepancies and errors) is used to cope with the data 
availability problems of other variables.  The variables used in this analysis and data sources are 
presented in table 5.3.   
 
Table 5.3. Variables and Data Sources in the RDAM Estimation  
  
Variable Description Data Sources 
Main Variables  
P Population Annual Population Estimates by US Census 
E  Employment  CTPP, ZBP and REIS 
Derived from Regional level  
ZE Expected level of employment3  CREIM 
Municipality-level Socio Economic Characteristics  
NWR The Ratio of Non-White Population Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
HISPR The Ratio of Hispanic Population Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
VACR Vacancy Rate Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
EDU1 The Level of the Educational Attainment Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
MHOHINC Median Household Income Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
MHV Median Value of Specified Housing Units Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
POVR Poverty Rate Census 2000 and American Community Survey 
Micro-level Information  
HINTERLA2 
The Area of Lands for Potential 
Incorporation  
TIGER4 
LU_UDL 
The Area of Developable Land within the 
Jurisdictional Boundaries 
National Land Cover Database by USGS and 
CMAP’s Land-Use Inventory 
OS The Area of Developed Open Space 
National Land Cover Database by USGS and 
CMAP’s Land-Use Inventory 
RC The Lengths of the Major Arterial Roads 
TIGER and Annual road mileage data by Illinois 
Department of Transportation 
GOV Presence of Major Government Offices CMAP’s Land-Use Inventory 
UNIV Presence of Universities or Colleges CMAP’s Land-Use Inventory 
BIZPARK Presence of Business Parks CMAP’s Land-Use Inventory 
DISTCBD Distance to CBD GIS data by City of Chicago 
DISTOHARE Distance to O’Hare International Airport GIS data by City of Chicago 
1) EDU is defined as a percentage of 25+ population, whose educational attainment is Bachelor's degree or above 
2) This is a measurement to consider the area of available hinterlands surrounding each municipality.  This represents 
the area of unincorporated land closet to each municipality.   
3) See the equation (5-7)~(5-9) for details. 
4) TIGER indicates the Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing system provided by U.S. 
Census. 
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To complete this RDAM estimation, a spatial weight matrix (W) is necessary.  The matrix was 
constructed using 2000 municipality-level journey to work data contained in CTPP.  This way of 
constructing the weight matrix is theoretically desirable, because here the matrix is introduced to 
consider the labor market areas beyond municipality boundaries.  Also, according to the 
experiment by Boarnet et al. (2005), a journey-to-work-data-based weight matrix is more likely 
to generate reasonable estimation outcomes.  
 
It should be noted that I make a following treatment on many explanatory variables and use the 
converted index value (i.e. index(x)k), as opposed to the real magnitude (xk), in the estimation for 
a long-run simulation purpose.  
t
t
k
tk
t
x
xx
xIndex
)(
)(
)(
σ
−
=    (5-11) 
This treatment may be necessary for the situations such as the following case.  Suppose that a 
positive and statistically significant effect of HISPR (the ratio of Hispanic population) on local 
population change is found with given data.  This may be probable, because the newly 
immigrated Hispanic population may tend to settle down in the communities where many people 
in the same ethnic group are living.  As the Hispanic population is moving into the region in 
increasing numbers over time, the level of HISPR in most municipalities will increase.  If the 
population change equation is set as a function of the real magnitude of HISPR with a positive 
coefficient, the overall population will be growing rapidly simply because of the generally 
increasing HISPR in the region.  Although this may be the case in the sense that the Chicago has 
come to attract more Hispanic immigrants in competition with other regions, this is not very 
probable.  Rather, it would be more reasonable to think that the location choice of a certain 
number of Hispanic residents or new immigrants is influenced by relative level of HISPR and to 
use local HISPR variance within the region to capture this effect.  The index, which indicates the 
relative position of each municipality on a variable’s distribution, is used for this reason. By 
adopting this strategy, the overall increase or decrease in the real magnitude of the variables will 
affect the region-wide totals in a more realistic fashion. 
 
Because the modified RDAM is also a spatial cross-regressive simultaneous equation system 
having the feedback and spatial simultaneity problems, traditional least square techniques, 
including traditional two stage least square, cannot provide consistent and unbiased estimates.  
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Therefore, like the spatial econometric analysis in chapter 3, the model is estimated using a 
spatial generalized moments approach, initially developed by Kelejian & Robinson (1993) and 
later extended by Kelejian & Prucha (1998 and 1999).  More specifically, the simultaneous 
equation system model is estimated in a constant coefficients model form.  Also, to obtain the 
final estimates for the simulation, the model specification is modified repeatedly, by excluding 
the independent variables that are statistically insignificant at the 5%-level.  Table 5.4 presents 
the final estimation outcomes.   
 
Table 5.4. Final Estimation Outcomes of the Modified RDAM 
 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic P-value 
[Population Change Equation] Dependent Variable: P – ZP    
C Intercept 201.061 37.9227 5.30186 [.000] 
IWECH (I+W) * (Employment Change) 0.018523 8.14E-03 2.27683 [.023] 
P0 Population in t-1 -0.012422 1.26E-04 -98.7758 [.000] 
IWE0 (I+W) * (Employment in t-1) 2.74E-04 9.28E-05 2.95723 [.003] 
Index(HISPR) HISPR Index 109.496 17.0398 6.42593 [.000] 
Index(MHOHINC) MHOHINC Index 101.471 44.0884 2.30155 [.021] 
Index(EDU) EDU Index 194.153 31.296 6.20377 [.000] 
Index(MHV) MHV Index -276.375 38.7214 -7.13754 [.000] 
Index(UNIV) UNIV dummy Index 54.7356 15.5275 3.52507 [.000] 
Index(LU_UDL) LU_UDL Index 214.496 18.3866 11.6659 [.000] 
Index(HINTERLA) HINTERLA Index 256.229 18.8212 13.6138 [.000] 
DUMMYREC1 Dummy of recession years 85.9552 41.4773 2.07234 [.038] 
R-squared = 0.884617 | Adjusted R-squared = 0.883772     
[Employment Change Equation] Dependent Variable: E – ZE    
C Intercept 176.177 44.3415 3.97317 [.000] 
IWPCH (I+W) * (Population Change) 0.08044 0.024666 3.26123 [.001] 
E0 Employment in t-1 -0.01769 2.43E-04 -72.8692 [.000] 
IWP0 (I+W) * (Population in t-1) 5.02E-04 1.58E-04 3.17294 [.002] 
Index(HISPR) HISPR Index 116.64 24.0711 4.84565 [.000] 
Index(EDU) EDU Index 207.491 40.3936 5.13674 [.000] 
Index(MHV) MHV Index -142.785 38.3557 -3.72267 [.000] 
Index(GOV) GOV dummy Index 74.2272 22.8953 3.24202 [.001] 
R-squared = 0.871904 | Adjusted R-squared = 0.870909     
1) In the recession years, while employment decreases significantly, generally net-migration is not much affected in 
spite of the unfavorable economic situation, because of the similar unfavorable situations in other areas.  So, 
employment is hardly matched to population in a RDAM set-up.  By including the dummy variables for such recession 
years, we can better deal with this unusual mismatch.  The dummy variables are expected to exhibit positive 
coefficients in the population change equation.    
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The overall model’s explanatory power is good (adjusted r-squared are 0.87~0.88).  Also, the rate 
of adjustment, which are the negative values of the estimated coefficients for P0 in population 
change equation (i.e. 0.012422) and that for E0 in employment change equation (i.e. 0.01769), 
are between 0 and 1 as expected.  This means that the model will generate dynamically stable 
processes.  Moreover, statistically significant reciprocal ‘population –employment’ interactions 
are found (see the estimates for IWECH and IWPCH in the two equations).   
 
In addition, the estimation captures the effects of municipality level socio-economic 
characteristics and micro-level attributes on household and business location decisions.  For 
example, the results revealed that population is more likely to grow in the towns showing higher 
ratios of Hispanic population, median income, and education level.  The presence of any 
university is found to be favorable to population increase, while the relative level of housing price 
has a negative effect on population growth.   Moreover, large areas of developable or 
incorporable land are positive factors of population growth.  
 
In similar fashion to population changes, the estimation outcomes suggest that employment tends 
to grow faster than expected if the municipality has a higher Hispanic population ratio or 
educational attainment level.  In the case of employment, the presence of major government 
offices also exhibits a statistically positive effect.  However, the presence of business parks and 
per capita major arterial road shows statistically insignificant effects.   
 
5.3.3 Model Solving  
     
Using the modified RDAM estimated above, the spatial REIM is constructed according to the 
structure presented in the previous section.  The overall framework has the equations for the 
macro-economic variables in the CREIM and the two equation system for local population and 
employment as well as the cell-level module.   
 
The entire set of equations is solved through the five step process for each forecast year, as 
explained above.  More specifically, once the values of all explanatory variables, including the 
potential level of employment for individual municipalities (
k
tZE ) are prepared in steps 1 and 2, 
the two equation system, with 606 unknowns (i.e. population and employment for 303 
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municipalities), interlinked based on the W matrix, is solved by using a simple algorithm, as 
demonstrated in figure 5.6.  Although it varies by forecast year, generally the convergence 
(within 0.001% tolerance) is attained with between 5 and 7 iterations. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Algorithm to Solve the Modified RDAM  
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The iteration along with the larger loop (i.e. Step 1 – Step 3 –Step 4), mentioned in the previous 
section, is conducted in a similar manner.  In other words, the ZE calculation (Step 1), RDAM 
solving (Step 3), and macroeconomic variable calculations (Step 4) are repeated until Z used for 
ZE calculation at starting point is the same as the new Z, calculated with the RDAM solutions and 
macroeconomic equations at the end.  In the case of this larger loop, the convergence within 
0.001% tolerance is also typically attained through with 10 to 15 iterations.   
 
Once the solutions for the all CREIM and RDAM variables are determined, the cell-level 
attributes (i.e. LU_UDL and HINTERLA) need to be updated as the final stage of each round of 
model run.  In this application, for simplicity, updating is accomplished based on following 
assumed rules.44 
1) Density of new development will be same as the base year level in the future, as long as 
undeveloped and incorporable land is available.  
2) Each municipality tries to maintain the area of undeveloped land within its jurisdiction at 
the base year level, by incorporating hinterland areas as the undeveloped land stock is 
decreasing.   
3) Pre-developed land will not be converted to undeveloped land even though population 
and employment is declining due to assumed irreversibility of changes. 
According to these rules, LU_UDL and HINTERLA for each municipality are updated based on 
the determined population and employment changes in the municipality.  Also, in every year of 
the simulation the Index(LU_UDL) and Index(HINTERLA) are calculated again for use in solving 
the modified RDAM.   
 
5.3.4. Baseline Simulation 
 
Using this method, the spatial REIM, applied to the Chicago area, is solved for the forecast period, 
from 2006 to 2040, and, as a result, baseline simulation outcomes are obtained.45  The 
                                                 
44 Under this setting, if population is growing in a particular municipality, first hinterland area (HINTERLA) is 
declining by the required land which is new population divided by the base year density.  If there is no sufficient 
hinterland, the stock of undeveloped land starts to decrease.  
45 In the baseline run, Index(HISPR), Index(MHOHINC), Index(EDU), Index(MHV), Index(UNIV), and Index(GOV) 
are fixed at the base year level for every municipality. 
 
 
 
104 
information generated includes not only the forecasts for detailed macroeconomic forecasts but 
also population and employment projections by municipality.   
 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 demonstrate how the spatial REIM projects the long-term regional growth 
differently compared to the conventional CREIM by showing the trajectories of regional 
population and total employment.  It is found that the overall growth, projected by the spatial 
REIM, is similar to the CREIM’s forecast in terms of the pace until 2020, although it fluctuates 
less.  However, the spatial REIM projects the regional growth rate to be slower than the 
conventional CREIM for the time periods beyond 2020; this is especially true for population.  
This slower growth after 2020 may be attributable to the potentially emerging shifts in the spatial 
structure or other intraregional level conditions, newly considered in the spatial REIM.   
 
Alternatively, it may be caused by some limitations of this application, such as the linear fashion 
of the RDAM or a short period of data used for the calibration.  
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Figure 5.7. Conventional CREIM vs. Spatial REIM: Regional Population Forecasts 
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Regional Total Employment Forecasts
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Figure 5.8. Conventional CREIM vs. Spatial REIM: Regional Total Employment Forecasts  
 
 
The larger difference between the new projection and existing CREIM forecasts after 2020 is also 
revealed in table 5.5, where the forecasts for main macroeconomic indicators in terms of annual 
growth rates for different forecast time periods are presented.  This table also shows that the gap 
is wider especially in the population growth trend, that is largely determined with the 
consideration of local conditions in the spatial REIM, rather than directly related to the 
employment at regional level.  Also, the gap is relatively large in construction, trade (including 
retail trade), and some service sectors, which largely depend on local spending, compared to other 
industries.  This may suggest that the spatial REIM seems to be responding to some constraints in 
household sector (especially slower growth rates) and that the effect of such constraints is spread 
out over the economy, particularly the local sectors.  
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Table 5.5. Conventional CREIM vs. Spatial REIM: Regional Total Employment Forecasts 
 
Overall Forecast 
Period (2005~2040) 
2005~2020 2020~2040 
 
Past 35 
Years 
(1970~ 
2005) CREIM 
Spatial 
REIM 
CREIM 
Spatial 
REIM 
CREIM 
Spatial 
REIM 
GRP 1.78% 2.13% 2.09% 2.08% 2.07% 2.16% 2.10% 
Population 0.53% 0.78% 0.57% 0.54% 0.55% 0.96% 0.58% 
Total Output 2.57% 2.07% 2.02% 1.49% 1.47% 2.51% 2.42% 
Employment 1.17% 0.84% 0.78% 0.53% 0.52% 1.08% 0.97% 
   Construction (Sector 5) 1.85% 0.62% 0.53% 0.06% 0.05% 1.05% 0.88% 
   Manufacturing (Sector 6~23) -2.10% -0.74% -0.78% -0.48% -0.49% -0.94% -1.00% 
   Trade (Sector 24~25) 0.76% 0.61% 0.52% 0.41% 0.40% 0.75% 0.61% 
   FIRE (Sector 34~35)1 2.23% 0.99% 0.94% 0.87% 0.83% 1.09% 1.03% 
   Service (Sector 36~45) 3.36% 1.14% 1.07% 0.64% 0.62% 1.52% 1.41% 
   All Other Sectors 0.55% 1.07% 1.02% 0.98% 0.97% 1.14% 1.06% 
Personal Income 2.17% 1.86% 1.83% 1.43% 1.42% 2.19% 2.13% 
1) FIRE stands for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. 
 
 
In addition to these region-wide projections, local population and employment forecasts can be 
generated by the new framework, that now incorporates municipality and cell-level layers into the 
CREIM.  Figures 5.9 and 5.10 present historical (2000~2005) and projected (2005~2040) 
population and employment changes of individual municipalities, respectively, in terms of annual 
growth rates.  According to these projections, basically the historical patterns of population and 
employment growth will be maintained in future, in the sense that 1) suburban areas attract more 
people and jobs compared to the city of Chicago or other municipalities in Cook County and 2) 
the population and employment growth are highly correlated at the municipality-level.  However, 
it can be seen that the employment growth rate will exceed the pace of population growth in most 
suburban communities in the future, whereas population had been grown much more rapidly there 
in past.  This can be attributed to the consideration of population – employment interactions and 
dynamic adjustment processes in the new framework.  In other words, jobs are more likely to 
locate in the suburban areas where people are abundant, while population growth momentum will 
not increase continuously until the wide gap between job opportunities and labor supply there 
become narrower. 
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Figure 5.9. Historical Population and Employment Growth by Municipality (2000~2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Projected Population and Employment Growth by Municipality (2005~2040) 
Projected Employment Growth (2005~2040) Projected Population Growth (2005~2040) 
Historical Employment Growth (2000~2005) Historical Population Growth (2000~2005) 
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5.4. Impact Analysis of Reactive Land Use Regulations  
 
5.4.1. Reactive Land Use Regulations by Suburban Communities 
 
Using the spatial REIM, in this section, a set of impact analyses are conducted to assess the 
macroeconomic impacts of some types of reactive land use regulations that limit housing supply 
and population growth in the municipalities.  Although Chicago has been considered as a less 
regulated region compared with many other metropolitan areas, a considerable number of 
suburban municipalities have implemented minimum-lot-size zoning ordinances or building 
permit caps.  According to a recent survey conducted by the Wharton’s residential land use 
regulation project in 2005 (Gyourko et al. 2008), among 98 municipalities surveyed (of total 296 
entities in this area), 11 cities or towns have at least a two-acre-minimum-lot-size requirement 
somewhere within their jurisdictions; and another 5 communities have at least a one-acre-
minimum-lot-size requirement (see figure 5.11).  Also, 10 municipalities have one or more 
explicit “statutory limits on the number of building permits for single family and multifamily 
product, on the number of single-family or multifamily units authorized for construction in any 
given year, on the number of multifamily dwellings permitted in the community, or on the 
number of units allowed in any given multifamily building” (p.701).  Interestingly, there is no 
municipality having both restrictions – i.e. 1) two- or one-acre-minimum-lot-size requirement and 
2) permit caps – together.  This may suggest that the two types of regulations are functioning in a 
similar way, that may be limiting population increases as well as housing construction in the 
municipality.  
 
As noted, such reactive land use regulations directly affect housing supply and thus population 
growth within the jurisdictions; and building permit data shows this deterrent effect. 
Municipality-level building permit data were compiled for the Chicago region, provided by U.S. 
Census, between 2006 and 2008 to check the effect of the regulations, because the regulation 
information is for year 2005.  Then, the number of permitted units divided by 2005 population 
(on the y-axis) was related to the projected annual population growth rate for the three years (on 
the x-axis) for two different groups: 1) municipalities with the minimum-lot-size requirements or 
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permit caps vs. 2) municipalities without such reactive regulations (figure 5.12).46  Two things are 
notable.  First, x and y show somewhat strong positive relationship, which may imply that the 
population growth projected by the spatial REIM correctly forecasts the population changes of 
individual municipalities because there appears to be a strong correlation with the observed 
building permit data.  Secondly, consistent with the expectation, the group of municipalities 
having the more reactive regulations shows a flatter slope, which indicates that the number of 
building permits tends to be smaller in these communities, when population growth potential is 
controlled.  In other words, the regulations may have a significant negative effect on local 
housing supply. 
 
  
 
Figure 5.11. Reactive Land Use Regulations in Chicago  
 
 
                                                 
46 Rather than using the number of permitted units as they stand, here I divide the number by the base year population 
and use the value to control the effects stemming from the size variance.  It also needs to be noted that the figure 
excludes the municipalities where building permit or land use regulation information is not available or 2005 
population is smaller than 5,000.   
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Figure 5.12. Building Permits & Reactive Land Use Regulations  
   
 
However, the regulations may not always come into effect.  There is no reason the regulations 
reduce local housing stock or population if there is no demand for new construction.  Also, as far 
as the new construction plans satisfy the lot-size or permit cap requirements, the regulations will 
not limit housing supply and following population increase to that extent.  This means that the 
presence of the regulations needs to be interpreted in the model as an upper limit of housing stock 
or population growth rate rather than a negative shock with a certain magnitude on the variables.  
Once the regulations are reflected in this way, mirroring reality, in simulation the potential 
negative shock will take effect conditionally with different amounts in different municipalities.47  
This issue also highlights that the effects of local land use regulations can be better analyzed by 
“modeling and simulation,” particularly a simulation model like the spatial REIM, in which 
population by municipality is projected, so that it is possible to identify whether or not the actions 
come into effect in a particular locality at a particular time point.      
  
 
 
                                                 
47 The shock will be zero, if a municipality does not satisfy both conditions: 1) the regulations are implemented and 2) 
population is likely to grow more rapidly than the given upper limit.   
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5.4.2. Prior Experiments: The Effects of a Negative Population Shock at a Particular 
Location  
 
As noted, the impact analyses of minimum-lot-size requirements and building caps can be 
properly conducted by imposing the upper limit on population increase.  Before conducting the 
impact analyses, a simple negative population shock to two selected municipalities, one at a time, 
will be considered to explore how the impact is spread out over the region’s economy and space 
in each case.  These experiments will enhance the interpretation of the complicated simulation 
outcomes in the main impact analyses, which are a mixture of many different shocks in different 
places having the regulations. 
 
More specifically, a negative population shock with the magnitude -1,000 is first given to the 
Frankfort village in year 2006; and then the same amount of shock is imposed on the Sugar Grove 
village in the same year.  According to the Wharton survey, both towns implemented the reactive 
regulations as of 2005.  At the same time, their population is estimated to grow very rapidly in the 
baseline spatial REIM projections.    
 
Figure 13 demonstrates how the population shock affects employment across space in the two 
cases.  Above all, it is evident that a greater employment loss occurs not only in the very 
municipality but also in the places which import the workers from the municipality with a shock, 
such as the cities of Chicago, Aurora, and Naperville, because the municipality-level employment 
change is linked to the population changes in the labor market areas captured by the spatial 
weight matrix based on the journey-to-work data in the modified RDAM.  Furthermore, although 
small, many other municipalities will experience employment decreases, even though they have 
no interaction with the affected municipalities in terms of the journey-to-work flow.  This is 
attributable not only to the indirect linkages through the power series of spatial weight matrix at 
municipality level but also to the systematic interconnections from a municipality to others via 
the regional layer.48  In other words, population and employment shock in any part of the region 
                                                 
48 A shock given to a particular municipality first alters the projections of all municipalities with consideration of their 
spatial interdependence and then changes the values of macroeconomic variables accordingly.  In addition, through the 
iteration of (Step 1) – (Step 3) – (Step 4), population and employment in individual municipalities are further adjusted 
to determine the probable state of the spatial economic system under the shock which satisfies the modified RDAM as 
well as all macroeconomic equations at the same time.   
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will alter macroeconomic variables (i.e. decreasing consumption, production, and inter-industry 
purchases) and then generate unfavorable effects on all parts of the regional economic system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13. The Effects of the Population Shock on Employment by Municipality in 2006 
 
Table 5.6 presents the effects of the population shock on regional employment by sector in each 
case.  First of all, the magnitudes of the impacts in Construction and Trade sectors are larger than 
the shares in the base year’s regional employment, listed in table 5.7.  In contrast, Manufacturing, 
which accounts for 9.5% of regional total employment in the base year, received just about 7.6% 
of the total impact in both cases.  This is consistent with the intuition that generally a population 
shock more profoundly affects the local sectors, that heavily rely on local spending.   
 
In addition, it is clearly shown that the magnitude and composition of overall impacts on regional 
employment vary by the location of the shock.  Even though the same amount of shock is given 
to the population, the effect is greater in the case of Frankfort village than the Sugar Grove village, 
probably for two main reasons: 1) Frankfort is more highly interconnected to other places in the 
region as a labor supplier and 2) the population shock given to the Frankfort affects the sectors in 
The Case of Sugar Grove Village 
 
The Case of Frankfort Village 
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a manner that generates a larger ripple effects on regional employment.  The differences in the 
composition can be partly explained by the differences in the industry mixes between the two 
municipalities and their associated communities (i.e. the places which have tight connections with 
the municipality).  In other words, the Frankfort’s larger share of Trade sector (18.2%), compared 
to that of the Sugar Grove (7.7%) may partly cause the larger impact on Trade sector in the case 
of Frankfort village.49   
 
Table 5.6. The Effects of the Population Shock on Regional Employment by Sector 
 
 The Case of Frankfort Village The Case of Sugar Grove Village 
 # % # % 
Construction (Sector 5) -63.9  11.5% -54.1  11.3% 
Manufacturing (Sector 6~23) -42.4  7.6% -36.3  7.6% 
Trade (Sector 24~25) -129.3  23.2% -98.3  20.5% 
FIRE (Sector 34~35) -46.5  8.4% -37.5  7.8% 
Service (Sector 36~45) -208.1  37.4% -176.8  36.9% 
All Other Sectors -66.0  11.9% -76.7  16.0% 
Total -556.2  100.0% -479.7  100.0% 
 
 
Table 5.7. Industry Mixes of the Region and the Two Municipalities  
 
 Region as a Whole Frankfort Village Sugar Grove Village 
Construction (Sector 5) 5.6% 10.6% 12.5% 
Manufacturing (Sector 6~23) 9.5% 12.4% 12.7% 
Trade (Sector 24~25) 20.2% 18.2% 7.7% 
FIRE (Sector 34~35) 11.3% 8.5% 7.8% 
Service (Sector 36~45) 41.2% 40.9% 43.2% 
All Other Sectors 12.2% 9.3% 16.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.14 demonstrates the long-run effect of the shock given in year 2006 on regional 
employment.  The graph shows that the negative effect on regional employment will be quickly 
mitigated in several following years, when a shock is given to a particular year (i.e. Year 2006 in 
this case) only.  This may be because the regional economic growth is largely determined by the 
                                                 
49 But, for a more complete explanation, consideration needs to be given to the industry mixes of the associated 
communities and inter-industry linkages of the Chicago economy.  In fact, a larger impact on Construction sector is 
found in the case of Frankfort village, even though the share of the sector is smaller there than the Sugar Grove.   
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exogenous national growth trends, and these are assumed to be unchanged.  However, it is found 
that approximately 20% of the immediate effect will be remaining in the long term.  First, this 
suggests that the full recovery will be difficult to achieve, when growth momentum is once 
disturbed by any shock.  In addition, this implies that the negative effects will accumulate, if the 
shock will be imposed for a longer period of time, as opposed to a single year.   
 
Long Run Effects of the Population Shock in 2006
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Figure 5.14. Long-run Effects of the Population Shock in 2006 
 
5.4.3. Macroeconomic Impact Analyses of the Reactive Land Use Regulations 
 
Finally, using the spatial REIM, the macroeconomic effects of the reactive land use regulations 
are assessed.  As explained above, the minimum-lot-size requirements and permit caps are 
regarded as an upper limit of population growth, rather than a negative shock on population.  In 
detail, to measure the effects, the upper bounds on year-by-year population growth rates are 
imposed in the 26 municipalities having such regulations according to the Wharton survey for all 
forecast years (i.e. between 2006 and 2040).  Because detailed information about the degree of 
land use regulations in individual municipalities is not available, the model is run multiple times 
for different scenarios that represent different levels of the upper limits ranging from 5% to 10%.  
It is assumed that the level of the upper limit is same in all 26 municipalities in each scenario. 
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Figure 5.15 presents the effects of the regulations on employment by municipality, when the 
upper limit is set as 5% (i.e. population growth can be attained up to 5%/year in the 
municipalities with the regulations.).  As shown, in 2006 (the first year with the restriction), the 
considerable negative impacts begin to appear in some municipalities, including Frankfort, Sugar 
Grove, Chicago, Aurora, Naperville, etc.  As discussed in the previous section, these places are 
the villages where the projected rapid population growth is limited by the regulations or the cities 
that import the workers from the affected villages.  Then, in 2040 (the last year in the simulation), 
it was found that the employment loss is dramatically expanded across space; most of the 
municipalities exhibit employment decline by more than 10 jobs due to the regulations 
implemented by a limited number of towns.  This expanding negative effect is also clearly 
demonstrated in figure 5.16, that shows the long-run effects of the regulations on region-wide 
employment level.  More specifically, net employment loss in the entire region will reach about 
5,500 (approximately 0.1% of total employment) in 2040, if year-by-year population growth rates 
are bounded at 5% continuously in the 26 municipalities, due to the regulations.  The figure also 
indicates that the magnitude of the effect depends on the degree of restrictiveness of the 
regulations.     
  
 
 
 
Figure 5.15. The Effects of the Regulations (Upper Limit: 5%) on Employment by Municipality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15. The Long-Run Effects of the Regulations on Regional Employment  
The Net Employment Effect in 2040 
 
The Net Employment Effect in 2006 
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Long Run Effects of the Regulations
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Figure 5.16. The Long-Run Effects of the Regulations on Regional Employment  
 
Another finding to be noted is that some municipalities appear to achieve employment gains, 
compared to the baseline in 2040.  Interestingly, the municipality, which achieves the largest job 
gain, is the Sugar Grove Village, one of the towns where population growth is limited by its land 
use regulation.   As demonstrated in figure 5.17, although the village experiences a large negative 
effect in a short- and mid-term with a peak loss by about 1,500 in 2025, thereafter, the net effect 
starts to decline; and, at the end, its 2040 employment level with the land use regulation is greater 
than that in the baseline projection.  This can be partly explained when attention is paid to the 
population growth trajectories of the village (figure 5.18).  In the baseline scenario, its population 
rises very rapidly until 2025, but then is stagnant, perhaps due to the depletion of developable 
land which is found as an important determinant of local population increase in the modified 
RDAM estimation.  Given this baseline trajectory, if the pace of population growth is controlled 
by the land use regulation, the village will be able to maintain the comparative advantage of 
larger developable land, which may be its major growth momentum, for a longer period of time 
and achieve extra population and employment growth in the long run.  In this sense, the land use 
control can be a strategic action to enhance the long-run local growth.  However, from the 
perspective of the region as a whole, such strategic behaviors of individual local governments 
may not be favorable, as confirmed by the found significant regional employment loss.  
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Employment Growth Trajectories of Sugar Grove Village
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Figure 5.17. Employment Growth Trajectories of Sugar Grove Village 
 
 
Population Growth Trajectories of Sugar Grove Village
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Figure 5.18. Population Growth Trajectories of Sugar Grove Village 
 
Table 5.8 summarizes the effects of minimum-lot-size requirements and permit caps on main 
macroeconomic variables in the case of 5% upper limit.  Consistent with the expectation, 
population, which is directly limited by the regulations, show the greatest percentage loss 
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compared to the baseline.  Although the magnitudes are smaller, the negative effects are found in 
all other variables, such as GRP, production, employment, and income.  Particularly, as in the 
case of the prior experiments, local sectors’ losses are larger than Manufacturing, which is 
relatively less dependent on household spending and local governments’ expenditures.  As 
demonstrated above, the regional economy will be affected more significantly if the regulations 
are implemented in a more restrictive manner.  The larger impact is also probable, when a greater 
number of municipalities in the region use such reactive land use regulations for their own 
interests, as opposed to considering the overall region’s prosperity.  
 
Table 5.8. Macroeconomic Effects of the Regulations: Baseline vs. Upper Limit: 5% 
 
 Year 2040 
 
Year 2005 
Baseline 
Upper Limit: 
5% 
Net Effect % 
GRP 404,448 832,890 832,451 -438 -0.05% 
Population 8,449,379 10,305,923 10,260,947 -44,976 -0.44% 
Total Output 921,052 1,851,569 1,850,418 -1,151 -0.06% 
Employment 4,813,568 6,309,561 6,304,096 -5,466 -0.09% 
   Construction (Sector 5) 269,899 324,307 323,968 -338 -0.10% 
   Manufacturing (Sector 6~23) 455,135 346,076 345,951 -125 -0.04% 
   Trade (Sector 24~25) 974,122 1,169,071 1,167,585 -1,486 -0.13% 
   FIRE (Sector 34~35) 541,939 752,546 752,246 -300 -0.04% 
   Service (Sector 36~45) 1,983,305 2,877,071 2,874,330 -2,741 -0.10% 
   All Other Sectors 589,168 840,491 840,016 -475 -0.06% 
Personal Income 362,000 682,226 681,945 -282 -0.04% 
Note: All monetary values are in 2005 chained million dollars. 
 
 
5.5. Summary & Discussion 
 
This study develops a new integrated multi-level simulation model, a spatial REIM, in which 
local- and lower-level dynamics are incorporated into a coupling-type REIM in a reciprocal 
interactive manner, as opposed to a top-down allocation process.  The integration of the multi-
level variables in a single framework expands the capabilities of the conventional REIM, which is 
a macroeconomic tool as it stands by facilitating the development of local-level forecasting and 
analysis.  
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In addition, with the established feedback connections from local layer to region-wide variables, 
the spatial REIM can support the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of local actions, 
particularly land use policies, for which most existing models based on a strict top-down 
approach, has limited usefulness. 
 
The spatial REIM was applied to the Chicago metropolitan area in which about three hundred 
municipalities with their own local government authorities of, but highly interconnected with 
each other as a part of the large single economic system.  Furthermore, the applied model is used 
to assess the macroeconomic effects of reactive land use regulations (i.e. minimum-lot-size 
requirements and building caps), which have been implemented in some suburban communities 
in the region.  From the impact analyses, it was found that the regulations that bind local housing 
supply and population growth within the jurisdictions: 
1) generate negative impacts, spread out over space and the economy through the labor 
supply chains and inter-industry linkages. 
2) dampen the pace of regional economic growth considerably, although the actions are 
sometimes favorable to the long-run prosperity of the implementing, individual  
municipalities.   
3) tend to induce disproportionate impacts on different sectors of the economy – i.e. local 
sectors, which heavily depend on household expenditures, are affected more seriously.    
4) induce effects that vary substantially by the location of the implementation.    
 
Although the new model and the impact analyses provide additional analytical capabilities for 
planning practices and a better understanding of the economic implications of land use 
regulations respectively, this study is not without limitations.  First of all, when local growth 
dynamics are modeled in the Chicago application, attention is only paid to aggregated population 
and employment, as opposed to population by group and employment by sector.  Without 
appropriate consideration of the heterogeneity among various groups of households and 
businesses, the model cannot effectively describe the complexity inherent in mobility and 
location decision-making processes that vary significantly by industry, firm size, population 
cohort, and income group.  However, expanding the complexity of the system may generate 
instability in the model, as the number of structured equations in the modified RDAM is 
increased to capture increased heterogeneity.  
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In addition, the linear fashion of the RDAM formulation, adopted to model the local growth 
dynamics, is not ideal for describing the intrinsic non-linearity of a dynamic metropolitan system.  
Again, the challenge is the model stability, which is more difficult to be attained with non-linear 
forms of dynamic equations.   
 
Moreover, the present version of the spatial REIM employs a modified RDAM, where the spatial 
interdependence is represented by a fixed spatial weight matrix, even though it is questionable 
that the matrix is a proper representation of true interdependence among municipalities over a 
long period of forecast years.  The simple cell-level updating module, as opposed to a more 
advanced simulation method, is another limitation of the present application.  Generally poor 
availability of local level economic data is also a challenge to be overcome to better calibrate the 
model. 
  
Future research will seek to figure out the effective ways to address these limitations and 
challenges in modeling and applications.  It is expected that the model will be improved and 
become a more competitive analytical tool to fully describe the complexity and dynamics of 
spatial economic systems.  Then, it will be able to better support various impact and policy 
analyses and facilitate informed decision makings.   
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6. SUMMARY & DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.1. Summary of the Overall Dissertation Research  
 
While changes in the regional economy are sometimes taken into account in connection with land 
use changes and the evolution of spatial structure, the reverse connection is rarely, if at all, 
studied.  To address this shortcoming, throughout the three pieces of research as well as a 
literature review in this dissertation, I examine how a regional economy is influenced by 
interventions in land development which significantly affect its property markets and overall 
spatial structure.   
 
The first study empirically analyzes the potential negative effect of strict land use regulations on 
household residential mobility.  Here, a correlation analysis first reveals that the metropolitan 
areas, where strict land use regulations were implemented in late 1980s, are more likely to exhibit 
a lower correlation between intraregional population and employment changes and an increasing 
mean commuting time between 1990 and 2000.  In addition, the spatial econometric analysis 
using a regional disequilibrium adjustment framework shows a lower population adjustment rate 
in the regulated regions, which implies lower household mobility in the areas.  The findings 
suggest that strict regulatory barriers to land development may freeze the local housing supply 
and dampen household residential mobility within the region.  The affected mobility itself may 
indicate the reduced utility of residents.  Further, it induces greater spatial mismatches and longer 
commuting, which may significantly reduce the efficiency in the operation of the regional 
economic system.     
  
In contrast, the second study empirically investigates the potential contribution of land use 
planning to uncertainty reduction and a more economically efficient use of land by focusing on 
the case of urban fringe land markets where agricultural production is operated under the 
uncertainties regarding the timing of potential land development for urban uses.  According to the 
analysis of land use data in Oregon, the UGBs seem to inform farmland owners’ decision making.  
Furthermore, a cross-sectional regression analysis using data for 82 single-county MSAs detects a 
positive effect of UGB on agricultural investment levels, suggesting the real contribution of the 
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UGB to uncertainty reduction.  The UGB’s effect is found to be statistically significant where 
larger shares of livestock and fruit are produced so that farmers are more likely to require 
information regarding the timing of development to reduce the risk of overinvestment. 
 
The third study assesses the macroeconomic effects of minimum-lot-size requirements and 
building permit caps that have been implemented by some of the suburban communities in the 
Chicago metropolitan area.  This is accomplished by employing a new integrated simulation 
model in which region-wide, local, and cell-level variables are interacted with each other in a 
reciprocal manner, as opposed to traditional ‘top down’ approach.  The restrictive regulations are 
found to impede regional economic growth by constraining local housing supply and population 
growth within the places, although the regulations sometimes enhance the long-run prosperity of 
the implementing, individual municipalities.    
 
  
6.2. Policy Implications of the Findings 
  
The implications of the findings for land use planning and policy reform appear great.  By 
showing some empirical analysis outcomes that suggest the negative effect of strict land use 
regulations on local housing supply and household residential mobility, the study on land use 
regulations and intraregional job-people interactions cautions land use planners or policy makers.  
Also the study raises an important issue: how can we minimize the delay of the development 
process and impact on housing supply, while maintaining the contribution of interventions to 
addressing market failures and realizing a well-organized spatial structure?  Is it desirable to add 
another layer of regulation (e.g. mixed use zoning or affordable housing requirements) to deal 
with the problem?  Alternatively, do we need to remove some of the regulatory barriers?  What 
type of institutional reform will be effective in shortening the delay of the development process?  
Do we need to advocate market-based approaches over traditional location-specific regulations?  
Future research that tackles such questions may be helpful for shedding light on this important 
issue. 
 
The second study emphasizes the benefits of land use planning practice with respect of 
information production and distribution, which have been largely ignored.  Given that land 
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markets and development processes generally bear significant transaction costs due to intrinsic 
uncertainties, we need to pay more attention to how we can reduce the uncertainty and realize a 
more efficient development process and land use effectively through land use planning practice.  
In this regard, planners need to make an effort to identify and target the situations in which 
uncertainties and transaction costs prevent an efficient use of land resources.  For instance, they 
need to think about why many brownfield sites are less likely to be redeveloped.  Do we have to 
facilitate redevelopment only by using financial incentives?  Or, can we deal with the problem 
effectively by addressing the lack and asymmetry of information regarding the sites?  Moreover, 
we need to seek a better institutional arrangement in which information is more efficiently 
produced and distributed.  
 
The third research also provides some lessons for planners and policy makers.  Given that land 
use controls in a particular municipality are found to have significant effects on other places and 
the overall regional economy, land use planning practice and regulation enforcement at local level 
needs to be better coordinated and conducted with proper consideration of region-wide concerns.  
This is required not only for unregulated places but also for the municipality itself, because every 
locality as a part of the regional economic system, highly interrelated with each other, so that a 
negative effect spilling over to others is likely to return.  The third study highlights the analytic 
needs for dealing with the interrelationships among municipalities and ‘land use – regional 
economy’ interactions.  Without an analytic tool, in which the behavior of a spatial economic 
system is well described, it is difficult to assess the potential effects of various policy options and, 
consequently, hard to attain informed policy decision making that is essential not only for 
effective land use management but also for regional economic development. 
 
One final point to be stressed is that the economic consequences of land use planning and 
regulations are found to highly depend on context.  As presented in the study on the contribution 
of land use planning to uncertainty reduction, the UGB’s positive effect on agricultural 
investment is more likely to be realized in the regions where the items that require a large amount 
of sunk costs and a long period of operation are mainly cultivated.  The real economic benefits of 
the UGB in farmland use may be very small in crop-dominant contexts, although its contribution 
with many other aspects would exist.  In addition, as discussed and demonstrated in chapter 5, the 
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effect of minimum-lot-size requirements and permit caps significantly vary by the location and 
time of the intervention.   
 
This suggests that linking land use planning and regulation to economic development requires 
context-based management of land use that promotes potential positive effects and/or dampens 
negative effects of interventions rather than simply reducing government interventions in land 
development or trying to articulate a one-size-fits-all policy approach.  To achieve a more 
systematic coordination of economic development and land use planning, attention needs to be 
paid to how and why policy outcomes vary by context.  In what circumstances are containment 
programs more likely to bring a greater efficiency gains in public service provision or 
agglomeration benefits, rather than generating housing affordability problems?  When does 
mixed-use zoning really contribute to reducing auto-based travel, rather than merely acting as an 
additional regulatory barrier?  To what degree and how can state or regional government bodies 
lead and guide local land use planning practices in order to facilitate the systematic cooperation 
of localities, rather than harming local autonomy?  Future research to answer such questions is 
needed in order to fully understand the relationship between land use policies and regional 
economic development. 
 
 
6.3. Limitations and Future Research 
 
The present dissertation research finds a set of significant causal links from land use to the 
performance of regional economy.  In addition, as explained above, the findings provide 
meaningful policy lessons and highlight the issues that need to be considered in order for us to 
improve current land use planning practice.  However, the studies are not without limitations.   
 
As noted in chapter 3, the first study suffers from the invalid estimation outcomes for many 
metropolitan areas, so that the results are not fully conclusive.  In addition, the causality (i.e. 
whether the strict land use regulations are really responsible for the lower household mobility in 
the areas or not) is still remaining untested, although the evidence suggests that this may be the 
case.  The design of the spatial econometric analysis, where only aggregate population and 
employment are considered, also needs to be extended to better assess heterogeneous household 
 
 
 
125 
and business mobility and their location choices.  Moreover, the measurement of the land use 
regulations, namely a single index, is another limitation of the study to be improved in the future 
research.   
 
Similar limitations exist in the second study.  Although the UGB may qualitatively differ by 
regions, the UGB establishment practice is considered by using a single dummy variable.  The 
use of investment in “machinery and equipment” as dependent variable is also an unsatisfactory 
feature of the regression analysis, stemming from the data availability, because this type of 
investment is relatively less irreversible compared to long-term soil improvement or building 
construction for agricultural purposes.   
 
Although the third study develops a new analytic framework, which can be employed for the 
economic impact analysis of local land use policies, the Chicago application as well as the model 
itself needs to be extended in many respects, as discussed in the discussion part of chapter 5.  
Particularly, the spatial REIM can better support planning practices, once it can properly deal 
with various groups of households and businesses, the non-linearity of growth dynamics, the 
evolving spatial interdependence among the municipalities of interest, etc.   
 
Future research will strive toward overcoming these limitations of each study.  Further, attention 
also will be paid to the policy questions derived from the findings of these studies.  By doing this, 
it will be possible to obtain a better understanding of the ‘bottom-up’ causal connections of how a 
change or intervention in land use influences regional economic performance.  Then, land use 
planning practice and economic development initiatives can be coordinated more systematically, 
leading a more complete realization of urban development that is economically prosperous and, at 
the same time, ecologically sustainable.  
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